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Hugh M. Davidson 
In the six studies which make up this volume, Mr. 
Davidson has sought to do four things: (1) to recover 
the crucial steps in the attempt to reconstitute rhetoric 
as a discipline for France and the French language in the 
seventeenth century; (2) to analyze the opposition to 
that attempt, as it appears in the Logique of Port-Royal; 
(3) to show how Pascal, starting from principles like 
those of the Port-Royalists, invented an art of persuasion 
which is reflected in the Lettres provinciales, especially, 
but also in the Pensées; and (4) to compare and con­
trast the ways in which one theme or factor in rhetorical 
theory — the audience — becomes specified in the minds 
of Corneille, Racine, and Molière as they write and 
defend their dramatic works. 
In the adventures of rhetoric in seventeenth-century 
France, the historian of ideas and methods uncovers the 
results of a persistent effort to renew and rebuild one of 
the great intellectual techniques invented by the ancients, 
and to do so in face of attacks from expert controversial­
ists for whom the future belonged to logic. The historian 
of literature finds in the documents principles of interest 
to him, for they make it possible to see in criticism now 
three centuries old signs of life and coherence instead of 
a curious taste for arbitrary pronouncements. They open 
to him, moreover, an important factor in some of the 
great creative minds of the century. In several ways and 
degrees this rhetorical discipline was actualized in the 
energies of Pascal, Corneille, Racine, and Molière. That 
it played a part in their ways of stating and solving their 
problems is no doubt one of the surest signs of its lasting 
power and greatness. 
Hugh M. Davidson is professor of romance languages 
at the Ohio State University. 
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Preface 
IN THE SIX STUDIES which make up most of the present 
volume, I have tried to do four things: ( i  ) to recover the 
crucial steps in the attempt to reconstitute rhetoric as a disci­
pline for France and for the French language in the seven­
teenth century (Chapters I-II); (2) to analyze the opposition 
to that attempt, as it appears in the Logique of Port-Royal 
(Chapters III—IV); (3) to show how Pascal, starting from 
principles like those of the Port-Royalists, invented an art of 
persuasion which is reflected in the Lettres provinciales 
especially, but also in the Pensées (Chapter V); and (4) to 
compare and contrast the ways in which one theme or factor 
in rhetorical theory—the audience—becomes specified in the 
minds of Corneille, Racine and Molière as they write and 
defend their dramatic works (Chapter VI). In a final chapter 
I have summarized my findings and have pointed out some of 
their literary implications in the seventeenth century. 
In connection with the first of these aims, I have been 
obliged to choose from a multitude of relevant documents 
found in the Bibliothèque Nationale and elsewhere. The 
small number studied here have as a common feature a con­
cern for rhetoric as a technical discipline that can be set down 
in a treatise; they are not occasional pieces that exemplify or 
use some particular aspect or device of rhetoric. My first two 
chapters contain, therefore, an account of the chief phases-
translation, adaptation and reformulation—through which the 
ancient scientia bene dicendi passed in the period extending 
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roughly from 1635 to 1685. It is here, perhaps, that the 
reason for the general title of this book is clearest, for at every 
turn in the theoretical study of rhetoric one encounters the 
three notions of audience, words, and art (in its personified 
form, speaker or writer), so interrelated that changes or effects 
in the first are traceable to causes in the other two, that is, 
in materials and techniques. 
In my next main section, comprising Chapters III and IV, 
I have brought together and discussed evidence showing that 
Arnauld and Nicole intended to replace rhetoric by logic. 
Their project, based on Cartesianism, calls for innovation and 
for departure from tradition rather than for guidance from 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, such as that sought by my 
first group of thinkers. As an intellectual center hostile to 
rhetoric, Port-Royal is thus set against the Academy, which 
was certainly the main base of those who wished to think 
and write according to lines laid down by ancient teachers 
of eloquence. 
In treating seventeenth-century theorists and their Greek 
or Latin predecessors and in treating the conflict between the 
Port-Royalists and the upholders of the traditional rhetoric, 
my effort has been to go beyond confrontations on matters of 
detail. I have attempted to uncover principles and to give 
some sense of their consequences within the frameworks 
established by logic and rhetoric as disciplines. Such a treat­
ment makes it possible for one to see through these seven­
teenth-century discussions to certain permanent possibilities 
of method that have not been, and indeed, cannot be, ex­
hausted: for example, Rapin realized some of those possi­
bilities in his particular way, as Quintilian had done in his 
fashion; and as later thinkers have shown, intellectual com­
mitment and inventiveness are all that is needed for further 
elaborations. I have referred briefly to this point in Chapter 
IV; as a matter of fact, the somewhat paradoxical idea of 
viu 
PREFACE 
rhetoric as a permanent possibility having various historical 
realizations underlies all that I have done here. (The same 
thing is true, of course, of logic.) 
The relationship of disciplines or theories to literature is 
a delicate matter. Theories do not lead by some deductive 
process to works in their particularity, but they may explain 
the generic or common aspects of works, and beyond that, 
they define the field in or against which the author exercises 
his freedom of choice as to the end and means of his activity. 
I have studied this relationship in some detail in my two 
chapters on Pascal and on the major dramatists. To take the 
outstanding instance, the Provinciales, in certain of their 
fundamental characteristics, are what they are because of 
Pascal's geometrically inspired art of persuasion; he shows 
us what an intellectual position much like that of the authors 
of the Port-Royal logic will give when it is applied in a 
literary context. Similarly, one finds in the critical writings 
(essays, prefaces, epistles, and so on) of Corneille, Racine, 
and Molière many reminders of the rhetorical slant generally 
assumed by literary creation in the seventeenth century. I 
have studied one of these—the preoccupation with the audi­
ence and its tastes and its reactions—a propos of each of the 
dramatists and have found that each has his own manner 
of coping with his audience and, in his mind's eye, his own 
way of defining it. These two chapters (V and VI) present, 
therefore, two specifications in and around literature of prin­
ciples drawn from seventeenth-century logic and rhetoric. 
I am indebted to many friends and colleagues (at Dart­
mouth, at the Ohio State University, and elsewhere), with 
whom I have discussed almost everything that follows here; 
to the members of the committee who made it possible for 
me to spend a year in Paris as a Fulbright Research Scholar 
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and to gather there the materials for Chapters I-IV; to Dart­
mouth College for grants to cover various incidental expenses; 
and to the Ohio State University for allowing me free time 
in which to complete this book. Without, of course, involving 
him in any way in the responsibility for my analyses and con­
clusions, I wish especially to acknowledge the assistance 
given me by Professor Richard McKeon, of the University 
of Chicago, whose penetrating essays and friendly suggestions 
have helped me a great deal. 
HUGH M. DAVIDSON 
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Chapter 1 
Problem and Solutions (I) 
N SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE the truly significant pe­
riod of development for rhetoric begins in 1635 with the 
founding of the Academy. It is often wrong to emphasize 
dates in anything as complex and fluid as literary and intel­
lectual history, but it is clear that in this case the date marks 
the start of a long alliance between rhetoric and official French 
policy. For the next fifty years, approximately speaking, no 
one could doubt the connection between the Academy and 
its program, on the one hand, and, on the other, what the 
monarchy and its ministers planned for France. Richelieu 
was, of course, the first patron of the group. In 1642, 
Pierre Séguier, chancelier de France and an intimate of 
the Cardinal, of Anne d'Autriche, and of Louis XIV, suc­
ceeded to the post. Thirty years later, at the death of Séguier, 
Louis XIV declared himself the protector of the Academy 
and set aside a place in the Louvre for its séances, Colbert 
interested himself directly in its work: it is known that he 
tried to stimulate its members to greater zeal and speed in 
their tasks than they sometimes showed. To recall these names 
is enough to indicate the kind of support given to the institu­
tion and the degree of importance attached to its program. 
From the outset, the work of the Academy—as one may 
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see from the lettres patentes, the first deliberations, the early 
discourses read at the meetings, and from other references-
was linked in one way or another with the notion of elo­
quence. In the official documents, Louis XIII declared: 
"Qu'après avoir fait tant d'exploits mémorables nous n'avions 
plus qu'à ajouter les choses agréables aux nécessaires, et 
l'ornement à l'utilité; et qu'il [Richelieu] jugeait que nous 
ne pouvions mieux commencer que par le plus noble de tous 
les arts, qui est l'éloquence."1 
The term reappeared as the members sought to define 
their task: "Dès la seconde assemblée, sur la question qui 
fut proposée de sa fonction [i.e., de l'Académie], M. Chape­
lain représenta qu'à son avis elle devait être de travailler à la 
pureté de notre langue; et de la rendre capable de la plus 
haute éloquence. . . ."2 In his projet, Chapelain repeated 
his view that the aim of the Academy was to make eloquence 
possible—this time it is "la dernière éloquence"—and went 
on to say that two ample treatises were needed, a rhetoric 
and a poetic. These would provide rules for writers in prose 
and in verse. But it would be impossible to compose them 
until a treatise on grammar was ready, since the grammar, 
as he conceived it, would furnish the body of the language, 
the necessary basis to which one might add the "ornaments 
of oratory and the figures of poetry."3 Moreover, prior to 
all these tasks lay that of compiling a dictionary, a treasury 
of elements out of which the rest could be constructed. 
As is evident, the idea of a cumulative series is what gives 
the plan its force: each of the verbal disciplines furnishes, by 
the investigation of its characteristic problems, the bases of the 
following one. At one end of the sequence is a collection of 
words tested but as yet unused (theoretically speaking); at 
the other end is the kind of knowledge (that is, poetics) 
needed for the most elaborate kind of expression. 
The efforts to realize this logical scheme met over the 
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years many obstacles: the irregular schedule of the séances; 
poor attendance; the unwieldiness of the group; the pull of 
activities other than those outlined in the program; the criti­
cisms and ironies of those on the "outside." But finally, after 
an interval of approximately sixty years, the Dictionary ap­
peared in 1694. The preface of that work recalled the original 
program, without making any promises as to when the series 
of treatises would be finished. 
One might conclude, therefore, that the grammar, the 
rhetoric, and the poetics had not been and never would be 
realized: the grand undertaking had failed. 
However, I believe it possible to say, without simply in­
dulging in paradox, that the whole plan had been effectively 
carried out. The official grammar, rhetoric, and poetics, in 
so far as they were write-able at all, had been composed 
through a curious combination of logic and favorable circum­
stances. Obviously the realization of the tasks could not wait 
until 1694 or thereafter. By that time basic moral and artistic 
attitudes had undergone a change. Leading critics were mov­
ing toward what was to become the Encyclopedists' conception 
of art works as products of the imagination. The terms of the 
discussion were arising out of psychological rather than tech­
nical considerations. Moreover, Louis XIV's regime, no longer 
a stable background against which literature might emerge 
as a splendid ornament, provided more and more subjects for 
critical analysis and for satire. 
But to return to my main point: the intellectual task of 
realizing treatises on language and its literary uses had been 
done, not by the Academy as a group, but by individuals who 
were members of it or who worked obviously from the 
starting points that Chapelain had originally outlined.4 In 
other words, there was in the middle decades of the century 
a widely-held view, more an attitude than a theory, that had 
been made explicit by the Academy. As I have suggested, it is 
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the conviction that literature is work with words according 
to distinct methods that lend themselves to explicit and even 
systematic treatment.5 To those who wished to pursue the 
matter further, this constituted a way of asking the ques­
tions; and writers like Vaugelas, Rapin, Boileau, and Bouhours 
worked out as best they could—as individuals—the conse­
quences of this basic attitude. 
Vaugelas' Remarques sur la langue française of 1647 falls 
on the borderline between grammar and rhetoric. One will 
not find in it, of course, anything like a systematic presenta­
tion of the topics associated with grammar, although many 
of the materials for such a treatment are definitely present, 
and Vaugelas himself believes that he has given answers tc 
the outstanding questions of word forms and syntax. The 
strong emphasis on usage, which he describes in the Preface 
as "the King, the tyrant, the arbiter, the master of languages," 
indicates clearly the grammatical aspect or tendency of his 
work. He thinks of himself, not as a legislator, but as a wit­
ness, one who wishes to describe, in his well-known phrase, 
". . . la façon de parler de la plus saine partie de la cour, 
conformément à la façon d'écrire de la plus saine partie des 
auteurs de ce temps."6 I do not mean to imply, of course, 
that his description is purely objective or purely factual. The 
quotation shows his normative bias; and where the facts fail 
him, he falls back on reason, that is, where usage is doubt­
ful, he argues by analogy from it in order to arrive at a 
preferred word or form. 
The real centers of interest for him, however, take him 
over the boundaries of grammar into rhetoric. The two tech­
nical notions in the light of which he works are pureté and 
netteté of language. These two qualities are the bases of elo­
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quence, he tells Séguier in the dedicatory epistle, and he 
restates the point many times before the Remarques are con­
cluded. In other words, he is looking beyond grammar to 
the ultimate use of language; or, to put it in another way, 
in writing his grammar, he looks for guidance toward rhet­
oric, a discipline higher on the scale of verbal arts. As a mat­
ter of fact, it is obvious that Quintilian, the teacher of elo­
quence, is at the origin of Vaugelas' distinction. 
Un langage pur, est ce que Quintilien appelle emendata 
oratio et un langage net, ce qu'il appelle dilucida oratio. Ce sont 
deux choses si différentes, qu'il y a une infinité de gens, qui 
écrivent nettement, c'est-à-dire clairement et intelligiblement 
en toutes sortes de matières, s'expliquant si bien qu'à la simple 
lecture on conçoit leur intention, et néanmoins il n'y a rien de 
si impur que leur langage. [Remarques, pp. 577-78.] 
Again, in his long article on équivoques, Vaugelas refers spe­
cifically to Quintilian's chapter "De perspicuitate" in Book 
VIII of the Institutio oratoria. And for another clear sign of 
the degree to which the rhetorical vocabulary dominates the 
thinking of Vaugelas, note the diction of the following lines 
from the Preface, where he lists subjects an author might 
have treated in connection with the French language. The 
leading ideas appear in the traditional, cumulative order that 
runs from correctness through elegance to rhythm. 
Après cela il eût encore fait voir qu'il n'y a jamais eu de 
langue où l'on écrit plus purement et plus nettement qu'en la
nôtre, qui soit plus ennemie des équivoques et de toute sorte
d'obscurité, plus grave et plus douce tout ensemble, plus propre 
pour toute sorte de styles, plus chaste en ses locutions, plus judicieuse en sesfigures, qui aime plus l'élégance et l'ornement,
mais qui craigne plus l'affection. Enfin il eût fait voir au'il n'y
en a point qui observe plus le nombre et la cadence aans ses
périodes, que la nôtre, en quoi consiste la véritable marque de la
perfection des langues. [Préface, Remarques, p. 3, § xv.] 
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A similar passage occurs at the end of the Remarques, in 
the very last paragraph, in fact: 
A la pureté, et à la netteté du style, il y a encore d'autres 
parties à ajouter, la propreté des mots et des phrases, l'élégance, 
la douceur, la majesté, la force, et ce qui résulte de tout cela, 
l'air et la grâce, qu'on appelle le je ne sais quoi, où le nombre, la 
brièveté et la naïveté de l'expression, ont encore beaucoup de 
part. [Remarques, p. 593.] 
The tying of purity and clarity of language on to the order 
of stylistic qualities traditionally followed by the rhetoricians 
is already unmistakable, but Vaugelas goes on to make the 
connection explicit. It is not for him, he says, to treat these 
other subjects: they exceed his powers; they require no less 
than a "Quintilien français." At the end of the Preface, just 
after the lines I have quoted above, he returns to the need 
for such a master. In fact, Vaugelas has a candidate in mind. 
He allows himself a short nominating speech, tactfully 
omitting, however, the name of the nominee: "La gloire en 
est réservée toute entière à une personne qui médite depuis 
quelque temps notre rhétorique, et à qui rien ne manque pour 
exécuter un si grand dessein. . . .  " Vaugelas period flows 
on. His candidate is a product of Athens and Rome, as well 
as of Paris; his eloquence bears the mark of the best minds 
of those three famous cities; he is one of the great ornaments 
of the bar and of the Academy, one whose tongue and whose 
pen are equally eloquent. . . . "C'est celui qui doit être ce 
Quintilien français, que j'ai souhaité à la fin de mes Remar­
ques' (Préface, Remarques, p. 3, §XV). 
In summary, then, one may say that the Remarques of 
Vaugelas stem directly from the conception of literary dis­
ciplines which the Academy had expressed in its early plans.7 
Although his work does, indeed, fall mainly in the domain 
of grammar, he defines or understands grammar as the basis 
8
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of rhetorical elaboration. Occasionally he touches on subjects 
usually associated with rhetoric. Still, he feels that the big 
questions there, especially those dealing with the beauties 
of elocution, will have to be treated by another hand. And, 
as we have seen, he knows someone "qui médite depuis 
quelque temps notre rhétorique." 
Pellisson and d'Olivet furnish in their history the key to 
the identity of the man Vaugelas had in mind. He was 
Olivier Patru, an avocat au Parlement, who was received 
into the Academy in 1640. A lawyer who had once had great 
success at the bar, he became, as time passed, more and more 
preoccupied with language and letters. He is supposed to 
have helped Vaugelas with his Remarques.8 He was an im­
portant collaborator, along with Rapin and Bouhours, on the 
Dictionnaire of Richelet. According to Bouhours, whose 
opinion is reported by Pellisson and d'Olivet, he was " . .  . 
l'homme du Royaume qui savait le mieux notre langue."9 And 
he knew it not simply as a grammarian, but as an orator, we 
are told.10 The passage at the end of Vaugelas' Preface, from 
which I have quoted above, is recalled: 
Une si rare louange s'adresse à M. Patru; et c'est lui qui devait 
être ce Quintilien français, que Vaugelas souhaite à la fin de ses 
remarques. 
On le regardait effectivement comme un autre Quintilien, 
comme un oracle infaillible en matière de goût et de critique. 
Tous ceux qui sont aujourd'hui nos maîtres par leurs écrits 
se firent honneur d'être ses disciples. [Histoire, II, 177.] 
The reputation of infallibility is somewhat shaken for us 
by two bits of advice that Patru gave. He is the "maître de 
notre éloquence" to whom La Fontaine refers in the preface 
to his fables,11 and this master, on hearing of La Fontaine's 
plan of doing his fables in verse, warned the poet against 
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the idea, because he believed that the genre required some­
thing like the brevity and dryness of Aesop's prose. On 
another occasion, he advised Boileau that the art of poetry 
could not be elaborated in a poetic form: it was not a "matière 
susceptible d'ornement" (Histoire, p. 178). 
Indeed, where his own work was concerned, Patru seems 
to have been a victim of this critical and negative tempera­
ment. Nothing ever came of his plan to produce the French 
rhetoric. At his death, a projet informe was found, but that 
was all. "Il n'était pas homme d'un grand travail," say Pellis­
son and d'Olivet, and they add: "D'ailleurs le soin excessif 
qu'il apportait à la correction de ses ouvrages, lui donnait le 
temps de vieillir sur une période. Le mal est que ses affaires 
domestiques en souffrirent, et qu'à la fin il fut durement vexé 
par ses créanciers."12 
If Patru had lived up to the expectations of Vaugelas and 
had composed a rhetoric that was authentically French, he 
would no doubt have had even more influence than he seems 
to have had, anyway. He embodied the aspiration of the 
Academy toward regular eloquence. He worked to revive 
and continue the ancient rhetorical tradition—too piously, one 
may say, and yet not without tact or independence. No one 
knows precisely what his doctrine was or might have been. 
However, we find some indication of it in a letter to the 
"Révérend Père *** de la compagnie de Jésus" that is pub­
lished in his Oeuvres. 
In this letter he takes up an important subject: the very 
possibility of éloquence in the seventeenth century. It had 
been argued that neither the materials nor the occasions for 
oratory such as that of Demosthenes or Cicero existed any 
longer. Patru replies that a certain degree of moral and in­
tellectual development, that is, a particular state of moeurs 
and of esprits, must be present for it: this is presupposed 
by all the rest, since it results in efforts to cultivate and per­
1 0 
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feet language. That said, he takes up the terms of the argu­
ment. He claims that the subjects and opportunities for the 
three ancient types of oratory—judicial, deliberative, and 
demonstrative—do still exist. He even emphasizes the possi­
bility of deliberative oratory, although he is obliged to admit 
that the political regime under which he lives differs widely 
from that of the ancient republics in which deliberative ora­
tory had flourished. Furthermore, we need to recognize, he 
says, that we have in France possibilities that Cicero and 
Demosthenes did not have: the subjects and techniques of 
l'éloquence de la chaire. Then, with what seems to be at 
least a partial return to his original point—the importance of 
moral and intellectual culture—he writes: "Enfin je conclus 
de tout cela que si nous n'avions point d'éloquents, ce n'est 
ni faute de matière, ni faute d'occasion, mais faute ou d'esprit 
ou de travail."13 
According to Pellisson and d'Olivet, the model he set for 
himself was Cicero, and they allow him all the virtues of 
his model except "force et véhémence." His gentleness of 
character precluded these qualities, they say in his defense, 
adding an amiable non sequitur to the effect that one must 
consider the many vices of which he had to purge French 
eloquence. And so, if the age did not have a Quintilian in 
the form of a treatise, it did have one in the flesh, and just 
missed having a Cicero, too. 
There were a number of other and more tangible attempts 
to solve the problem of rhetoric as a discipline to be con­
stituted. The subsequent history of eloquence in the seven­
teenth century provides, in fact, an interesting example of 
the way in which an intellectual question or need comes to 
be widely felt and then acted upon. The logic of the under­
lying literary theory posed the problem with unmistakable 
1 1 
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clarity. But, to be effective, logic had to have help from acci­
dents of birth, training, and circumstance: it was necessary 
to wait for the appearance of an individual able to bring 
about a solution in the form of a treatise. That was the natural 
response to make to the challenge, it seemed, in an age that 
tended to believe strongly in the value of formally conceived 
arts and sciences. 
Eventually two treatises did appear, one in 1659 and the 
other in 1671, both claiming to fill the need that had been 
indicated. What was called for was so obvious that they even 
had identical titles: La Rhétorique française. The first was 
written by René Bary, conseiller et historiographe du Roi, 
the second by the Sieur Le Gras, avocat au Parlement.1* 
Each of these works is placed explicitly in the continuing 
stream of concern for eloquence. The fulsome introduction 
to the treatise of Bary, signed by Le Grand, sieur des Her­
minières, another royal counselor and member of the bar, 
mentions the "promise" of the Academy and the hopes center­
ing on Patru : 
Je ne crois pas, Monsieur, offenser votre modestie, si je dis 
que c'est à vous seul, à qui notre siècle doit entièrement l'élégance 
du discours et la beauté de l'éloquence. . .  . Il y a longtemps 
que la célèbre Académie, la gloire du Royaume, et la maîtresse 
de l'éloquence, nous avait fait la promesse d'une Rhétorique si 
souhaitée. Mais enfin, Monsieur, votre libéralité l'en a pleinement 
acquittée: et nous attendrons avec moins d'impatience que l'élo­
quent Patru joigne sa magnificence à votre libéralité, et, qu'il y 
ajoute l'excès de ses trésors à l'abondance de vos richesses.15 
Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac, he goes on to say, was the first 
to achieve uniformity of style in the French language and to 
discover its possibilities for periodic rhythms, but he credits 
Bary as being the first to formulate the rules with certainty. 
"C'est pourquoi les plus vains et les plus envieux sont con­
traints d'avouer que votre Rhétorique doit régner dans l'empire 
des belles-lettres" (Bary, p. xxxi). 
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In his turn, Le Gras refers twelve years later to previous 
efforts to compose a French rhetoric and to the end of 
Vaugelas' Preface. The author of the Remarques, as capable as 
anyone of doing the job, he says, had left it for someone else 
who had been meditating on it for a long time and who had 
all the needed qualifications. "Mais cette rhétorique prétendue 
étant demeurée sans éclore depuis vingt-quatre ans qu'elle 
a été promise; cela nous doit faire croire que la mort de 
l'auteur, ou quelque autre accident nous a dérobé cet avan­
tage."16 He obviously intends to challenge the "reign" of 
Bary's treatise "in the empire of belles-lettres." He knows his 
predecessor's work, to judge from the slighting remarks he 
makes about a rhetoric " . .  . qui a paru au jour depuis 
quelques années," and from a passage that he quotes dis­
approvingly from Le Grand's extravagant introduction. But 
he evidently has decided to dismiss all previous work as un­
fruitful and as too general. 
When we turn to the examination of these two arts, we 
see some, but not much, originality in the treatments of the 
subject. The authors do attempt to write specifically French 
rhetorics. They know that they must describe the circum­
stances in which eloquence may occur in France in the 
seventeenth century, circumstances necessarily different from 
those to which the classical theories were adjusted. Whenever 
they think of their subject matter in relatively narrow terms, 
that is, when they think of it primarily as oratory, they tend 
to substitute for the ancient division (deliberative, judicial 
and demonstrative or epideictic oratory) the distinction of 
eloquence into that of the chaire and that of the barreau. 
They emphasize the novelty of Christian eloquence, although 
they see in Augustine, if not in their pagan masters, Cicero, 
Quintilian, and Aristotle, a patron and source of instruction. 
The differences in the geniuses of the languages are given 
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special and usually short treatments: French has resources 
not available to Greek and Latin, and vice versa. In the main, 
these comments are grammatical rather than rhetorical. 
On the whole, the two treatises are best thought of as re-
doings of Quintilian, with help from his predecessors and 
followers. That of Le Gras is more comprehensive in this way. 
His work is only an abrégé, he says, although it contains the 
main precepts of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes, 
Augustine, Scaliger, Erasmus, Vossius, "et plusieurs autres." 
(In the seventeenth century, plusieurs usually equals beau-
coup.^) Principally, though, he follows Quintilian, who, in the 
opinion of all those who know, was the "most excellent" master 
or teacher of rhetoric in Rome. But in the cases of both Bary 
and Le Gras, it is clear that they are translating, paraphrasing, 
and popularizing a doctrine already in existence, already hav­
ing its classic exposition. In so doing, they obviously make a 
real contribution to the vitality of the dominant view of litera­
ture and the way in which it is composed. And yet one must 
say more, I think, than that they repeat effectively, along 
with inevitable variation and some originality, what they find 
in their models. Their sense of the tradition they represent 
has to be grasped apart from the details of their treatises. What 
counts for more is their way of conceiving the doctrine as a 
whole and its relations to other disciplines. Bary's préfacer 
makes very broad claims: 
Véritablement, l'art de bien dire, et la souveraine éloquence 
dont je parle, est la plus importante pièce de la Politique; puisque 
c'est elle qui enseigne à persuader les esprits et à fléchir les 
volontés dans les cabinets des Princes, dans les compagnies 
souveraines, dans les temples et dans les armées.17 
Le Grand does not limit the place and power of rhetoric to 
the practical decisions of politics. Taking up the Ciceronian 
ideal of a wedding of wisdom and artistic expression, he finds 
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a place in philosophy for his discipline, not merely as a method 
of exposition, but also as a method leading to the solution of 
problems. Perhaps the most interesting assertion, for the stu­
dent of seventeenth-century literature, is the one that locates 
rhetoric between dialectic and poetry. It may use the reasoning 
techniques of the former while avoiding its abstractness and 
technicality; and it may use rhythm or nombre without precise 
counting of syllables. It is easy, within this framework, to 
move rhetoric toward either of the extremes. Having first 
provided himself with a classical precedent, Le Grand turns 
first toward poetry and then toward logic. 
Nous pouvons encore parler plus nettement, et nous pouvons
dire avec le Stoïque Posidonius que la poésie est une oraison 
nombrée, qui n'est différente de la rhétorique que par la pro­
portion de certaines mesures, et que par l'excès de quelques 
licences; que ces mesures et ces excès ne donnent point
d'atteintes ni de changements à la substance de la chose; et que
la rhétorique peut subsister non seulement dans le nombre des
fictions poétiques et figurées, mais aussi dans la méthode des 
syllogismes épidictiques ou contentieux. [Bary, pp. vii-viii.] 
Here is surely an interesting variation from our original set 
of terms—dictionary, grammar, rhetoric, poetic—where precise 
relationships were not expressed. There was a sequence, fore­
seen in the program, as I have noted, since each of the later 
treatises would depend on the earlier one or ones. But here 
we learn first of rhetoric as a tool in politics and in philosophy, 
where it is widely applicable, and then as a productive art of 
discourse which takes its place between dialectic (or logic) 
and poetry. The mean term differs from the extremes only 
in degree. This is especially true where poetry is involved: 
" . .  . concluons hardiment que la poétique n'est autre 
chose, que la partie la plus contrainte et la plus observée de 
l'art oratoire" (Bary, p. viii). It is reasonable, therefore, to 
say with Cicero that Homer was a great orator, with Her­
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mogenes that he was an excellent rhetorician, and with 
Demetrius that he was the teacher of eloquence. 
Le Grand qualifies this abstract view of poetics as a part 
of rhetoric. As things happened in history, he believes, the 
natural movement was from poetic eloquence, with its original 
burden of laws, moral principles, religious mysteries, and 
secrets of nature, to the looser discipline of eloquence itself. 
By the discovery of the principles of rhetoric, the human 
mind managed to disengage speech from the rules of poetry. 
He applies this myth to the history of French language and 
literature: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries he sees 
the flowering of poetry as leading to the perfecting of prose, as 
opening the way to such things as elegance and ornament. 
(The treatise of Bary could then appear as the climax of this 
evolution in French thought and expression!) 
Le Gras is hardly less bold in his claims for rhetoric. In 
his dedication, which is addressed to Colbert, he says con­
cerning the worth of his subject: 
C'est, Monseigneur, le plus important de tous les arts, la plus
relevée de toutes les sciences humaines, qui enseigne à faire 
servir les autres sciences au commerce de la vie civile, au bien 
et au salut des hommes; les détourner de leurs mauvaises entre­
prises; les consoler dans leurs afflictions; les soutenir dans leurs 
défaillances; et les relever de leur abattement et de leur chute. 
Elle montre comment il faut défendre leurs biens, leur vie et leur 
honneur. Enfin cet art contient les règles nécessaires pour dé­
fendre la vérité, et la faire triompher du mensonge. C'est ce qui
lui a fait donner le titre glorieux de Reine des Sciences.18 
A little later he adds that this queen of the sciences is also 
the most stately and magnificent ornament of any empire. 
He tells, in his preface, of two enthusiasms that motivate 
him. He admired Quintilian as the teacher of rhetoric and 
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he admired Colbert for his efforts to equal the achievements, 
or more exactly the ornaments, of the Greek and Roman 
"empires." Since the greatest of the ornaments is eloquence, 
he felt himself obliged to treat of that art, and to do so 
according to the example of the Latin master. 
In spite of these claims, one senses a defensive tone here 
and there in the Preface. Many people misunderstand the 
position of his science, he says; they put rhetoric after the 
other disciplines instead of before and above them. This in­
adequate conception causes young men to be prejudiced 
against it, to scorn "cet art excellent de la parole." He tries, 
therefore, to explain why the ancients held it in high favor 
and why he wants to help it regain its prestige. 
All this indicates, I think, that by 1670 we are reaching 
a critical point in taste and in theorizing about eloquence. Le 
Gras has composed a treatise based on a model that has lost 
some of the magic it had twenty years before. As we shall 
see, Rapin is already putting together at this same time a 
treatment of eloquence that is not only more independent in 
spirit than that of Le Gras but also more flexible and accessi­
ble than that of Quintilian. And so Le Gras finds himself 
presenting his work to a generation that is somewhat indiffer­
ent to the claims and technicalities of rhetoric. But he remains 
convinced of its educative value. He sees it as inseparable 
from moral virtue—the theme is the ancient one of the vir 
bonus dicendi peritus, fully developed by Quintilian—and he 
concludes: "En un mot, il n'y a point d'ouvrage dans toute 
l'Antiquité plus capable d'éclairer l'esprit, de former le juge­
ment, ni de rendre un homme habile et capable des plus 
grandes choses que les institutions oratoires de Quintilien" 
(Préface, La Rhétorique française, p. xxi). 
Although these epistles and prefaces belong to genres which 
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encourage an inflationary attitude toward the subject at hand, 
they are nevertheless revealing. In them one gets a feeling 
for the connotations and associations that the art of rhetoric 
had at the time when they were composed and, also, a sense 
of individuality in point of view, whereas, once the technical 
parts of the works begin, the sequence of topics follows that 
of Quintilian and Cicero. But I should like in any case to 
review briefly the method and central notions of Le Gras; I 
choose him because he is more orderly and thoroughgoing 
than Bary. 
He starts with an elaborate definition of rhetoric as it is 
seen from five different angles: according to the etymology of 
the word (this takes him back to péo>, pyrwp and /V0/01**?); 
according to the essence of the doctrine (for him expressed 
as "l'art de bien dire"); according to the effects of the art 
(it aims to change or dominate minds through the power of 
speech); according to its parts (it directs the processes of in­
vention, arrangement, expression, retention, and delivery); 
and according to the divisions of the speech itself (it gives 
rules for conciliating the audience in the exordium, for in­
structing it in the narration and in the proofs, and for exciting 
suitable emotions in the peroration). And he reverts to the 
requirement I have already mentioned, that the orator must 
be an homme de bien, " . .  . parce que la rhétorique donnant 
des règles pour traiter un sujet des deux côtés, il faut néces­
sairement que celui qui possède cet art, soit homme de bien, 
pour ne s'en servir qu'à faire triompher la vérité et la justice" 
(La Rhétorique française, pp. 2-3). 
The method falls into four parts for Le Gras (since he 
puts into a single section both memorization and delivery). 
Under the heading of invention, we meet again the inevitable 
distinction of the three genres—demonstrative, deliberative, 
and judicial—which include all possible subjects of discourse. 
Le Gras, himself a lawyer, analyzes the last type in detail, 
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treating of the lieux, the kinds of questions, the problem of 
the passions and how to arouse them. For disposition or ar­
rangement, he goes back to the consecrated terms used in his 
definition and writes a section on exordium, narration, and so 
forth. 
Then comes elocution. Le Gras repeats and develops two 
things that he had already said in a passage of the preface, a 
passage that obviously echoes Vaugelas and Quintilian, 
namely, that elocution or expression is the most important 
and the most difficult part of rhetoric, and that the funda­
mental qualities one must seek are pureté and netteté in 
language.19 The first of these refers, of course, to the sine qua 
non of grammatical correctness. Clarté or netteté concerns 
the applications of words to things; it depends on the propriety 
of language; and here Le Gras enters on a long sevenfold dis­
cussion of how one determines when words are propres or not. 
After these basic virtues or qualities, the writer must look 
to ornamentation, which is taken to be the most important 
part of rhetoric. Since ornamentation is what holds the at­
tention of the listeners and produces admiration in their 
minds, one cannot call eloquent any discourse that lacks it, 
no matter how pure the diction may be or how clear the 
expression. An ornament or figure is any uncommon form of 
expression; applied to a single word, it is a trope (as metaphor 
or onomatopoeia); to more than one word, it becomes either a 
figure de mots (as antithesis or anaphora) or a figure de pensée 
(such as interrogation or doubt). Le Gras insists on the need 
to integrate ornamentation into the fabric of the discourse. 
One does not use it for its own sake. It gives to variety style; 
it makes the subject matter vivid; it affects the emotions of the 
listener or reader; it serves to render the emotions of the 
speaker and hence to promote conviction; it provides, in some 
cases, useful transitions; and finally, it makes possible the 
genre sublime. 
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When he moves on to the subject of "composition," Le Gras 
tries to do something new in French. He understands by this 
term the final fitting together of the speech, especially as 
regards details in the sequence of ideas, words, and sounds. 
This gives him his occasion to treat the qualities of discourse 
that are subject to the judgment of the ear. Before him, he 
claims, no one had discussed composition in this sense. But 
he will attempt it, since Cicero had asserted that the beauty 
of an oratorical piece consists not only in the exactness of the 
words and in the magnificence of the ornaments, but also in 
the final disposition of the words and in their metrical char­
acteristics. Here Le Gras borrows a distinction from Quintilian 
—ordo, junctura, and numerus,20 which he renders as ordre, 
liaison, and nombre. Ordre has to do typically with gradation 
or climax or prerogative in a sequence of ideas. In a develop­
ing expression, for example, he recommends that we normally 
mention day before night and man before woman! Under 
liaison, the typical concern is to remove clashes of vowels or 
other harsh combinations of sounds, so as to leave with the 
listener an impression of smoothness and fullness. Finally 
nombre, a quality depending again on the judgment of the 
ear, refers to the introduction of measure into discourse. It 
must not, however, resemble in a strict way the measure of 
French verse: in prose, verses are a great vice. Le Gras calls 
this effect rime, after the Greek pv6fw<;} he says. He points 
out the ambiguity of the term and the possibility of confusion 
with the end rhymes of French verse. This metrical discussion 
leads to a short section on periods, since the rhetorical period 
is composed of members having some resemblance to verses. 
The chapter heading "De la bienséance ou manière de 
parler juste" signals a new and important turn in the exposi­
tion. Le Gras recalls the opinion of Cicero that this is one of 
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the most important and difficult parts of rhetoric. "En effet, 
la bienséance est ce qui donne plus de grâce et de force à 
l'oraison: tellement que le même Cicéron dit que celui qui 
la sait ménager dans le discours, mérite avec justice le titre 
glorieux d'orateur" (La Rhétorique française, p. 239). The 
phrase parler juste indicates the turn the argument is taking. 
Up to this point, the treatise has given the principles of 
speaking well, of parler bien. The new phrase adds to the 
idea of an intrinsic excellence in thought and expression still 
another quality, the suitability of the speech to factors out­
side of itself, to the audience and to the circumstances in 
which it will be said or read. "La bienséance a quelque rap­
port au devoirs de la civilité, au compliment et à la politesse: 
tellement que ceux qui n'ont pu s'en servir, sont rustiques et 
sauvages" (La Rhétorique française, p. 239). I shall not go 
here into the various divisions of bienséance, as it applies to 
subject matters, ends, manners, person, times, and places, but 
I should like to quote from a page where Le Gras contrasts 
and relates utilité and bienséance: 
Avant de pouvoir achever ce traité, il est nécessaire de 
remarquer en cet endroit que celui qui veut parler juste, doit 
prendre garde que ce qu'il dit soit non seulement utile à son 
sujet, mais aussi bienséant: que ces deux parties sont souvent 
unies, parce que ce qui est bienséant est pareillement utile: qu'il 
arrive néanmoins quelquefois que ces parties sont opposées, et 
qu'alors la bienséance doit prévaloir, et obliger à se taire, dont on 
apporte l'exemple de Socrate, qui aima mieux souffrir la mort par 
une condamnation injuste, que de se servir de l'oraison que 
Lysias avait dressée pour sa défense. . . . [La Rhétorique 
française, pp. 243-44.] 
What the subject demands and what the occasion demands 
may come into conflict. When they do, Le Gras is ready to 
decide the issue in favor of the latter. 
He ends his treatment of elocution with the traditional 
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distinction of the style has, the style médiocre, and the style 
sublime. In a series of analogies or parallels, he first refers 
the styles to the three aims of speech: to instruct, to please, 
and to move. He then assigns to each a typical subject matter: 
relatively unimportant topics like material things or money, 
matters that are "médiocres"—Le Gras obviously has some 
difficulty with this mean term; he repeats it without examples 
—and finally matters of life and death, of state and religion. 
He attempts a differentiation of effects: the hearer follows 
the discourse ("se laisse aller au discours") in the first two 
types or he is moved to tears or other signs of strong feeling 
in the sublime genre. Le Gras thinks that the styles should be 
mingled for variety and relief; in fact any speech, as he con­
ceives it, tends to go through the three styles in succession, 
instructing, pleasing, and moving by turns. It should be said 
in his favor, after this confused and inadequate* formulation 
of a complex matter, that Le Gras recognizes the possibility 
of changes and variations in this order and adds a qualification 
to the effect that one very rarely finds an orator equally good 
in all three styles. 
I have described first the method of Le Gras, although it 
came after that of Bary, because the values and weaknesses 
of the earlier work stand out by comparison. Bary's treatise 
is less complete and less orderly; one can understand the 
feeling of Le Gras that the French rhetoric had not yet been 
written as he surveyed what his predecessors—and in particu­
lar, Bary—had done. For example, Bary treats only of in­
vention, disposition, and expression, whereas Le Gras, with 
more pious regard for his sources, restores memorization and 
delivery, thus keeping to the traditional five parts. A study of 
the analyses proposed by Bary shows that they are drawn from 
the same models—mainly Cicero and Quintilian—as those of 
Le Gras but they are sketchier. The aims (persuader, 
émouvoir, plaire^, the types of oratory, the parts of the 
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harangue, the treatment under elocution of words, phrases, 
figures, periods—all the usual furniture is there, but the effect 
as a whole seems less tidy. Bary does manage an occasional 
touch of humor, which gives some relief from the steady 
and solemn enthusiasm shown by Le Gras for his subject. 
Bary has a feeling for the possibilities of irony in long enumer­
ations. The orator must be, he says, inventive, learned, ju­
dicious, intelligible, diligent, virtuous, observant, and careful 
of his pronunciation. In commenting on the second of these 
qualities, he builds up a period that is not without malice: 
Si la rhétorique est vague et indéterminée; si tout ce qui peut 
tomber sous la connaissance, peut servir de matière à l'oraison, si 
l'on ne dispose des auditeurs, que par la multiplicité des raisons 
et des expériences, des exemples et des autorités; si l'on ne 
triomphe des esprits, que par la connaissance des inclinations et 
des intérêts, des moeurs et des mouvements: il ne sera pas difficile 
de faire voir que l'orateur doit entendre la logique et la méta­
physique, la physique et la morale, la politique et la jurispru­
dence, et que ceàii qui est dépourvu des ces disciplines doit 
incomparablement plus exercer ses oreilles que sa langue. [Bary, 
p. 94.] 
If we look back at this point to the original problem—to 
create a rhetoric for the French language—and try to say what 
the status of the question was after Bary and with Le Gras, 
we must conclude that an adequate solution had not been 
found. Neither theorist had shaken off enough of the weight 
of tradition. The old conception of the scientia bene dicendi 
persisted, with most of its roots in political and legal situations 
still visible. Both of them adopted with slight change the 
original plan of the discipline, its chain of actions or processes, 
starting with invention and ending with delivery. There is a 
tendency in both to abridge the last two, memoria and actio. 
They are working to cut the art loose from its oratorical con­
text so that it may become a more generalized science of ex­
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pression. This shortening of rhetoric, especially noticeable in 
Bary, seems more significant than his and Le Gras' efforts to 
locate the genius and secrets of the French language insofar 
as they are relevant to persuasive discourse. Although they 
claim to be doing something new, what they discuss under 
these topics is usually a reprise in a more systematic framework 
of things Vaugelas had said in his Remarques. The real 
novelty lies in the effort, sometimes conscious, sometimes not, 
to get away from formal oratory to an art that is less confined 
and specific, one that extends without pedantry to the whole 
field of belles-lettres and not merely to the set speech. The 
realization of this effort is the achievement of Rapin. And it 
may thus be said that the French rhetoric of which the Acad­
emy projects spoke did not come into being until Rapin 
really rethought the problems involved in taking language as 
a basic element in every one of the main artistic and intellec­
tual genres. 
1. Pellisson and d'Olivet, Histoire de l'Académie française (3rd éd.; 
Paris, 1743), I, 41. Volume I, written by Pellisson (1624-93), covers 
the period from the establishment of the Academy until 1652. 
2. Ibid., p. 35 (italics Pellisson's). 
3. Ibid., p. 132. 
4. It will be recalled that even in the case of the dictionary project 
the Academy had no monopoly: two important dictionaries, those of 
Richelet and Furetière, appeared in 1680 and 1690, respectively. 
5. The assumption being that anyone who tries to write has the prior 
sine qua non of natural gift. 
6. Remarques sur la langue françoise utiles à ceux qui veulent bien 
parler et bien écrire, facsimile edition by Jeanne Streicher (Paris, 1934), 
Préface, p. 3, IL 
7. He was, in fact, the original holder of the thirty-second fauteuil; 
and it is known that he was one of the members who took special respon­
sibility in the work on the dictionary. 
8. See the Oeuvres diverses de Mr Patru, de l'Académie française (3rd 
éd.; Paris, 1714). In the "Eloge" one reads: "M. de Vaugelas tira de lui 
de très grands secours pour son excellent liyre de Remarques, et cet 
illustre grammairien à qui notre langue est si obligée, confessait devoir 
à M. Patru les principaux secrets de son art." 
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9. Histoire, II, 166. 
10. The discourse he gave when he was received into the Academy 
so impressed the members that they decided to make such a speech part 
of the ritual of admission to their company thereafter. 
11. See Volume I, page 8, of the "Grands Ecrivains de la France" 
edition of the works of La Fontaine. 
12. Ibid., p. 180. Incidentally, on one occasion, when Patru needed 
money, Boileau bought his library with the condition that Patru would 
continue to have the use of it. 
13. Oeuvres, p. 583. 
14. I have used for Bary the revised edition of 1673, published in 
Paris; for Le Gras, the first edition, also published in Paris. The latter's 
subtitle reads: " . .  . les préceptes de l'ancienne et vraie éloquence: 
accommodés à l'usage des conversations et de la société civile, du barreau 
et de la chaire." 
15. Pp. [xxx-xxxi]. 
16. P. [ix]. Le Gras appears not to have known that it was to Patru 
that Vaugelas referred in his Preface. 
17. P. [iv] of the "Discours préliminaire." 
18. P. [ii] of the Epître. 
19. ". . . Ces deux parties qui donnent aujourd'hui tant de peine aux 
bons et aux mauvais écrivains. . . . "—Préface, p. i. 
20. See De institutione oratoria IX. iv. 22. 

Chapter U 
Problem and Solutions (II) 
ÏL [ETORic achieves a new status and a new kind of co­
herence at the hands of René Rapin. In his Comparaisons des 
grands hommes de l'antiquité, qui ont le plus excellé dans 
les belles-lettres and in the logical sequel to that work, his 
Réflexions sur l'éloquence, la poétique, l'histoire et la philoso­
phie, avec le jugement qu'on doit faire des auteurs qui se sont 
signalés dans ces quatre parties des belles lettres,1 he is not 
merely translating and paraphrasing his sources. Those pro­
cedures would lead one to neglect the differences between the 
seventeenth century and the times of Aristotle and Cicero. 
Instead he is rethinking the whole subject in a way that re­
flects consciously the taste of his contemporaries, consciously 
though not slavishly, since he aims by his treatises to improve 
their taste. I believe that his distinctive contribution can be 
outlined as follows, ( i  ) Whereas the tendency in his ancient 
sources is to attribute art to the orator alone, Rapin thinks of 
writer and reader as sharing the same set of qualifications. 
(2) To an extent and with a degree of rigor not found in his 
contemporaries, he gathers under a single discipline, based 
on eloquence, all works of belles-lettres, all modes of expres­
sion: eloquence, poetry, history, and philosophy. (3) He 
modifies the aims of writers and speakers; for him they seek 
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less to persuade us, in the strongly practical sense that the 
word had in the ancient rhetorics, than to please, instruct, and 
move us, that is, to affect us in a broader, freer way. 
With these generalities in mind, let us look at the structure 
of Rapin's work. It is a series of eight volumes, divided into 
four volumes of comparisons (Demosthenes and Cicero, 
Homer and Virgil, Thucydides and Livy, Plato and Aristotle) 
and four volumes of reflections (on rhetoric, poetry, history, 
and philosophy). In spite of what he says at first, that the 
work is a " . .  . recueil de huit volumes, sur toutes les 
matières principales qui regardent les belles lettres, tous 
composés les uns après les autres, sans aucun rapport par­
ticulier entre eux,"2 there is an obvious parallelism in the 
two sets of four volumes. When Rapin begins, after the 
coquetterie of the opening sentence, really to discuss what he 
has done, he reveals the plan which has been his guide. He 
presents a number of testimonials to the value of cultivating 
belles-lettres and then continues: 
Voilà quels étaient les sentiments de ces grands hommes sur 
le sujet de ces sciences, dont je fais ici l'abrégé: voilà l'estime 
qu'ils en faisaient. Et j'espère qu'on me saura gré du recueil que 
j'en donne, pour apprendre à notre siècle une nouvelle manière 
d'enseigner ces sciences; par l'autorité, en lui proposant de 
grands exemples; et par la raison, en lui donnant les plus belles 
maximes qu'on puisse donner, pour un dessein si important. 
[Comparaisons, I, iv-v]. 
Now this new way of teaching the disciplines in question 
—by authority and by reason—is an instance of the theological 
mind at work (Rapin was a Jesuit father) moving into the 
realm of literature and relating the old distinction of ex­
ample/precept to two ideas usually applied elsewhere, as when 
one appeals to authority as a certifying principle based on 
revelation or to reason as a similar principle based on evi­
dence. But this transfer of terms is not the important thing. 
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We must see what happens to the art of eloquence when one 
approaches it as an ensemble of examples and maxims. In a 
sense, it regresses. It loses its technicality and thus it becomes 
less of a scientia. For, strictly speaking, an art or science comes 
into being at the end of a process involving at least three 
steps: experiences, reflections on experiences, and the articu­
lation of reflections into a body of knowledge. In other words, 
in words more appropriate to a productive discipline, knowl­
edge progresses from example to precept to art or method. 
This last stage is being relaxed by Rapin—not completely 
abandoned, but made less rigorous. However, what appears to 
be a serious weakness from the formal point of view of method 
or inquiry shows itself in another light as a source of strength. 
One may even say that the vitality of rhetoric in the latter half 
of the seventeenth century depended on this formal regression. 
The ancient theories were designed as professional training 
for specialists who would eventually conceal rather than reveal 
their technique, in harmony with the principle of ars celare 
artem. Such discipline is obviously too elaborate for a situation 
in which the audience considers itself as "professional" as the 
artist, in which poets and those who judge their works share 
in knowledge of the basic modes of expression. If everyone 
who matters is interested in eloquence and has or wants to 
have taste in what concerns it, the technicalities of Aristotle 
or Quintilian or even of Cicero are out of the question. The 
same principle applies to the other fields of belles-lettres. 
They, too, are made more available and less academic by this 
"nouvelle manière d'enseigner ces sciences," which moves back 
from their more highly conceptualized and coherent states to 
the particulars and maxims where they originate.3 
I have just mentioned Cicero. In the Réflexions sur l'élo­
quence* Rapin gives him far more space and praise than any 
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other ancient authority. Evidently Cicero's way of treating 
the art corresponds closely to what Rapin intends. 
Cicéron dans les traités qu'il nous a laissés de l'éloquence, 
n'est pas tout à fait si méthodique qu'Aristote: mais il est plus 
poli et plus élégant: qui est son caractère essentiel dont il ne se 
défait jamais. Mais tout solide qu'il est, il n'est pas toujours le 
plus régulier du monde: parce qu'il pense plus à plaire qu'à 
instruire.5 
Cicero has an order, but it is concealed; perfect regularity is 
for the savants only. Cicero's tact in expounding the rules 
leads Rapin to conclude that " . .  . il n'y a point d'auteur, 
d'où l'on puisse tirer tant de fruit, tant de politesse, tant 
d'éloquence, tant de solidité, et tant de bon sens que de 
Cicéron" (Réflexions, II, in). Rapin admires very much the 
performance of Antonius in the De oratore, as he explains 
with a light touch the rhetors' precepts and as he speaks of 
questions at law. These are for Rapin the driest of subjects, 
but Antonius manages to treat them "agréablement et en 
homme de qualité" (Réflexions, II, v ) . 
The praise of Cicero's elegance and lack of pedantry points 
to something important in Rapin's theory. It leads us, within 
the broad framework furnished by the notions of "compari­
sons" and "reflections," to another, more specific tendency in 
his attempt to reformulate rhetoric. He will try nothing so 
extreme as replacing it by another discipline: that is the 
solution of the Port-Royalists, as we shall see. But he is 
definitely prepared to give more weight to the natural bases 
of art and to assert the priority of genius in belles-lettres. 
Mais après tout, il faut avouer la vérité, quelque avantage 
qu'on ait en l'éloquence par les instructions de si grands maîtres, 
l'art y fait moins que le génie: et la plus grande partie des sujets 
que traite l'orateur sont de telle nature que l'opinion y a plus de 
part, et a beaucoup plus d'effet que la science . .  . et il se 
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trouve des gens dans toutes les professions qui ont de l'éloquence 
et qui parlent bien, sans en avoir appris aucunes règles.6 
The usual statement follows to the effect that both art and 
nature must be there for the sake of perfection; still, the 
theorist is never to be allowed to forget that theory is not 
indispensable. 
Rapin appeals in so many different places to "nature" and 
to the "natural" that it is not easy, in fact it would be wrong, 
to assign a fixed value to the term. Nature refers in general 
to any set of defining characteristics; it is always a given some­
thing that has consequences in fact or in reasoning; it is 
something to argue from, to work from. Each of the main 
factors in rhetoric—listeners or readers, subjects, and speakers 
or writers—has a nature in this sense. Taken together these 
natures form the prior conditions of speech (whether it takes 
the form of a poem, an oration, or a work of history or philoso­
phy). Discourse is a variable depending on the limits laid 
down by the other three factors; what to say can never be 
known until the intelligible aspects of the rest of the situa­
tion have been grasped. Subjects may be grands and élevés 
or they may be petits and familiers, according to the natures 
of the things represented. Listeners are diverse in many ways: 
they vary as to age, sex, status, native ability, education. They 
have in common, however, minds, hearts, and feelings, that 
is, a general human nature, and no orator will really succeed 
without "une connaissance parfaite du coeur humain" (Ré­
flexions, II, 23). And an elementary obligation of the speaker 
is to "know himself," to understand his own naturel or talent, 
so as to avoid forcing it by putting on manners or speech not 
suitable to it. Discourse results, therefore, from many par­
ticular acts of judgment, all of which go to assure its suita­
bility, its "proportion" to what the subjects, speakers, listeners, 
and other circumstances are. In "Réflexion XII," Rapin shows 
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clearly how he thinks the orator must proceed and how in a 
typical instance mistakes occur: 
Quand on s'applique à l'étude de l'éloquence, on a souvent
coutume de s'y méprendre par les fausses mesures que l'on prend
ou avec soi-même, ou avec son sujet, ou avec ceux à qui l'on 
parle. . . . L'orateur qui a de l'élévation d'esprit, pèche quel­
quefois par la trop grande complaisance qu'il a de se suivre 
lui-même: sans se donner le soin de se proportionner à sa matière,
ni de se mesurer à la capacité de ceux à qui il parle.7 
After all this insistence on nature it comes as no surprise 
that, when he shifts to the subject of expression, Rapin favors 
the tour naturel, the turn which renders things immediately 
to the mind with the least possible refraction due to human 
art. Are not things more striking than the images and figures 
of elocution? As a consequence the true orator makes no effort 
to display his art, since distortion would result. Nor, for that 
matter, does he try to conceal it : "La vraie éloquence n'affecte 
ni de paraître ni de ne paraître pas: elle a ses principes et 
ses règles, sans y chercher tant de façon: et l'art véritable ne 
s'amuse jamais à couvrir ni à découvrir trop d'art." (Réflexions, 
II, 17-18). Art neither shows itself nor hides itself; it simply 
is, almost in the same way that nature is. 
In short, the role of art in eloquence is dwindling before 
our eyes. It makes no difference that all of the familiar terms 
having to do with the technique of expression appear in these 
pages: they are ghosts of what they had been. Of course we 
know that art, as Rapin understands it, has its rules and 
principles and processes. And we know that he thinks it to be, 
as it had traditionally been, a strengthening of natural powers 
by study, practice, and imitation. Nevertheless, a change has 
taken place. The knowledge involved has lost its technical 
status as a productive science or method. As for the strengthen­
ing of natural gifts, which seems an essential element of any­
thing that calls itself an art, it is fair to say that the capacity 
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to produce has been replaced by something rather different, 
by an informal sort of logic directed to the inner aspects of 
things, in other words, by a capacity to judge. I said earlier 
that, to Rapin's mind, poets, orators, historians, and philoso­
phers, on the one hand, and their readers or audiences, on the 
other, should come to share a common knowledge. It is now 
clear that their common possession should be, more than 
anything else, this power of discernment, this taste. 
In the section entitled "Le Dessein de cet ouvrage" thai 
precedes the Comparaisons and Réflexions, Rapin asserts: "Je 
commence ce premier tome par l'éloquence, la plus nécessaire 
des facultés comprises en ces deux volumes; parce qu'elle est 
propre à tout" (Comparaisons, I, p. [v]). If one puts with 
this principle, namely, that rhetoric underlies the whole field 
of disciplined expression in words, the fact that he constantly 
analyzes rhetorical problems in terms of nature and art, there 
arises the question of what place these two leading ideas have 
in poetry, history, and philosophy. What I wish to do now is 
to fill in briefly the shadings of these notions as they move in 
and out of the remaining sets of reflections. This is, I think, 
the best way to show how Rapin managed to achieve a unified 
and original discussion of belles-lettres. 
In what he says of poetry one is immediately struck by the 
reappearance of words that gravitated about the "nature" and 
"art" in his rhetoric. He refers again and again to "moeurs," 
"passions," "bienséance," "agréments," "nombre," "harmonie," 
"sujet," "expression." And this last term occurs with its usual 
cortège of adjectives: "congrue," "claire," "naturelle," "écla­
tante," "nombreuse," and their opposites. There is, however, 
an obvious novelty: Aristotle's Poetics moves into the fore­
ground of the discussion. As result, Rapin adds some Aristo­
telian trimmings to his earlier vocabulary. For example, it is 
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impossible to follow Aristotle without using the concept of 
literary types or kinds, and here, in the Réflexions sur la 
poétique, epic, tragedy, comedy, and a string of minor genres 
furnish topics for Rapin and enable him to specify his obser­
vations. Sometimes he modifies—consciously or unconsciously 
—his basic language in an interesting way, as when he uses 
sujet interchangeably with fable (that is, plot) or when he 
applies moeurs not only to the dispositions and habits of the 
audience, as is usual in the theory of rhetoric, but also to those 
of the people whom poets represent in dramatic or epic poems. 
But these resemblances lie on the surface. A deeper analogy 
to eloquence emerges in the inevitable attempt to define the 
end of poetry: 
Les uns veulent que la fin de la poésie soit de plaire: que c'est 
même pour cela qu'elle s'étudie à remuer les passions, dont tous 
les mouvements sont agréables. . .  . Il est vrai que c'est le but 
que se propose la poésie, que de plaire: mais ce n'est pas le 
principal. . .  . En effet, la poésie étant un art, doit être utile 
par la qualité de sa nature, et par la subordination essentielle que 
tout art doit avoir à la politique, dont la fin générale est le bien 
public. C'est le sentiment d'Aristote et d'Horace son premier 
interprète. [Réflexions, II, ioo.] 
This breathtaking promotion of Horace (and Rapin is not, of 
course, the first to suggest it in his century) leads to the con­
clusion that the principal aim of poetry is to serve, to profiter, 
and to do that in two ways. First, through relaxation, after 
which the mind may return with a new strength to its usual 
tasks. Second, through the instruction which it gives man, or, 
in the more cautious phrase of Rapin, ". . . qu'elle [la poésie] 
fait profession de donner à l'homme. . . .  " 
Car la vertu étant naturellement austère par la contrainte 
qu'elle impose au coeur en réprimant ses désirs: la morale qui 
entreprend de régler les mouvements du coeur, par les instruc­
tions, doit plaire pour être écouté: à quoi elle ne réussit mieux 
que par la poésie. [Réflexions, II, 101.] 
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What does this mean? It seems to me to mean that the nature 
—that is, the defining trait—of the audience is exactly the same 
for poetry as for eloquence. In both instances people are to 
be taught something or to be improved in an agreeable way. 
When Rapin treats of eloquence, it is self-evident that instruc­
tion is involved; and so he emphasizes pleasure, even to the 
point of saying that rhetoric is l'art de flaire. Similarly, it is 
obvious that the poet aims to please; that much is taken for 
granted; the emphasis falls, instead, on the need to instruct. 
In other words, both arts propose to serve the same two ends, 
but as different species of belles-lettres they have differing 
problems of balance in achieving them. 
The discussion of utility brings us to a new sense and role 
of nature in poetry. The aim of instruction, although it 
orients the poet or critic in a general way, must be specified 
if it is to be of real use. Rapin does this by linking the lessons 
of poetry to what is represented in the poetic species; he 
thinks here of nature as subject matter rather than as the 
determining principle of the audience. Heroic poetry proposes 
the examples of great virtues and vices, exciting us (in theory 
at least) to love the one and to avoid the other. Tragic poetry 
defines and rectifies, again by outstanding examples, the use 
of the passions by showing us that vice does not go un­
punished, and that good fortune may be more apparent than 
real. Comedy corrects private faults (and through them public 
lacks) by putting before us a critical image of ordinary life. 
All of this is clearly a discussion of moeurs, and of those 
differences in moeurs that have consequences for poets. The 
universal rule to follow, says Rapin, becoming quite specific, 
is that one must . . . représenter chaque personne dans 
son caractère" (Réflexions, II, 116), that is, with the appropri­
ate marks of age, rank, desires, and so on. " . .  . Horace dans 
Fendroit de sa poétique, où il distingue les âges pour en faire 
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des portraits, dit que ce n'est que par la représentation des 
moeurs qu'on se fait écouter au théâtre: car tout y languit, 
dès que les moeurs n'y sont pas gardées" (Réflexions, II, 118). 
In short, what is here designated by "nature" has been trans­
ferred, so to speak, from the column of audience (in the treat­
ment of eloquence) to the column of res or subject matter (in 
the treatment of poetry). As we saw, the orator had to under­
stand his audience in order to adjust the presentation of his 
thesis to it, and he seeks this understanding in a grasp of 
human nature, especially as it reveals itself in passions and 
morals. The poet in turn must understand human nature-
approached in the same way as patterns or forms of character 
and feeling—partly, of course, because he too is obliged to 
take account of the audience, whose approval he hopes to 
gain, but mainly because he finds in these dispositions and 
their consequences what he is called upon to portray. They 
function as his thesis. 
"Nature" in its third application refers to the initial gift 
underlying everything the poet does. Rapin takes six of the 
first seven réflexions to stress its importance. He presupposes 
in the true poet " . .  . un grand naturel," "un esprit juste, 
fertile, pénétrant, solide, universel," "un grand sens," "une 
grande vivacité." His best example is Homer " . .  . qui eut 
un génie accompli pour la poésie, et aussi l'esprit le plus 
vaste, le plus sublime, le plus profond, le plus universel qui 
fut jamais" (Réflexions, II 97). This kind of genius is not 
to be confused with imagination, nor does it have any con­
nection with poetic fureur. The orator may be able to make up 
for its lack by art; not so the poet. And finally, in the first 
reflection of the series on the various genres, Rapin advises the 
poet (as he had advised the orator) to consult his strengths, 
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so as not to attempt less or more than he should according to 
his gift. 
Where eloquence is concerned, Rapin tends, as we have 
seen, to reduce its complications to something simple like 
good sense or taste. He continues and carries even further this 
line of thought in speaking of poetry. Again and again he 
refers to the role of judgment, to the choices that precede 
immediately the act of writing. The poet must know how 
to distinguish, as he works with a serious or elevated subject, 
between what is beautiful and agreeable in nature and what 
is ugly and unpleasant. 
Car la poésie est un art où tout doit plaire. Et ce n'est pas 
assez de s'attacher à la nature, qui est rude et désagréable en 
certains endroits : il faut choisir ce au'elle a de beau d'avec ce qui 
ne l'est pas: elle a des grâces cacnées en des sujets qu'il faut 
découvrir. Quel discernement doit avoir le poète, pour faire ce 
choix et pour rebuter, sans s'y méprendre, robjet qui ne plaira 
pas, et retenir celui qui doit plaire. [Réflexions, II, 128.] 
"Distinguer," "choisir," "découvrir," "discernement"—every 
one of these indicates the change in emphasis from the art as 
a whole to the critical moment or act that Rapin takes as its 
most important and necessary part. 
Another passage shows even more clearly the trend toward 
simplification—and incidentally, the confidence with which 
Rapin brings rhetoric into poetics. 
Il y a une rhétorique particulière pour la poésie, que les poètes 
modernes ne connaissent presque point. Cet art consiste à savoir 
bien précisément ce qu'il faut dire figurément, et ce qu'il faut 
dire tout simplement; et à bien connaître où il faut de l'ornement 
et où il n'en faut pas. . . C'est un pur effet du génie, que ce 
discernement, et que cette rhétorique particulière, qui est propre 
à la poésie. [Réflexions, II, 128-29.] 
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Thus he goes beyond a reduction of art or method to culti­
vated judgment; he turns it into a natural gift! But he no 
doubt expresses what is for him a more typical view when in 
an earlier passage, commenting on the need for the poet to 
have a "grand sens," he makes the traditional remark about 
the relationship between nature and art, substituting judg­
ment, however, for art: "Mais comme le jugement sans génie 
est froid et languissant, le génie sans jugement est extravagant 
et aveugle" (Réflexions, II, 96). 
As is clear from the last three quotations, Rapin's notion 
of judgment fluctuates between the habit of judging and the 
act of judging. I think that the latter is especially characteris­
tic of his analysis. In an important passage he sees particular 
judgments according to rules of time, place, action, and so on 
as capable of being summed up in a single comprehensive 
judgment, made in the light of a single comprehensive value: 
bienséance. This is the supreme value that every artistic judg­
ment is designed to affirm or deny of poems or parts of poems. 
"Sans elle, les autres règles de la poésie sont fausses. . . . 
Enfin tout ce qui est contre les règles du temps, des moeurs, 
des sentiments, de l'expression, est contraire à la bienséance, 
qui est la plus universelle de toutes les règles" (Réflexions, 
ii, 135-36). 
As he reflects on poetry, Rapin uses often and without any 
sense of crossing boundaries many terms and principles that 
have served him already in the reflections on eloquence. Some­
times he changes the emphases, as in the treatment of enter­
tainment and instruction; sometimes he adds new elements, as 
in the case of generic and poetic vocabulary borrowed from 
Aristotle. But the bases remain the same. This is especially 
noticeable in Rapin's way of transposing the fundamental 
themes of nature and art. The "nature" of the reader or 
spectator is the same in poetry as in rhetoric (since both poems 
and speeches are addressed to someone who is a judge); 
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however, the term is broadened into human nature as the 
object which the poet will imitate or represent in his work. 
The "naturel" of the poet becomes even more decisive than 
it was before in the case of the orator: here it tends to out­
weigh all other factors. The movement of art away from 
elaborate doctrine toward refined judgment, something already 
clear in Rapin's rhetoric, continues in the discussion of poetry 
and the introduction of bienséance simplifies matters even 
further. Particular rules are inescapable, since poetry is a 
form of expression distinct from prose and since it is written 
in different genres, each of which has its own assumptions and 
way of coming into being. Nevertheless the many rules that 
guide the poet's judgment turn out to be based on a single 
decisive value, appropriateness. To state a rule, to decide a 
particular point, that is, to make one choice among the in­
definitely large number that have to be made in composing 
a poem, to estimate the worth of a poem as a whole, or even 
to distinguish from among ancient and modern works those 
really fit to be admired—any of these acts involves ultimately 
a reference to bienséance. 
Rapin takes some pains to distinguish—though with mixed 
success, as we shall see—his historian from his poet, his orator, 
and his novelist. One of the first of his reflections on history 
begins: 
Le roman ne pense qu'à plaire; et l'histoire ne pense qu'à 
instruire. Voilà proprement leur différence essentielle; celle-ci 
n'ayant d'autre but à se proposer, que l'instruction du public. Car
comme elle ne travaille pas seulement pour le présent, sa vue ne
doit pas se borner au temps qui est passager; mais à la postérité,
qui dure toujours. [Réflexions, II, 220.] 
Plaire and instruire again: as the aims of literary expression 
they are never far from the surface of Rapin's mind. In elo­
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quence and in poetry, he believes in a combination of the 
two. Here he apparently intends to eliminate pleasure as a 
proper aim for the historian and to assign it to the art of 
the novelist. But the deeper exigencies of his position soon 
show themselves. Near the end of this reflection he quotes 
Thucydides: "J'aime mieux, disait-il, plaire en disant la 
vérité, que de réjouir en contant des fables" (Réflexions, II, 
221). And in the marginal heading for the next reflection we 
read: "Que la vérité est le seul moyen par où l'histoire plaît 
et va à sa fin." Fiction may please, but so also may the truth; 
and so, once more, Rapin can suggest that the writer seek two 
aims simultaneously. 
As a matter of fact the image of the austere reader delight­
ing in truth changes soon after. Rapin calls him distrait and 
volage when he takes up the essential procedure of history, 
which is narration. He does not dismiss such a reader; far 
from it: it becomes the business of the historian to keep him 
reading. One of the great beauties of narration, he continues, 
resides in skilful transitions, thanks to which the reader moves 
from subject to subject "sans se lasser" (Reflexions, II, 232). 
And so, although in his initial distinction of the tasks of the 
novelist and the historian he discards the rule of pleasure 
for the latter, he later finds himself unable to proceed with­
out it. The story is repeated when Rapin tries to distinguish 
history from poetry and oratory according to the presence 
or absence of figurative language. The historians will use 
figures sparingly to enliven their accounts and to avoid 
froideur, while orators and poets speak mainly and appro­
priately in such language, poets being especially free to try 
unusual turns of thought and expression. The closer one 
looks, the more this difference dwindles to one of degrees. 
In fact, at one place it reaches the vanishing point, as Rapin 
quotes from Cicero, "Magnum quid historiam recte scribere 
et summi oratoris proprium" (Réflexions, II, 268). 
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In the reflections on history we see once more the concern 
with nature and art, or, more specifically, with audience, work, 
and author as distinct but interrelated factors. I have already 
suggested in connection with the aims of the historian how 
his audience resembles the audience of poetry and eloquence. 
There are some nuances worth noting, however. Taking his 
cue, I think, from the beautiful phrase of Thucydides, who 
intended his history to be a "thing for all time," Rapin endows 
the readers of historical eloquence with a special dignity. 
Il faut donc penser à écrire noblement, quand on se mêle 
d'écrire l'histoire. Car dès qu'on parle à toute la terre et à tous 
les siècles, on est revêtu d'un caractère, qui donne de l'autorité 
pour élever la voix, parce que c'est aux Rois, aux Princes et aux 
grands de tous les pays et de tous les âges qu'on parle, et qu'on 
devient en quelque façon le maître et l'instructeur du genre 
humain. [Réflexions, II, 206.] 
In interpreting these lines, one wants to complete the picture 
by recalling those passages in which the reader appears easily 
distracted, easily bored. Even so, Rapin obviously seeks here 
to establish an obligation bearing on the historian because 
of the nature of his readers, who are high in rank and who 
include both present and future generations. 
The discussion becomes more subtle when Rapin speaks 
of another "nature," that of the subject matter entering into 
the historical work. 
C'est un champ bien vaste que la matière propre à exercer 
l'art d'un historien, puisqu'elle s'étend à toutes les actions des 
hommes, sur la paix, sur la guerre, les conseils, les négociations, 
les ambassades, les intrigues, et toutes les différentes aventures 
qui peuvent arriver dans la vie. Cicéron demande deux qualités 
dans la matière d'une histoire, que ce soient de grandes choses, 
et qu'elles soient dignes d'être racontées au public. [Réflexions, 
II, 215.] 
The movement of thought is characteristic: first expansive, 
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underlining the size and variety of the field of human action; 
then selective, as the historian's judgment separates by Cicer­
onian criteria the truly memorable and truly instructive actions 
from all the rest. 
Still, something quite complex remains for him to study 
and recount: since men are involved, the historian must be a 
connaisseur of motives and characters. Otherwise he is merely 
a "gazetier" who is satisfied to relate events and results with­
out bothering to inquire into their causes. The point made 
here sounds very like the obligation of the poet—mentioned 
above—to represent each person "dans son caractère." Rapin 
contrasts Livy, the most accomplished of them all, he says, 
and one of the greatest masters of eloquence who ever lived, 
with Tacitus, much to the advantage of the former, because 
he respects the natures of people and of ages. 
C'est ainsi qu'il donne aux derniers rois de Rome tout l'orgueil 
que leur inspirait l'indépendance; qu'il varie l'esprit de la répu­
blique . . . qu'il distingue chaque âge et chaque siècle, par le 
génie qui a le plus régné, sans confondre les mouvements diffé­
rents de ce génie dans les différentes circonstances des temps, 
lesquels ne se ressemblent point. [Réflexions, II, 218.] 
Tacitus fails in this sympathetic variation; it is his character 
that explains what he narrates; too shut up in himself, he 
makes everything resemble everything else. 
The same idea—and the same examples—recur in the dis­
cussion of portraits, which are a great ornament when they 
are done a propos. 
Mais c'est un coup de maître, que d'attraper cette ressemblance,
laquelle ne consiste que dans les traits singuliers et imperceptibles,
qui seuls expriment la nature, et qu'on ne trouve point, à moins
de fouiller dans les coeurs, et d'en développer tous les replis, pour 
faire bien connaître ce qui est caché. [Réflexions, II, 251.] 
Nature emerges thus at the springs of the actions to be told 
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in history. But it presides likewise over the discussion of the 
historian's genius. 
Rapin began, as we saw, by making him the maître et in­
structeur du genre humain, the chief justice, so to speak, in 
the court of humanity. 
. . . L'historien est de tous les auteurs celui qui se fait un 
plan plus vaste, et qui s'érige un plus grand tribunal. Car c'est 
à juger souverainement de tout ce qui se passe dans le monde, 
à faire la destinée des grands de la terre, pour leur réputation 
dans la postérité, et à donner des leçons à tous les peuples pour 
leur instruction. . . . Car que peut-on imaginer de plus beau 
que l'histoire, qui sait rendre justice au mérite, et à la vertu, en 
éternisant les actions vertueuses. [Réflexions, II, 205.] 
Such evaluative judgment is, I think, a species of something 
broader and more fundamental: judgment as discrimination. 
The initial act of the historian as he chooses his subject, the 
criticism of sources and documents, the conduct of the narra­
tion, the drawing of portraits, the analysis of motives, the 
selection of evocative details—in short, the whole sequence 
of wide-ranging and innumerable acts through which the 
historian passes—is a sequence of judgments in this generic 
sense. 
Quel jugement ne faut-il pas pour prendre en tout le bon 
parti; tourner les choses dans leur bon sens, aller toujours à ce 
qui est le plus solide; interposer son sentiment sur les matières 
dont on parle, sans forcer le lecteur par des préjugés: ne toucher 
aux endroits délicats, qu'avec cette délicatesse d'esprit qui ne 
peut être l'effet que d'un sens exquis; ne point charger son 
discours de trop de matière, qui en étouffe l'esprit, sans y donner 
place à quelque réflexion qu'on fasse soi-même, ou qu'on donne 
lieu de faire à son lecteur; savoir trouver le véritable noeud qu'il 
y a dans chaque affaire sans s'y méprendre, pour l'éclaircir, et 
en faire le dénouement, ne point débiter de grands événements 
sur des motifs frivoles; ne point cacher des pensées fausses sous 
une expression éclatante; éviter ce qui sent l'étude et tout ce qui 
a l'air contraint, et suivre en toutes choses ce rayon de lumière 
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et d'intelligence qui donne idée du discernement de l'historien, 
en donnant bonne opinion de sa capacité et de sa suffisance1? De 
sorte que la partie la plus nécessaire à l'histoire est le jugement. 
[Réflexions, II, 269-70.] 
As Rapin discusses in this impressive way the nature of 
historical judgment, is he not at the same time defining the 
sense of art (or what is left of it) in history? At every moment 
of the process, to a degree not required of the orator or the 
poet, the power of judgment must be aimed at a grasp of 
the truth and of the true-seeming. Hence the general warn­
ings in other passages against figures and other stylistic orna­
ments and the recommendation that one limit oneself to 
writing noblement, sensément, purement, simplement. As 
with poetry and eloquence, a multitude of particular "rules" 
and bits of advice is indeed offered concerning narrations, 
transitions, portraits, passions, descriptions, harangues, reflec­
tions, and so on, but the complexities of art are frequently 
telescoped and all arguments referred to the single principle 
of judgment, to something that is more a matter of psychology 
or nature than of technique. 
Normally the forms of oratory, poetry, and history are im­
mediately accessible to the public, at least to the cultivated 
part of it. Philosophy usually requires some rewriting for 
the general reader. Rapin is very conscious of this problem 
as he undertakes his reflections on philosophy. Luckily he 
has an ancient model, Cicero (incidentally, a distinguished 
rhetorician). 
Je ne suis entré dans aucune discussion des préceptes, qui se 
débitent dans l'école, pour ne pas languir: je ne m'arrête qu'aux 
maximes générales, sans rien approfondir. En quoi j'ai tâché 
d'imiter Cicéron, qui dans ses livres de philosophie ne s'engage 
presqu'à aucun détail des opinions dont il parle, qu'autant 
qu'il le peut faire sans rien perdre de sa politesse ordinaire. 
[Réflexions, II, 292-93.] 
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Cicero explains only the general principles and maxims of 
each school, adding a few reflections of his own. That is what 
I have done, says Rapin: "C'est ce que j'ai fait pour m'accorder 
au goût du siècle, où l'on est moins touché de la grande 
érudition que du bon sens" (Réflexions, II, 293). What this 
means is obvious : the usual domination of the scene by public 
tastes and lights. As I have shown, in this theory the reader's 
judgment in grading a speech or a poem or a history is at 
bottom equal to that of the one who created the work. What 
happens when such a reader turns to philosophy as taught 
by Rapin? "Et comme on trouvera dans le fond de ces ré­
flexions une satire de la fausse philosophie et un éloge de la 
vraie: je suis sûr par là de plaire à la plus considérable secte 
des philosophes, qui est celle des honnêtes gens" (Réflexions, 
II, 293). So the answer to the question is that Rapin pro­
motes his reader to the rank of philosopher, and, in fact, gives 
him an advantage, since the company of honnêtes gens is 
larger than that of the original thinkers. The principles that 
these thinkers made convincing by putting them into system­
atic arguments are extracted and made relevant to savoir 
vivre, the really serious philosophical business. We recognize 
once more the dual aim of instructing and pleasing. But, as 
I indicated above, there is a significant variation. Rapin had 
not, after all, felt obliged to restate what Demosthenes and 
Homer and Thucydides had said. The works of philosophers, 
however, cannot be absorbed as they are; they have to be 
cut and rephrased lest they repel and in order that philo­
sophical principles or maxims may have some bearing on 
particular lives. It is clear that in some unspecified balance, 
Rapin sees such application as more important than pedantic 
respect for original contexts and intentions. 
The love of wisdom, the study of virtue—these are the 
fundamental qualities of the philosopher, according to Rapin, 
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and the one who possesses them becomes an authority, an 
example, or even an oracle. Socrates is the philosopher par 
excellence. He had "facilité du génie," "agréments d'esprit," 
"profondeur," "solidité," "sublimité de lumière et d'intelli­
gence," "simplicité." At other moments, when Rapin has in 
mind especially the would-be philosopher rather than his 
ideal, he stresses balance and moderation as characteristics 
of the philosopher's mind. But I do not think that these 
traits, however real they may be to him, are as truly basic 
as something indicated by the term secte, used above, and its 
correlative, sectateurs, used elsewhere. By implication these 
words define the philosopher as the holder of an opinion 
who has attracted to himself a group of partisans, of people 
who share his opinion. In other words, Rapin is led by his 
principles to think of philosophizing, viewed historically, as 
a kind of rhetorical activity. 
Let me be more specific. A Greek philosopher, in his time 
and setting—so to speak—expounded his views to his friends 
or to associates in his school; eventually this group came to 
include thinkers of other ages, and formed " . .  . la secte 
de Socrate, de Platon, des Pyrrhoniens et des Sceptiques, 
qui est originairement la même" or " . .  . celle d'Aristote 
et des Péripatéticiens" (Réflexions, II, 292). As a matter of 
fact, there were many more schools than these. Rapin con­
fesses that his greatest problem in composing his reflections 
on philosophy was bringing some order out of this abundance. 
In his opinion, Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius failed to make 
any proper distinctions among the sects; Varro counted two 
hundred and eighty of them; Themistius went as far as three 
hundred. Rapin contents himself with treatments of the 
seven "principal" ones and their leaders. 
What he goes on to do here, it seems to me, is to bring 
these chefs de secte to a point at which they can communi­
cate with the seventeenth-century audience of "honnêtes 
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gens," that is, with people who belong, after all, to the most 
considerable group of philosophers. In other words, the 
scheme is the same, whether he writes the history of philos­
ophy or whether he summarizes it for the use of his readers: 
a philosopher is a lover of truth and virtue who addresses 
himself to hearers or readers who have the privilege of agree­
ing or disagreeing and of determining thus the value of the 
man, of his speculation, and of his school. 
Given such a man, what is the nature of his discourse, or, 
since in philosophy language and style are less important than 
content (once obscurities have been removed by clever ex­
position), what is the subject matter that he studies? Rapin 
answers in a completely traditional way. The philosopher 
studies thought itself and its laws in logic; man's desires and 
the regulation of them in morality or ethics; the world (that 
is, the entire order of natural and observable things) in 
physics; and finally, in metaphysics, purely intellectual objects, 
abstract and spiritual beings. After reflections on philosophy 
in general—essentially a series of paragraphs commenting on 
the opinions and historical fortunes of the "sectes"—he offers 
chapters on each of the four subject matters I have just 
mentioned. 
Now philosophy is not studied for itself alone, but as a way 
to savoir vivre, to a habit of adapting oneself to circumstances 
and of doing so without loss of one's independence. 
A la vérité la plus belle de toutes les philosophies est de savoir 
vivre: c'est à dire de s'accommoder aux temps, aux personnes, aux 
affaires, quand la raison le demande: mais cela même doit se 
faire librement et sans contrainte; pour ne pas imiter ces âmes 
faibles, qui n'ont que des sentiments empruntés sur chaque chose, 
et qui s'abaissent à avoir de la condescendance pour des opinions 
auxquelles ils ont peine à se soumettre: parce qu'ils n'ont pas la 
force de garder leur liberté entière. [Réflexions, II, 343-44.] 
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Since the aim of "la plus belle des philosophies" is unmis­
takably practical, the study or reading of philosophy is natu­
rally drawn into the status of means to that end. The savoir 
in question comes from reason in its role as judge, as maker 
of distinctions according to circumstances. One thinks at once 
of the quality of bienséance that Rapin developed so fully in 
his first two groups of réflexions. Eloquence and poetry sought, 
ultimately, bienséance in expression: now philosophy becomes 
the art of attaining it in action. 
The lines quoted show, of course, where the objectives of 
the "professional" philosopher lie, but they also serve to define 
the attitude and posture, that is, the nature, of his audience. 
They point to a definite expectation on the part of honnêtes 
gens who read philosophy or reflections on it. Furthermore, 
although the present passage makes no mention of religion, 
there are many others that leave no room for doubt: savoir 
vivre means knowing how to live as a Christian. This one 
for example: 
Ainsi, pour ne pas nous méprendre, commençons à étudier ce 
qu'il faut croire, avant que de penser à raisonner. Réglons l'usage 
de notre foi, pour régler l'usage de notre raison; soyons Chrétiens 
avant que d'être philosophes; que notre première sagesse et notre 
principale philosophie soit notre religion. [Réflexions, II, 423.] 
Such are the practical and religious dispositions that char­
acterize the audience in this epiphany of the familiar rhe­
torical triad—and this piece of the picture matches the other 
two. One sees the congruence of the parts in a scheme that 
makes of the philosopher an advocate, of philosophy a posi­
tion reducible to maxims or opinions, and of the reader or 
hearer someone who distinguishes the true from the false 
and the useful from the harmful in view of natural and 
Christian ends. 
PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS ( i l  ) 
In philosophy Rapin finds it easy, from one point of view, 
to identify the appropriate art: it is logic. But in his reflec­
tions on logic he tends regularly to generalize, to avoid a 
systematic presentation in favor of examples and anecdotes. 
Once more the controlling notion of judgment comes to the 
foreground, although it is true that he develops the theme 
according to some new values. In the first place, one must 
pay attention to the different degrees of certainty that are 
attained in judgments. "C'est une grande science de juger 
des choses selon les différents degrés de certitude qu'elles 
peuvent avoir, de démêler la vérité des apparences; de prendre 
pour opinion ce qui n'est qu'opinion, et de savoir bien dis­
tinguer ces jugements pour juger sainement de tout" (Ré­
flexions, II, 331). This suggests an art of judging that is 
focussed on particular propositions and on the modes accord­
ing to which predicates are said of subjects. In other places 
Rapin emphasizes the interrelationships of judgments: they 
may be balanced against each other as opposed extremes or 
one judgment may stand as a mean between extremes. 
For example, he advises us to stay in the voies ordinaires 
(Réflexions, II, 332); as soon as one leaves these paths and 
rejects widely shared opinions or sentiments, one runs the 
risk of falling into absurdity. Or again, he notes a difference 
between "esprits" that are naturally free and masterful and 
those who are "naturellement esclaves" (Réflexions, II, 335); 
he thinks both are extremes. In another instance, he criticizes 
equally those who never have any doubts and those who are 
doubtful of everything; the proud man who will not approve 
of anything for fear of submitting to something and the 
"volage" who approves of everything in order to spare him­
self the effort required to do some thinking of his own. 
"S'accommoder de tout et ne s'accommoder de rien, ce sont 
d'autres extrémités à éviter à un sage" (Réflexions, II, 340). 
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And so the most accessible kind of regulation for judgment 
here would seem to come to these two pieces of advice: ( i  ) 
in judging, distinguish, of course, the true from the false, but 
also note degrees of certainty within the category of truth; and 
(2) avoid extremes. Logic as the art of thinking in philosophy 
becomes some such technique of balanced discrimination. 
In its ancient forms, as well as in its later derivations or 
counterparts, rhetoric is in essence a discipline that regulates 
transactions involving words in which what is said is part 
of an effort to secure the adherence of a listener or a reader 
to the views of a speaker or writer. One may, therefore, iso­
late in the rhetorical situation four aspects or dimensions-
speaker, audience, speech, and aim—three of which I have 
just analyzed as they appear in the Réflexions of Rapin. The 
custom of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian is to specify the 
audience according to the kind of occasion for decision: de­
liberative (concerning what should be done); judicial (con­
cerning what has been done); or epideictic (concerning the 
quality of a thing or a person). A particular set of circum­
stances leads to words addressed to people who then make 
up their minds, with consequences for that situation. In at 
least two of these cases (my reservation applies to the "judi­
cial" category), the audience is heterogeneous and is char­
acterized by a wide range of notions and feelings that enter 
directly into the orator's calculations. In Rapin's theory, the 
conception of the audience moves definitely in the direction 
of a homogeneous elite, les honnêtes gens, who have culture, 
standing, and, in some cases, money for patronage. 
Having narrowed considerably the focus of rhetoric as 
regards the composition of the audience, Rapin goes on to 
broaden the traditional notion of rhetorical occasions or cir­
cumstances. Set pieces of public oratory belong to his subject 
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matter, of course, but so does any instance of disciplined 
speech, no matter where it falls: in eloquence proper, in 
poetry, in history, or in philosophy. This broadening does not 
come as something invented suddenly and wholly by Rapin. 
In many critical works of smaller compass, it had already left 
its effect on the vocabulary used in discussing works other 
than orations. The fundamental rhetorical processes of inven­
tion and expression, which are by nature hard to pin down, 
lent themselves to such uses. The feat of Rapin is to gather 
into a whole de grande envergure the principles and conse­
quences of this unsystematized tendency. 
By thus extending rhetoric to new fields, Rapin compli­
cates the role of the audience as judge of expression. The 
place of antilogism, the inevitability of shocks between op­
posed statements in matters of law or civic policy, had always 
been recognized in rhetorical theory. But the judge, whether 
thought of as one person or as an assembly of many persons, 
was hardly in the wide-open situation of Rapin's reader, who 
has before him, especially during the process of forming his 
taste, an immense number of works in a variety of genres. 
The change in the audience and in the scope of rhetorical 
judgment involves a change in the orator: he becomes any­
one " . .  . qui se mêle d'écrire et de parler." He had been 
an expert in possession of a genuine science that made him 
the master of the rhetorical situation. In Rapin's analysis this 
productive virtue, with its content of clear and certain knowl­
edge, is redefined as a habit of judgment. It is based on experi­
ence that may in turn give rise to reflections or maxims (when 
it bothers to make itself explicit) rather than to organized 
theory. It is more immediate than discursive in its way of 
working; and at times it seems less a habit than a natural 
power. 
In the most radical change of all, perhaps, the writer or 
speaker now faces judges who equal him in understanding, 
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background, and taste. I say faces; this is actually the ex­
pression of an ideal; Rapin looks forward to a time when 
poets, orators, historians, and philosophers, on the one hand, 
and their audiences, on the other, will all recognize essen­
tially the same rules and act according to essentially the same 
taste. If anything, Rapin wants to do more for audiences 
than for authors: 
Je ne dirai rien de l'excellence et du prix de ces lettres, sans
lesquelles la vie ne peut presque avoir aucune douceur ni aucun
agrément pour un honnête homme: parce que Ton trouve dans
le commerce de ces sciences tous les plaisirs de l'âme et tous les
cette honnêteté qui fait le commerce le plus doux de la vie, que
l'on ne peut parvenir presque à aucun degré de politesse, ni de
cette honnêteté qui fait le commerce le plus doux de la vie, que
par quelque teinture de ces facultés et par quelque connaissance
de ceux qui y ont excellé. [Comparaisons, I, (iii-iv).] 
But this honnête homme, this enlightened consumer (to speak 
as Valéry might), is on the way to becoming, as he approaches 
his ideal, a producer as well. Rapin continues: 
Ce ne fut que par là que Mécénas devint le favori du plus
grand empereur du monde, et le plus honnête homme de la cour
la plus polie qui ait peut-être jamais été. Outre qu'il avait un 
discernement exquis pour tous les ouvrages de l'esprit, il en 
faisait lui-même: et il encourageait ceux qui avaient du génie
pour les lettres, encore plus par son exemple que par ses libéra­
lités: car il faisait de beaux vers. [Comparaisons, I, (iv).] 
It would not be possible, I think, to say more clearly what 
Rapin has done to Quintilian: his teaching ideally forms, not 
the cultivated orator-statesman, but the courtier-connaisseur­
patron who writes verse à ses heures. 
In his Cicero and his Quintilian, Rapin read that the end 
of rhetoric is persuasion by means of discourse that pleases, 
instructs, and moves. It seems to be true that means tend 
naturally to substitute themselves for ends; in any case, that 
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happens here. For one thing, persuasion refers to something 
too specific for a scheme as broad as this one, which includes 
all the divisions and subdivisions of belles-lettres; for another, 
the term has essentially practical connotations: it suggests an 
agreement followed by action. Obviously Rapin needed a 
more flexible and speculative end. He found the answer in 
what had been the means to persuasion, in delectare, docere, 
and movere. Eloquence, he writes, is the "veritable art de 
plaire"—and at one stroke he has left behind all that limited 
him in persuasion. But note also the rest of the sentence: 
"L'éloquence, qui est le véritable art de plaire, n'y réussit 
jamais mieux qu'en imitant la nature." 8 This satisfies the in­
structive function, while subordinating it as a means to pleas­
ure. (I interpret nature here as any object or person which 
furnishes, when imitated by an author and recognized by his 
public, the speculative value I have just mentioned.) Rapin 
does not forget movere: 
L'éloquence qui ne touche que l'esprit, et ne va pas jusques 
au coeur, n'est pas une véritable éloquence. . .  . Et s'insinuant 
par des voies imperceptibles dans l'âme de ceux à qui elle parle, 
elle fait sur eux de si puissantes impressions, qu'ils semblent 
agir moins par jugement et par conseil, que par l'émotion 
et par impétuosité. Ainsi toutes ces beautés qui vont à l'esprit 
sans aller au coeur, ne sont point de véritables beautés. . . . 
[Réflexions, II, 20.] 
Above all the work must please, and the way to that end lies 
in appeals to thought and to feeling, in that order. In other 
words Rapin modifies and realigns the traditional principles: 
the over-riding aim of persuadere tends to disappear into 
docere and that plus movere become the means to delectare. 
The Academy had agreed on its prospectus in 1635. In 
1684, Rapin published the complete set of his Comparaisons 
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and Réflexions.9 What had been a live problem for almost 
fifty years had at last found its solution. A synthesis of con­
siderable power, backed by erudition tactfully used, it was 
far superior to anything his immediate predecessors had done. 
Vaugelas had stopped short of the main job, leaving it for 
Patru; Patru had lived and talked rhetoric but had not 
written it down; Bary and Le Gras had for the most part 
copied and rephrased Quintilian, since they understood the 
problem as a call to import ancient theory into the seven­
teenth century. Rapin saw that the old had to be thought 
through again, that it must be recast in an attractive form if 
it was to become truly available. He continues a conservative 
and backward-looking tradition but he shows signs of a genu­
inely independent talent: in the unusual structure of the 
work, in its steady effort to be discriminating, in its accessi­
bility, in its style. Contrary to the expectations of the Acad­
emy, the composition of a French rhetoric did not precede 
the writing of great literary works. Practice and the develop­
ment of theory went hand in hand, each explaining or illus­
trating the other; and when Rapin's synthesis appeared in 
its final form, French classicism was over. For us the special 
value of his work comes from this vital interrelation. I know 
of no better contemporary source to which one may turn 
for a summary of the literary culture to which the honnête 
homme aspired and of the common doctrine that writers knew 
even when they chose to interpret it freely. 
1. These are the titles of the Paris edition of 1684 in two volumes. 
They are repeated in the Amsterdam edition of 1709, also in two volumes, 
to which my footnotes refer. Where quotations are drawn from Volume I, 
I have identified them by the abbreviation Comparaisons; where they are 
taken from Volume II, I have used Réflexions. 
2. From "Le Dessein de cet ouvrage," Comparaisons, I, p. [il. 
3. Rapin recalls to his readers the story of Marcellus, who, according 
to Plutarch, gave Rome the "amour des belles choses" by pictures and 
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statues that he brought back from Syracuse and showed to the public. 
"C'est ce que je voudrais tâcher de faire, c'est-à-dire, d'affectionner notre 
siècle aux belles-lettres en lui proposant les grands modèles. . . . C'est 
même une espèce de méthode de devenir savant pour les gens de 
qualité, sans les obliger à descendre dans un détail trop mécanique de 
préceptes, et sans tomber dans les minuties de la^ construction et de la 
grammaire, qui est toujours désagréable aux gens d'un esprit déjà avancé" 
{Comparaisons, I, p. [v]). From the point of view of rhetorical theory, 
it has seemed to me more useful to study here the Réflexions rather than 
the Comparaisons. But the latter have a definite place in Rapin's program, 
as the lines just quoted show clearly. 
4. A detailed analysis of these reflections would be out of place here. 
For the wide scope of Rapin's exposé, note these lines: "Le premier volume 
(jui contient les réflexions sur l'éloquence a trois parties, les réflexions sur 
1 éloquence en général selon l'usage qu'elle a dans les lieux où l'on 
parle, sur l'éloquence du barreau, et sur l'éloquence de la chaire. Sur 
quoi tout ce qui peut s'observer dans l'usage de ces trois sortes d'éloquence 
est exactement observé: avec toutes les règles que chacun demande par 
son caractère dans un assez grand détail" {Comparaisons, pp. [vii-viiil). 
5. Préface, Réflexions, pp. [ii-iii]. 
6. Ibid., p. [viii]. Cf. also: "L'éloquence qui est le véritable art de 
plaire n'y réussit jamais mieux qu'en imitant la nature: ce n'est pas un 
moyen fort sûr pour persuader que de donner trop à l'art. . .  . Le 
souverain art de 1 éloquence est de s'attacher scrupuleusement à la nature 
comme à son premier original" (ibid., pp. 16-17). 
7. Ibid., p. 13. Other mistakes easily interprétable according to the 
basic schema are: " . .  . De réprésenter les objets plus grands que le 
naturel; de prendre un grand air en de petites affaires; d'affecter de grandes 
expressions en de petits sujets; faire le bel esprit avec le peuple; vouloir 
être ardent et pathétique dans des sujets qui ne le méritent pas; accabler 
les esprits faibles par des discours trop forts."—Ibid., p. 13. The explan­
ation is always the same. " . .  . Dès qu'on sort de la nature, tout 
devient faux dans l'éloquence" (jhid., p. 17). 
8. lbid., p. 13. 
9. He had published them in separate volumes over the period from 
1664 to 1681. Here are some salient facts. (  O Comparaisons: Homer and 
Virgil (two French editions in 1664 and 1669; three in Latin in 1684, 
1704, and 1707); Demosthenes and Cicero (two editions in 1676); (2) 
Réflexions: on poetics (editions in 1674, 1675, and again in 1675); on 
eloquence (editions in 1671, 1672, and 1679). The comparison of Plato 
and Aristotle appeared in 1671, that of Thucydides and Livy in 1681. 
The reflections on philosophy were published in 1676. I have found no 
sign of separate publication of the reflections on history; they may be 
combined in the Instructions pour l'histoire of 1677 a n d 1690, but I have 
not been able to consult either of those editions. Rapin's Oeuvres were 
published in 1709 and 1725; they included the Comparaisons and 
Réflexions. These dates and indications give some idea of the success and 
continuing impact of Rapin's thought. See also note 1, above, for the 
reference to the collected edition of the Comparaisons and Réflexions in 
1684. 
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Chapter III 
Port-Royal: Logic vs. Rhetoric (I) 
<HE SECOND EDITION of the Logique of Port-Royal, which 
appeared in 1664, includes an interesting discours. It is the 
second of two printed at the beginning of the volume. In 
this very substantial essay the authors—Arnauld and Nicole-
undertake to defend their logic against objections aroused by 
the first edition of 1662. One of these criticisms takes as its 
point of departure that what is supposed to be a treatise on 
logic contains so many sallies into rhetoric, ethics, physics, 
metaphysics, and geometry. The authors give first a general 
answer: in these excursions they can demonstrate the applica­
bility of their precepts. Instead of being an isolated exercise, 
logic moves into any and all discussions with its special help 
in the arts of knowing and judging. Then comes comment 
on several disciplines in particular; and rhetoric leads the list: 
t:, 
On a considéré, par exemple, en ce qui concerne la rhétorique, 
aue le secours qu'on en pouvait tirer pour trouver des pensées, 
des expressions, et des embellissements, n'était pas si considé­
rable. L'esprit fournit assez de pensées, l'usage donne les expres­
sions; et pour les figures et les ornements, on n'en a toujours 
que trop.1 
They refer, thus, immediately to invention and expression, 
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the principal moments of the rhetorical process, at least in 
its simplified form in which it concerns not oratory but com­
munication in general; and they lose no time in revealing an 
attitude toward the art that is basically hostile. 
They see no need for a method of invention and ex­
pression, since natural facility and usage are already more 
than sufficient. The addition of art leads one into bad ways 
of speaking and writing; it encourages false and hyperbolic 
thoughts, forced figures, and other vices of the "style rhétori­
cien."2 The real need is for a restraining force. One should 
not give free rein to thought in an inventive phase, and then, 
at the moment of expression, look about for elaborate ways 
of saying what one has found. Thought is supposed to be 
adequate to its object, not abundant; words are supposed to 
be a medium, not an element that attracts attention to itself 
thanks to decoration. These Jansenist minds know where to 
locate the restraining force—in their logic: "Or l'on trouvera 
peut-être autant de choses utiles dans cette logique pour con­
naître et pour éviter ces défauts que dans les livres qui en 
traitent expressément" (Logique, p. 28). 
I think it easy to see the reason for conflict and competi­
tion between these two arts. When thought and expression 
are removed from their full rhetorical and practical context 
(we have seen an outstanding example of this typical trend 
in Rapin's theory), there is nothing to separate the art which 
had traditionally regulated them from l'art de penser, the 
discipline of thought wherever it is exercised, in practice or 
in theory. The increasing prestige of mathematics and physics 
had a part in this process of comparison and interference. The 
partisans of the sciences generalized their techniques and 
sought new applications for them in a way that reminds one 
very much of the expansionist tendencies of the rhetoricians. 
And so, with the Cartesian sureness and consistency that is 
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so remarkable in the Logique, Arnauld and Nicole report at 
the outset on those areas where their art has met and purified 
rhetoric. 
In the last chapter of Part I, for example, they have defined 
the proper role of the figured style and given the "true rule" 
for distinguishing the good figures from the bad ones. In the 
chapter on lieux, or commonplaces, they have proposed ways 
of avoiding the empty copia that rhetoricians usually admire. 
In the chapter on errors in reasoning, they have insisted that 
the false can never be beautiful: 
L'article où Ton parle des mauvais raisonnements où l'Elo­
quence engage insensiblement, en apprenant à ne prendre jamais 
pour beau ce qui est faux, propose en passant une des plus 
importantes règles de la véritable rhétorique, et qui peut plus 
que toute autre former l'esprit à une manière d'écrire simple, 
naturelle et judicieuse. [Logique, pp. 28-29.] 
As Boileau was to say, eleven years later, "Rien n'est beau 
que le vrai. . . .  " Finally, in this same chapter, they have 
stressed the care one should take not to irritate those to whom 
one speaks: one thus avoids " . .  . un très grand nombre 
de défauts d'autant plus dangereux, qu'ils sont difficiles à re­
marquer" (Logique, p. 29). On that point the gentlemen of 
Port-Royal spoke from experience! 
Such are the points where the authors turn explicitly to 
rhetoric and use on it the astringent power of logic. In reality 
the implications of what they do are even more radical. The 
section on method (Part IV), one of the innovations in this 
logic, contains a latent mine of arguments against eloquence 
and its devices; and beyond that, the narrow conception of 
thought itself taken by Arnauld and Nicole as their starting 
point can never be reconciled, in any real sense of the word, 
with the liberal notion of elements or factors of persuasion 
on which the ancients had based their scientia bene dicendi. 
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The first passage relevant to the theory of rhetoric comes 
in the discussion of the meanings of words. After examining 
the way words signify, the authors of the Logique conclude 
that words have principal and accessory meanings. They con­
sequently recognize two degrees of expression. The first of 
these is aimed at when we try, by strict attention to the mean­
ings of words, to utter or write "la vérité toute nue" (Logique, 
p. 128). The second degree is sought when, in addition to 
telling the truth about things, we wish to convey the emotions 
we experience in conceiving or speaking of them. Such speech 
has the curious property of arousing feelings similar to ours 
in other people: whoever uses the figured style—the technical 
term for the second degree of expression—will be more mov­
ing to his listeners or readers, because the soul, though in­
structed by images of truths, is affected mainly by images of 
feelings ("mouvements"). Arnauld and Nicole quote the 
inevitable maxim from Horace: "Si vis me flere, dolendum 
est / Primum ipsi tibi" ("If you wish me to weep, you must 
first grieve yourself.") 
Something of what they mean by figure is clear from the 
example they give, part of a line from Virgil: "Usque adeone 
mori miserum est?"3 ("Is it, then, so painful to die?") In 
other words, the line would have been much less moving had 
it been merely a declaration, with the words arranged in the 
normal order for such a case. I infer, therefore, that the turns 
in question are what are traditionally called figures of thought, 
as opposed to figures of words or speech. A discussion such 
as the present one, located in the part of logic that deals with 
thought, conception, and definition, emphasizes predictably 
the kind of figurative expression which bears on what is 
said and on emotion rather than on word patterns as such. 
One may use language, then, for the exact rendering of 
thought or for communicating feelings as well. The problem 
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is to decide when each of these styles is appropriate. As for 
the "style figuré": 
II est visible qu'il est ridicule de s'en servir dans les matières 
purement spéculatives, que l'on regarde d'un oeil tranquille, et 
qui ne produisent aucun mouvement dans l'esprit. Car puisque 
les figures expriment les mouvements de notre âme, celles que 
l'on mêle en des sujets où l'âme ne s'émeut point, sont des 
mouvements contre la nature, et des espèces de convulsions. 
[Logique, p. 129.] 
There is nothing less agreeable than certain sermons where 
the prédicateurs exclaim indifferently about everything and 
are just as agitated in moments of philosophical reasoning as 
in what they say of the most striking and necessary truths of 
salvation. As faults go, improper presence of figures is matched 
by improper absence of them. Here the Port-Royalists criticize 
the scholastics for the bareness of their style. Their manner 
of expression is less capable of arousing feelings of respect and 
love for Christian truth, and also less agreeable because, for 
the listener, pleasure comes more from feeling than from pure 
learning. 
The position of the Logique is now clear: not elimination 
of a favorite rhetorical device, but restriction in the use of 
it, restriction so severe that it calls into question the place 
of emotion as a persuasive force of which a speaker may 
avail himself. One may agree with Port-Royal that preaching 
is an essential activity and still go on to ask what consequences 
this doctrine of levels of expression will have for the large 
number of people who are not involved directly in the 
saving of souls but who do care about method and good 
judgment in secular affairs. There the problem of using 
rhetoric as an art of thought and expression (and even of 
behavior) becomes acute. On good classical precedent it 
claimed to be a universal technique; in what appears to be 
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merely a brief discussion of figures, Arnauld and Nicole are 
actually challenging the structure of rhetorical discipline. For 
they are cutting out, in everything except sacred oratory, most 
of the third link in the rhetorical chain of invention, arrange­
ment, and elocution. Their attitude represents, in the first 
place, a tremendous change in emphasis. With the authority 
of Cicero behind him, Quintilian speaks of elocution as the 
hardest part of rhetoric: "Plus exigunt laboris et curae quae 
sequuntur. Hinc enim jam elocutionis rationem tractabimus, 
partem operis, ut inter omnes oratores convenit, difficillimam." 
("More work and diligence are required in what follows. For 
now we shall discuss the theory of elocution or style, which is 
the most difficult part of the art, as all orators agree.") (De 
institutione oratorio. VIII. proemium. 13.) It is the process in 
which art shows itself most clearly, invention and arrange­
ment being within the capacity of any intelligent man. "Et 
Marcus Tullius inventionem quidem ac dispositionem pru­
dentis hominis putat, eloquentiam oratoris, ideoque praecipue 
circa praecepta partis hujus laboravit." ("Cicero, too, believes 
that any intelligent man is capable of invention and arrange­
ment, but elocution belongs to the orator alone, and conse­
quently he gave particular care to the rules for this part of the 
art.") (Ibid., 14.) The real orator comes into his own at this 
point. 
In the next place, the very nature of the expressive process, 
as viewed by the rhetorician, is bound to conflict with the 
assumptions and special interests of the logician. The former 
sees that process as a movement from correctness ("latinitas") 
to clarity and order ("perspicuitas" and "collocatio") to ele­
gance ("ornatus," "figurae"). Thus Quintilian: "Igitur, quam 
Graeci <j>pd(nv vocant, latine dicimus elocutionem. Ea spec­
tatur verbis aut singulis aut conjunctis. In singulis intuendum 
est ut sint latina, perspicua, ornata, ad id quod efficere volumus 
accommodata; in conjunctis, ut emendata, ut collocata, ut 
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figurata." ("What the Greeks call phrasis, we name in Latin 
elocution or style. It may be considered in individual words 
or in groups of words. Where they are taken singly, we must 
be sure that they are Latin, clear, elegant and appropriate to 
the desired effect; where they are joined together, we must 
see to it that they are correct, well-placed, and adorned with 
figures.") (De institutions oratorio. VIII. i. i.) In other words, 
in its last and most important stage, expression necessarily 
tends away from the simple to the complex, from the usual 
to the rare. The emphasis on tropes and figures, the subtleties, 
the numerous and overlapping definitions—to the logician all 
of these are clearly extravagant. To him the art of eloquence 
serves mainly to complicate gratuitously the problem of ex­
pressing and conveying truth. 
Finally, in the third place, the Port-Royalists distrust in a 
basic way the power that obviously lies in speech fashioned 
by this art. The affirmations of Cicero and Quintilian con­
cerning the admiration for the speaker and the sympathy for 
his cause which are aroused by rhetorical devices easily seem 
to ally themselves with duplicity, with insincerity, with will­
ingness to faire flèche de tout bois, so long as the end is 
achieved.4 Rien nest beau que le vrai as a principle is under­
mined by any such pragmatism (and I believe that rhetoric 
is definitely a species of pragmatism); it is in danger of 
becoming rien n'est vrai que l'utile, and beauty need not 
necessarily belong to or result from a true demonstration, 
since it is something that has been added to thought. 
And so the Port-Royalists solve the problem by distinguish­
ingfirmly between the language of matières purement spécula­
tives and discourse on religious matters. Instead of pages and 
pages of turns and figures of speech and thought, with com­
ments and examples of their power, use, and misuse, we have 
a short treatment of the way words signify. In addition to their 
principal references, they have accessory meanings, that is, 
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indexes of feeling. A figurative style, such as one sees in the 
church fathers and in the practice of those who preach well, 
may properly work with these accessory meanings. 
The extreme reduction worked on the topics of figures and 
elocution is matched by another and more explicit attack—the 
word is not too strong—on traditional rhetorical theory. It 
occurs in chapter XVI of Part 3 of the Logique ("Du rai­
sonnement"). The heading of the chapter reads tendentiously, 
"Des lieux ou de la méthode de trouver des arguments. Com­
bien cette méthode est de peu d'usage" (p. 290). The first 
thing to note is the point in their treatise at which the Port-
Royalists choose to discuss the commonplaces or starting points 
of rhetorical reasoning. That choice gives right away an idea 
of the revolution in intellectual style at which the Logique 
aims. In Aristotle, in Cicero, in Quintilian, invention comes 
first, before all matters of arrangement and expression; in this 
work Arnauld and Nicole do not approach the subject until 
they have first considered problems of ideas or conceptions and 
problems of judgment (that is, of combining ideas), until in 
fact they have almost reached the end of the treatment of 
reasoning (that is, of combining judgments). To be precise, 
we hear nothing of invention until the doctrine of Port-Royal 
has been expounded in its positive phase and the moment for 
critical or polemic conclusions is at hand. 
The authors know exactly what they are doing; their posi­
tion strikes directly at a key point of ancient theory: "II est 
donc assez inutile de se mettre en peine en quel ordre on doit 
traiter des lieux, puisque c'est une chose à peu près indiffé­
rente. Mais il serait peut-être plus utile d'examiner s'il ne 
serait point plus à propos de n'en traiter point du tout" 
{Logique, p. 291). They realize that the ancients had a high 
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esteem for this subject which may be treated in any order 
and which may indeed be skipped altogether. 
On sait que les Anciens ont fait un grand mystère de cette
méthode, et que Cicéron la préfère même à toute la dialectique,
telle qu'elle était enseignée par les Stoïciens, parce qu'ils ne 
parlaient point des lieux. . . . Quintilien et tous les autres 
rhétoriciens, Aristote et tous les philosophes, en parlent de 
même; de sorte que l'on aurait peine à n'être pas de leur 
sentiment, si l'expérience générale n'y paraissait entièrement 
opposée. [Logique, pp. 291-92.] 
One winces to see the juxtapositions and mixings made so 
readily in that passage. In a train of sweeping formulas Cicero, 
''Quintilien et tous les autres rhétoriciens, Aristote et tous les 
philosophes . . .  " are presented as saying essentially the 
same things. Arnauld and Nicole do not bother to discriminate 
between the thorough pedagogy of Quintilian and the urbane 
discretion of Cicero—but I suppose that that difference is not, 
after all, a basic one. More striking is that they obviously fail 
to keep separate what Aristotle said in his theory and what 
later happened to rhetoric when it was turned into a method 
applicable everywhere. For Aristotle, rhetoric was one art 
among many arts and sciences, having its specific purpose 
(persuasion) and its subject matter (questions not susceptible 
of a scientific treatment that arise in particular circumstances 
before a particular audience); whereas for Cicero and Quin­
tilian, it is the art, the science; in fact, for them it is co­
extensive with philosophy. It even improves on philosophy 
by virtue of its technique of expression, which makes wisdom 
easier to communicate and to practice than would otherwise 
be possible. These differences in ways of defining the art are 
not casual but pervasive, so that invention or the use of com­
monplaces can never refer to the same thing in Aristotle and 
in the two others. 
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Niceties of historical semantics do not interest the authors 
of the Logique. They have evidently taken as their basic text 
something like the enthusiastic chapters in Book II of Cicero's 
De oratore. For example, one reads there: "His igitur locis in 
mente et cogitatione defixis et in omni re ad dicendum posita 
excitatis, nihil erit quod oratorem effugere possit, non modo in 
forensibus disceptationibus, sed omnino in ullo genere di­
cendi."5 ("With these commonplaces fixed in one's mind and 
memory and called up with every subject proposed for dis­
cussion, there is nothing that can escape the orator, not only 
in matters debated in the forum, but in any kind of elo­
quence.") But general experience, the experience of almost 
all those who have studied the "méthode des lieux" belies this 
optimistic view. Is there a single one, the authors go on to ask, 
who learned this technique in the collèges and who can really 
say that, when he came to treat some subject, he reflected on 
the commonplaces and that he found there the principles he 
needed? However, there are more fundamental objections, 
theoretical ones this time, to the use of this method. Here the 
Port-Royalists turn to St. Augustine: 
De sorte que l'on peut dire véritablement des lieux ce que
Saint Augustin dit en général des préceptes de la rhétorique. On
trouve, dit-il, que les règles de l'éloquence sont observées dans 
les discours des personnes éloquentes, quoi qu'ils n'y pensent pas 
en les faisant, soit qu'ils les sachent, soit qu'ils les ignorent. Ils 
pratiquent ces règles, parce qu'ils sont éloquents; mais ils ne 
s'en servent pas pour être éloquents. Implent quippe Ma quia 
sunt éloquentes, non adhibent ut sint éloquentes. L'on marche 
naturellement, comme ce même père le remarque en un autre 
endroit. [Logique, p. 293.] 
It is the same judgment that they offered in the second 
preliminary discourse. Natural powers and their operations 
suffice in knowing and speaking. Nature has no real need 
of an art to perfect it, and so, as an immediate consequence, 
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rules and commonplaces are denied the fertility that Cicero 
had seen in them. Instead of helping in a situation where one 
must find suitable things to say, they merely describe what 
expert speakers did in the past.6 Their status is almost, if 
not entirely, speculative rather than productive. Cicero had 
objected to the dialectic of the Stoics because it was of no 
use in finding arguments but limited itself to criticizing and 
analyzing them once they are found. The Port-Royalists are, 
in effect, reducing his method of the loci argumentorum to 
the impotence he had hoped to avoid. 
Since an inventive art is not necessary, we are not surprised 
to be told that if we impose and apply one anyway, it may 
actually hinder and corrupt the operations of the natural 
powers. The commonplaces, by their very nature, enter into 
all discourse, " . .  . mais ce n'est pas en y faisant une ré­
flexion expresse que Ton produit ces pensées: cette réflexion 
ne pouvant servir qu'à ralentir la chaleur de l'esprit, et à 
l'empêcher de trouver les raisons vives et naturelles qui sont 
les vrais ornements de toutes sortes de discours."7 
Something even more pernicious, a bad mental disposition, 
arises from the application of the method. It encourages a 
facility that is only too common anyway, a readiness to "dis­
courir de tout à perte de vue" (Logique, p. 296), and a 
taste for the copia rhetorum; and it discourages willingness to 
make the effort needed for accurate thought. The Port-
Royalists want to lead us away from habits of judgment that 
depend finally on the audience; the ideal image of people 
surrendering to the flow of eloquent language has no appeal 
for them. We should respond instead to the call of the object 
being known, to the demands of the subject matter. True 
thought does not invent according to arbitrary recipes; it dis­
covers. The full force of the term "commonplace" is felt here, 
and that of its antonym, the proper place. When one applies 
a stock of generalities to all objects of inquiry and discussion, 
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distinctions become vague and differences fade into a more 
or less spurious unity. "L'esprit s'accoutume à cette facilité, 
et ne fait plus d'effort pour trouver les raisons propres, par­
ticulières et naturelles, qui ne se découvrent que dans la 
considération attentive de son sujet" (Logique, p. 295). 
Some interesting rapprochements with Descartes suggest 
themselves here. In the Discours de la méthode, his criticisms 
of scholastic logic and of its concern with the forms of the 
syllogism take at bottom the same form as those of the 
Port-Royalists as regards rhetoric and invention. The syllo­
gism, says Descartes, is not a technique for finding the truth, 
though one may expound what one already knows in that 
form. The human mind is naturally capable of moving in an 
orderly fashion from principles to consequences, that is, of 
deduction. There is no need for it to learn how to go through 
this process; bringing in at this point a superfluous art, com­
parable in science to the method of commonplaces in rhetoric, 
merely invites trouble. Furthermore, the forms of reasoning 
are dangerous in application because they have a validity 
that does not depend on the truth of the materials cast in 
them. They tempt us to let perfection of form legitimize 
confused ideas and false principles, since the coherence of 
the argument may make it pass in spite of the content. Des-
cartes, Arnauld, and Nicole obviously share the same confi­
dence in nature8 and the same desire to set aside formalisms 
that interfere with the normal workings of human powers. 
But Descartes is involved also in the trend away from the use 
of the lieux communs. As Gilson points out, Descartes reduces 
scholastic logic to dialectic, and then dialectic, in turn, to the 
method of the commonplaces, as is clear from the Entretien 
avec Burman : 
Ea potius est dialectica, cum doceat nos de omnibus rebus 
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disserere, quam logica, quae de omnibus rebus demonstrationes 
dat. Et sic bonam mentem magis evertit quam adstruit, nam dum 
nos divertit et digredi facit in nos locos communes et capita, quae 
rei externa sunt, divertit nos ab ipsa rei natura.9 
("That is dialectic, when it teaches us to discourse on all 
matters, rather than logic, which furnishes demonstrations in all 
matters. And so it overturns good sense instead of building on it; 
for, as it turns us aside and causes us to digress into common­
places and topics, which are external to the thing, it diverts us 
from the nature itself of the thing.") 
Ever since Aristotle, rhetoric had been the counterpart in 
practice of dialectic, and one of the resemblances had been 
that both disciplines, being divorced from specific subject 
matters, must appeal for principles to topics or distinctions 
that are broadly applicable. And now, by a concurrence that 
underlines once more the deep influence of Cartesianism on 
Port-Royal, one sees Descartes defending his logic, that is. 
his method, against dialectic—basically a theoretical rhetoric 
—while Arnauld and Nicole defend essentially the same logic 
against rhetoric—basically a practical dialectic. Each attacks 
the method of commonplaces wherever he finds it, and for 
essentially the same reasons.10 
Between the critical observations on rhetorical topics and 
the next main section—on method—Arnauld and Nicole in­
sert two chapters on bad reasonings or "sophisms," first in 
science or theory, and then in civil life and ordinary discourse. 
The second kind of error concerns us directly, because to 
uncover certain sophisms is to see through the art of the 
rhetorician. 
Errors of judgment—for here, as always in this logic, the 
real point of departure is the judgment—are analyzed accord­
ing to their origins. Some are due to causes within us, in 
general to abuses of the will, where reasons reflect not the 
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true but the useful or what is advantageous for us. Others 
arise from the characteristics of things outside us; they deceive 
us because they appear to be, as well as are, and we take the 
appearances for the realities. With necessary cross-references 
for cases in which a mixing of sources of error occurs, the 
development follows the two lines indicated by the chapter 
titles: "Des sophismes d'amour propre, d'intérêt, et de passion" 
and "Des faux raisonnements qui naissent des objets mêmes." 
We do not ordinarily adopt an opinion because of genuine 
reasons but because of some usefulness it has for us: that is 
the fundamental fact in this account of false reasoning. It 
turns almost imperceptibly into an account of how people are 
effectively persuaded. 
Si Ton examine avec soin ce qui attache ordinairement les 
hommes plutôt à une opinion qu'à une autre, on trouvera que 
ce n'est pas la pénétration de la vérité, et la force des raisons; 
mais quelque lien d'amour propre, d'intérêt ou de passion. C'est 
le poids qui emporte la balance, et qui nous détermine dans la 
plupart de nos doutes. . . . Nous jugeons des choses, non par 
ce qu'elles sont en elles-mêmes; mais par ce qu'elles sont à notre 
égard: et la vérité et l'utilité ne sont pour nous qu'une même 
chose. [Logique, pp. 333-34.] 
Here the Port-Royalists take a characteristic turn. Instead of 
adjusting themselves to this disturbing personal factor, and 
exploiting it by the rules of an art, they decry it and their 
rules are designed to reduce or eliminate this factor. To them 
there is nothing less reasonable than to make our self-interest 
into a reason for believing something. All that our self-
interest can properly do is to lead us to consider more atten­
tively where the truth lies, and " . .  . il n'y a que cette 
vérité, qui se doit trouver dans la chose même, indépendam­
ment de nos désirs, qui nous doive persuader" (Logique, 
PP- 334-35)­
Any attempt to teach or persuade another mind must 
reckon with this pessimistic view of the way persuasion takes 
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place. According to the Jansenists, man is by nature self-
centered, he naturally desires every advantage for himself, 
with the unavoidable corollary that every man is naturally 
jealous, envious, and ill-disposed whenever he sees some 
superiority in another. Here is the practical consequence : 
La connaissance de cette disposition maligne et envieuse, qui 
réside dans le fond du coeur des hommes, nous fait voir qu'une 
des plus importantes règles qu'on puisse garder, pour n'engager 
pas dans l'erreur ceux à qui on parle, et ne leur donner point 
d'éloignement de la vérité qu'on leur veut persuader, est de 
n'irriter que le moins qu'on peut leur envie et leur jalousie en 
parlant de soi, et en leur présentant les objets auxquels elle [sic] 
se puisse attacher. [Logique, pp. 340-41.] 
The wise man is careful to "se cacher dans la presse" and to 
hide any marks of personal advantage, lest distaste for his 
person spread to the opinions he wants to teach. Pascal had 
carried the rule to its logical conclusion: 
Feu Mr. Pascal, qui savait autant de véritable rhétorique, que 
personne en ait jamais su, portait cette règle jusqu'à prétendre 
qu'un honnête homme devait éviter de se nommer, et même de 
se servir des mots de je et de moi, et il avait accoutumé de dire 
sur ce sujet, que la piété chrétienne anéantit le moi humain, et 
que la civilité humaine le cache et le supprime. [Logique, p. 341.] 
This fascinating passage shows beyond a doubt the true 
intention of this section of the Logique. If the "genuine kind" 
of rhetoric tries to do away with all awareness of the speaker, 
what does that imply for the other kind of rhetoric? The first 
place to look for an answer, I think, is in the theory of Aris­
totle. In Book II of his Rhetoric, he examines through seven­
teen chapters the role of the speaker as a means or source of 
persuasion quite apart from his power of inventing arguments. 
For he takes his place as one of three causes leading to per­
suasion; the other two are the speech or proof and the dis­
positions of the hearers.11 It is essential for the orator to 
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establish early in the game an impression of good sense, good 
character, and good will (Rhetoric IL i. 1378*. 6). He should, 
moreover, make the most of the possibility of exciting by 
knowledge and technique his hearer's feelings. At this point 
Aristotle enters on his famous and cold-blooded analysis of 
passions (considering the states of mind in which each is 
felt, the people toward whom each is felt, and the grounds 
on which it is felt) and of characters (considering the feel­
ings and qualities that follow typically from various ages and 
degrees of fortune). He expects the orator to know all these 
things and to use his knowledge, especially in political oratory 
and in the law courts, where he will wish to influence juries 
and audiences by appeals to emotions and to accepted ideas 
as well as by proofs. Whereas the Port-Royalists see almost 
exclusively the negative possibilities introduced into the situ­
ation by feelings, Aristotle and other ancient theoreticians see 
both negative and positive possibilities. The emotional factor 
may work either way; it is, therefore, the business of the art 
to make this factor serve the advantage of the speaker. 
The discussion of 7ra0os and rjOos is continued by Cicero 
and Quintilian, where the analysis becomes even more prag­
matic and more sharply focussed on results than it had been 
in Aristotle. No one of the three functions of the orator 
Qconciliare, docere, movere) is sufficient in itself to persuade, 
though in a particular case one or another of them may need 
more emphasis. But on the specific point of the need for a 
speaker to make himself acceptable and amiable to the audi­
ence, Antonius speaks with a bluntness that can hardly have 
escaped the authors of the Logique: 
. . . Nihil est enim in dicendo, Catule, maius quam ut faveat 
oratori is qui audiet, utique ipse sic moveatur, ut impetu quodam 
animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. 
Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate 
aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe aut timoré aut errore 
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aut aliqua permotione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut 
juris norma aliqua aut iudidi formula aut legibus. [De oratore 
II. xlii. 178.] 
("Now in speaking, Catulus, there is nothing more important 
than that the hearer be favorably inclined to the speaker and 
that he be so moved that he is swayed by some impulse or 
excitement of mind more than by judgment or deliberation. For 
men decide many more things by hate or love or desire or anger 
or grief or joy or hope or fear or error or some other inner 
affection than by truth or precept or legal principle or judicial 
form or laws.") 
So far the diagnosis reads very much like that of the Port-
Royalists: men's opinions depend more on passions than on 
truth. However, the orator accepts this as a fact and bases on 
it his effort to establish a favorable image of himself in the 
mind of the listener. 
Valet igitur multum ad vincendum probari mores et instituta et 
facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum pro quibus, et 
item improbari adversariorum animosque eorum, apud quos age­
tur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam quom erga ora­
torem turn erga ilium, pro quo dicet orator. [De oratore II. xliii. 
182.] 
("It is very important to success that the morals, principles, 
deeds, and lives of those who plead cases and of their clients be 
approved, and that those of their adversaries be censured; and 
also that the minds of the judges be won over as much as possible 
to a favorable disposition both toward the speaker and toward 
the one on whose behalf he speaks.") 
When the topic of movere has its turn, we have an even 
clearer indication of the lengths to which the advocate will 
go in the manipulation of passions for the sake of his case. 
It is desirable, says Antonius, that the judge bring to the 
case a positive attitude toward the advocate; then the problem 
is merely to currentem incitare, to spur the galloping horse. 
If this starting advantage is lacking, the orator will know how 
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to proceed. Like a doctor studying a patient, he will use all 
his energy and thought to grasp the feelings, opinions, and 
expectations of the judge, in order to see from what stand­
point he may persuade most easily; he will turn his sail to 
the point from which the breeze presents itself. If the judge 
has no passions or prejudices, the speaker will have to work 
harder, but the power of the word is such that he may work 
confidently: 
Sin est integer quietusque iudex, plus est operis; sunt enim 
omnia dicendo excitanda, nihil adjuvante natura. Sed tantum 
vim habet ilia, quae recte a bono poeta dicta est, flexanim atque 
omnium regina rerum oratio, ut non modo inclinantem excipere 
aut stantem inclinare, sed etiam adversantem ac repugnantem, 
ut imperator fortis ac bonus, capere possit. [De oratore II. xliv. 
187.] 
("However, if the judge is unbiased, and free from passion, 
the task is harder; for everything must then be called forth by 
oratory, with no help from nature. But so great is the power of 
eloquence, which was rightly called by a good poet, 'Incliner of 
the soul, and queen of all things/ that it can not only make 
straight one who is biased or bias one who is upright, but can 
even, like a good and brave commander, make a prisoner of a 
resisting opponent.") 
It will be noted that the appeal is to oratio, not to ratio. 
But the emotions of love, hate, fear, or pity appropriate to 
the occasion must be somehow present in the speaker if he is 
to excite those emotions in the hearers. The demands made 
on him by his cases and subjects would seem to be so varied 
that he would have to study and practice the art of the actor. 
On the contrary, says Antonius, " . .  . magna vis est earum 
sententiarum atque eorum locorum quos agas tractesque di­
cendo, nihil ut opus sit simulatione et fallaciis. Ipsa enim 
natura orationis eius, quae suscipitur ad aliorum animos per­
movendos, oratorem ipsum magis etiam, quam quemquam 
eorum qui audiunt, permovet." ("So great is the force in those 
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thoughts and commonplaces which you handle and discuss in 
speaking that there is no need for pretense or deceit; for the 
very nature of the language which is adopted to move the 
passions of others moves the orator himself more than any one 
of his listeners.") (De oratore II. xlvi. 191.) His own speech 
intoxicates him! 
Quintilian's views parallel those of Cicero. He recognizes 
the place of emotion in all parts of the speech; he emphasizes 
its importance in the exordium and in the peroration, two 
sections where conciliare and movere are especially to be 
sought.12 He stresses once more the decisive part played by 
feelings in persuasion, and pares down correspondingly the 
importance of proofs: to affect the judge or listener, to cause 
him to weep, "Hue igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus ejus, hie 
labor est, sine quo cetera nuda, jejuna, infirma, ingrata sunt, 
adeo velut spiritus operis hujus atque animus est in affecti­
bus." ("To this end, therefore, the orator must devote himself; 
this is his task and work; without this the rest is bare, spirit­
less, weak and unattractive; for the soul and the life, so to 
speak, of oratory are found in the emotions.") (De institutione 
oratoria, VI. ii. 7.) Finally, he asserts that one must feel the 
emotions to be communicated to one's audience. Here he goes 
beyond Cicero and proposes a technique for arousing oneself. 
By the power of imagination an orator or advocate can repre­
sent so vividly to himself the issues and acts of which he 
speaks that he becomes in effect a spectator and reacts as a 
spectator would. 
The contrast is total with Port-Royal. On the one hand, 
the speaker whose mind and efforts are based on imposing 
his truth by argument, yes, but especially by force of character 
and by manipulation of feelings, and, on the other hand, the 
speaker who effaces himself, who wants no coloring of the 
moi to deflect the judgment of the listener, who leaves all or 
as much as possible to the force of reasons springing from 
the nature of things. The classical theory apparently invites 
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the audience to fall into and the speaker to bring about the 
very "sophismes d'amour propre, d'intérêt et de passion" 
against which the Logique supposedly gives protection. 
The leading principle of the next discussion of sophisms is 
that one may take the appearance of the thing for the reality, 
the unimportant aspect of it for the essential part, the part 
which should motivate judgment. This brings us into a sig­
nificant comparison of judgment in art and judgment in elo­
quence. "Aussi ceux qui sont intelligents dans la peinture 
estiment infiniment plus le dessein que le coloris ou la déli­
catesse du pinceau, néanmoins les plus ignorants sont plus 
touchés d'un tableau, dont les couleurs sont vives et éclatantes, 
que d'un autre plus sombre, qui serait admirable pour le 
dessein" (Logique, pp. 355-56). In passing, one should note 
the very strong preference implied in that "infiniment." The 
argument continues: in the judgment of paintings the ig­
norant are likely to defer to the expert, so the frequency of 
error is less notable than in other things where everyone feels 
free to judge, and such is the case with eloquence. "On ap­
pelle, par exemple, un prédicateur éloquent lorsque ses 
périodes dont bien justes, et qu'il ne dit point de mauvais 
mots; et sur ce fondement M. de Vaugelas dit en un endroit, 
qu'un mauvais mot fait plus de tort à un prédicateur ou un 
avocat qu'un mauvais raisonnement" (Logique, p. 556). The 
terms of the analogy begin to be clarified: drawing and color 
correspond to reasoning and words or expression. 
But let us digress for a moment to note the reference to 
Vaugelas. His Remarques sur la langue française (of 1647, 
fifteen years before the first edition of the Port-Royal Logique) 
are obviously designed to fit into a rhetorical approach to 
language. He looks forward to the coming of a French Quin­
tilian. In referring to Vaugelas, Arnauld and Nicole show us 
PORT-ROYAL: LOGIC VS. RHETORIC ( I  ) 
indirectly the actuality of their treatment of rhetoric; they 
were not simply attacking ancient authorities; they had their 
sights on contemporary and official representatives of the 
classical point of view. 
One must believe, they go on to say, that Vaugelas was 
speaking of a matter of fact, of a situation that exists, but of 
which he does not approve. It is true that there are people who 
judge sermons and legal arguments in this way, " . .  . mais 
il est vrai aussi qu'il n'y a rien de moins raisonnable que ces 
jugements: car la pureté du langage, le nombre des figures 
sont tout au plus dans l'éloquence, ce que le coloris est dans 
la peinture, c'est-à-dire, que ce n'en est que la partie la plus 
basse et la plus matérielle . . .  " (Logique, p. 356). 
What seemed to emerge in the discussion of figurative 
language—that the Port-Royalists would find little of interest 
in the part of rhetoric known as elocution—is confirmed here. 
Conceptions based on things, conceptions which speakers 
and writers transmit as they are, with all of their original 
liveliness—that is what Arnauld and Nicole want everyone 
to strive for, the one exception13 being religious truths. There 
the prédicateur should try to express and to communicate the 
feelings with which he conceives those truths. Once more 
we find ourselves returning to the point that an artistic theory 
of expression is unnecessary and pernicious. Both clear con­
ception and moving language may be found in people who 
have no special interest in words. In fact those two virtues 
are rare among those who apply themselves consciously to 
such matters. 
. . . C'est ce qui se peut rencontrer en des personnes peu 
exactes dans la langue, et peu justes dans le nombre, et qui 
se rencontre même rarement dans ceux qui s'appliquent trop 
aux mots, et aux embellissements, parce que cette vue les détourne 
des choses, et affaiblit la vigueur de leurs pensées, comme les 
peintres remarquent que ceux qui excellent dans le coloris, n'excel­
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lent pas ordinairement dans le dessein, l'esprit n'étant pas capable 
de cette double application, et l'une nuisant à l'autre. [Logique, 
PP- 356-57-] 
The ornamented language and especially the eloquence Cicero 
calls abundantem sonantibus verbis uberibusque sententiis 
may conceal falsities. The decorations not only make it 
harder for the audience to discern the truth; they actually 
lead speakers astray: be on your guard, say the Port-Royalists, 
when you hear an orator begin a long gradation or an anti­
thesis with several members; his figures will probably cause 
him to twist the truth in order to make it fit the " . .  . vain 
ouvrage de paroles qu'il veut former" (Logique, p. 358). 
"Pointes," rhyme, Ciceronian expressions, allusions to pagan 
divinities (they ridicule Cardinal Bembo for saying that a 
pope had been elected by the favor of the immortal gods, 
deorum immortalium beneficiis^)—al\ are sources of errors often 
unperceived by those who utter them, so dazzled are they by 
their own words. 
It is here that the logicians make absolutely clear the aes­
thetic implications of their doctrine. 
Les faux raisonnements de cette sorte que l'on rencontre si 
souvent dans les écrits de ceux qui affectent le plus d'être 
éloquents, font voir combien la plupart des personnes qui parlent, 
ou qui écrivent, auraient besoin d'être bien persuadées ae cette 
excellente règle, qu'il n'y a rien de beau, que ce qui est vrai: 
ce qui retrancherait des discours une infinité de vains ornements 
et de pensées fausses. [Logique, p. 360.] 
The argument for the "véritable rhétorique" reaches its 
climax at this point. It sets itself up in opposition to the theory 
of thought and expression that was at the same time being 
recovered and restated from the ancients. "Rien n'est beau que 
le vrai," the cardinal principle of French classicism, has one 
of its most vigorous expressions and justifications in this logic. 
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But the curious thing is that neither logic, as here conceived, 
nor rhetoric, as Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian conceived it, 
has a place for an independent beauty that is an end in itself. 
All concerned agree on that; they begin to differ when they 
say on what primary value beauty depends. With the Port-
Royalists, it follows from truth; Quintilian represents the 
other side when he declares succinctly: "Numquam vera 
species ab utilitate dividitur." ("True beauty is never separate 
from utility.") (De institutione oratorio. II. viii. 2.) With the 
former, truth is established by demonstration, with Quintilian 
by persuasion; and for both, beauty must be subordinate to 
the primary aim or technique. The overriding utilitas points 
to the heart of the matter for the rhetorician, who is basically 
skeptical. He is ready to make a case for either side of the 
question, and he is willing to consent to the verdict of a third 
party. For him truth comes out of a contest for someone's 
adherence to an opinion, and in that context what one decides 
to say is tested by the criterion of effectiveness in causing 
adherence. To the logician the nature of things and the nature 
of thought are decisive; truth emerges from the effort to bring 
the two into coincidence. Once achieved, the truth is laid 
before the third party, who is not expected to judge it, as 
though he stood above it, but rather to recognize it and to 
submit to it. The Port-Royalists are quite prepared to pay 
the price: 
II est vrai que cette exactitude rend le style plus sec et moins
pompeux; mais elle le rend aussi plus vif, plus sérieux, plus 
clair, et plus digne d'un honnête nomme: l'impression en est 
bien plus forte, et bien plus durable; au lieu que celle qui naît
simplement de ces périodes si ajustées, est tellement superficielle,
qu'elle s'évanouit presque aussitôt qu'on les a entendues. [Logique, 
p. 360.] 
The "sophisme de l'autorité" and the "sophisme de la 
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manière" belong also in the category of mistaking some ap­
pearance or external mark for the reality or the truth. In 
the first of these, age or piety or moderation or wealth or rank 
or erudition or some other quality of the author is taken as a 
sign of truth and a stimulus of judgment. Since the minds 
of men are ordinarily "faibles et obscurs, pleins de nuages et 
de faux jours" (Logique, p. 365), they usually accept the 
views held by people having some visible qualification or title 
to authority. Although there is no necessary connection be­
tween the truth and such marks, this 'Voie de persuader" often 
prevails. Of course, Arnauld and Nicole make a distinction 
between legitimate authority and the unimportant or mis­
leading kind. One must respect that of the Church in matters 
of faith and the mysteries of salvation, but elsewhere in­
trusions of authority are often causes of error. 
Mais dans les choses dont la connaissance n'est pas absolument
nécessaire et que Dieu a laissées davantage au discernement de
la raison de chacun en particulier l'autorité et la manière ne 
sont pas si considérables, et elles servent souvent à engager 
plusieurs personnes en des jugements contraires à la vérité. 
[Logique, p. 366.] 
It will be readily noted that this treatment of authority is, 
from the point of view of rhetoric, another attack on the 
speaker as a means of persuasion. The suppression of the -moi 
that, as we have seen, is required in argumentation for reasons 
of piety and honnêteté and the avoidance of authority in 
instances where such pressure is not called for: these two ideas 
complement and reinforce one another. 
Actually the position of the Port-Royalists as regards the 
image and role of the speaker or writer has even a further 
nuance, one that allows them to assimilate as much as possible 
of the traditional concern for the sensibilities of the audience. 
Here I am thinking of their final chapter on the subject of 
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bad reasoning in which they treat what they call "manière." 
By this term they mean something other than signs like age 
or piety as the bases of authority, and, also, something distinct 
from style. They are referring to a man's way of stating the 
truth, or, more specifically, to the moral attitude that under­
lies that way. For example, one is more inclined to believe 
the person who speaks easily, with gravity, moderation, and 
gentleness than to believe the person who shows anger, hos­
tility, or presumption. Once more the authors of the Logique 
remind us that these external tokens may deceive; we in the 
audience must consider "manière" and "fond" separately. 
Nevertheless, it is in connection with manner that Arnauld 
and Nicole enunciate what they call the greatest principle of 
rhetoric. One cannot but think that here they are drawing on 
bitter experience in the furore over Jansenius' book on Augus­
tine and Pascal's Lettres provinciales. If it is reasonable to be 
on one's guard against deciding an issue on the basis of the 
way it is proposed, it is equally reasonable for the persuader 
to seek to clothe the truth in "manières favorables," that is, 
suitable for getting approval, and to avoid "manières odieuses" 
which would alienate men. Since no truth can be expounded 
without an accompanying manner, it cannot be neglected. I 
do not say that it should be exploited: for the Port-Royalists, 
one would then fall back into the habits of the Ciceronians. 
The aim must be to stay out of truth's way. 
S'ils honorent sérieusement la vérité, ils ne doivent pas la 
déshonorer en la couvrant des marques de la fausseté et du 
mensonge: et s'ils l'aiment sincèrement ils ne doivent pas attirer
sur elle la haine et l'aversion des hommes par la manière cho-
Suante dont ils la proposent. C'est le plus grand précepte de laîétorique, qui est d'autant plus utile qu'il sert à régler l'âme 
aussi bien que les paroles. [Logique, p. 374.] 
For Port-Royal, rhetoric is not the method of truth, as it 
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tended to be in the tradition; it is only a means of easing the 
communication of truth once it has been found by another 
method. Aristotle's great achievement had been to formulate 
in his Rhetoric a dispassionate account of the means of per­
suasion that did not involve them in the requirements of 
scientific accuracy and in the commitment to any one truth. 
The Ciceronian tradition, though it insisted on an alliance 
of wisdom and eloquence in rhetoric, is ultimately skeptical 
or probabilistic on questions of truth. The Port-Royalists 
would have had a higher opinion of rhetoric if they had not 
held so high an opinion of truth, so firm a conviction of its 
attainability, and such confidence in its power to impose 
itself once grasped. 
This Logique seriously intends, therefore, to improve and 
even replace rhetoric. The comments of its authors, made en 
passant as they develop their art of thought, have dealt so far 
with language (especially in its figurative uses), with com­
monplaces (as the principles with which invention begins), 
and with reasonings (insofar as they depend on things and on 
the manner and status of the speaker). Their manual appears 
at a time when seventeenth-century literary theory is begin­
ning to crystallize into its clearest and, as we have come to say, 
its most obviously classical phase. The moment is well chosen 
for the kind of deliberate braking influence that this Art de 
penser seeks to exercise on the dominant Ciceronian trend. 
For the final implications of this attempt, we shall have to 
study the fourth and most original section of the work, the 
one entitled, "De la méthode." 
i. La Logique ou l'art de penser (Paris, 1664), p. 28. All references, 
unless otherwise noted, are to this edition. 
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2. As a matter of fact, Arnauld and Nicole could have been (and, 
perhaps, were) inspired in their criticism and in their remedy by Quin­
tlian, who is perfectly aware of such excesses. Cf., for example: " . .  . 
Resistam iis, qui, omissa rerum (qui nervi sunt in causis) diligentia, 
quodam inani circa voces studio senescunt, idque faciunt gratia decoris, 
qui est in dicendo mea quidem opinione pulcherrimus, sed cum sequitur 
non cum affectatur." ("I must resist those who, failing to concern them­
selves with things and ideas, which are the sinews of pleadings, grow 
old in the futile study of words; they do so for the sake of elegance, 
which is, I agree, the most beautiful quality of style, but only when it 
is appropriate and not when it is affected.") (De institutione oratoria, 
VIII, proemium 18; the edition I am using is that of Henri Bornecque^ in 
four volumes, Paris, n.d.) Or, again, at the end of the Proemium: "Sit 
igitur cura elocutionis quam maxima, dum sciamus tamen nihil verborum 
causa esse faciendum, cum verba ipsa rerum gratia sint reperta." ("Let 
us be as careful of form as possible, but let us recognize that one should 
do nothing merely for the sake of words, for the words themselves 
were invented for the sake of things to be expressed.") But we can be 
sure that the Port-Royalists did not share Quintilian's view of ornament 
(" . . . qui est in dicendo . . . pulcherrimus"); nor would they have 
emphasized admiration and pleasure as rhetorical aims. Quintilian does 
just that in the lines that follow immediately the second passage quoted. 
3. Aeneid xii. 1. 646. But the authors of the Logique have before them, 
not Virgil, but Quintilian. In Book VIII, chap, v ("De generibus sententi­
arum"), we learn first that "Sententiam veteres, quod animo sensissent, 
vocaverunt." ("The ancients signified by the word sententia a feeling 
or opinion.") Later, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the chapter, Quintilian 
offers two examples of plain declarations, one of which is: "Mors misera 
non est, aditus ad mortem est miser." He continues, "Sed majorem vim 
accipiunt et mutatione figurae, ut 'Usque adeone mon miserum est?' 
Acrius hoc enim quam per se: 'Mors misera non est!'" ("Death is not 
painful, but the approach to death." " . .  . But the ideas take on greater 
force by a change in the figure: 'Is it, then, so painful to die?'—a form 
that is more vigorous than the simple statement: 'Death is not painful.'") 
4. "Sed ne causae quidem parum confert idem hie orationis ornatus. 
Nam qui libenter audiunt et magis attendunt et facilius credunt, pler­
umque ipsa delectatione capiuntur, nonnumquam admiratione auferuntur." 
("But the elegance of expression contributes also not a little to the success 
of the case. For those who listen with pleasure pay closer attention and 
believe us more easily; most of the time they are led along by this very 
pleasure; sometimes they are carried away by admiration. ) (Bk. VIII, 
chap, iii, 5.) 
5. Bk. II, chap, xli, 175. My references are to the edition of De 
oratore, ed. E Courbaud and H. Bornecque (Paris, 1956-59). 
6. Cicero's position is opposed to this, of course, but it does not lack 
nuances. Crassus is made to say in De oratore I. xxxii. 146. "Verum ego 
hanc vim intellego esse in praeceptis omnibus, non ut ea secuti oratores 
eloquentiae laudem sint adepti, sed, quae sua sponte homines éloquentes 
facerent, ea quosdam observasse atque collegisse; sic esse non eloquentiam 
ex artificio, sed artificium ex eloquentia natum. Quod tamen, ut ante 
dixi, non eiicio; est enim, etiamsi minus necessarium ad bene dicendum, 
tamen ad cognoscendum non inliberale." ("But I consider the virtue and 
status of all rules to be this: not that orators by following them have 
won praise for eloquence, but that certain persons have noted and 
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collected what men of eloquence did of their own accord; so that eloquence
has not sprung from art, but art from eloquence. However, as I said 
before, I do not reject art, for, though not necessary for oratory, it is still 
a liberal subject for study.") Antonius has similar things to say in Book 
II (e.g., in chap. viii. 32), and in both cases the reservations about the 
usefulness of the rules, especially in their more elaborate forms, make 
the factors of nature or original gift and practice more important in 
eloquence. 
7. Logique, pp. 293-94. Here the authors of the Logique have very 
probably drawn their ammunition from Quintilian himself, as they had 
a few lines earlier, when they paraphrase and quote him as follows: 
"Aussi quoique Quintilien fasse paraître de l'estime pour cet art, il est 
obligé néanmoins de reconnaître qu'il ne faut pas, lorsqu'on traite une 
matière, aller frapper à la porte de tous les lieux pour en tirer des argu­
ments et des preuves. Illud quoque studiosi eloquentiae cogitent, neque 
omnibus in causis ea, quae demonstravimus, cuncta posse reperiri, neque, 
cum proposita fuerit materia dicendi, sçrutanda singula et velut ostiatim 
pulsanda, ut sciant, an ad probandum id, quod intendimus, forte respon­
deant; nisi cum discunt et adhuc usu carent" (p. 292). (" . . . Those 
who study eloquence should reflect on this fact, that they cannot find in 
all cases all of the forms of argument that we have indicated; and when 
a subject has been proposed for treatment, they should not examine all 
the headings successively and knock on every door, so to speak, to see 
whether they may give the proof that we seek—unless it be when they 
are learning and still lack practice.") 
The passage in Quintilian continues: "Infinitam enim faciat ista res 
dicendi tarditatem, si semper necesse sit ut tentantes unum quodque eorum, 
quod sit aptum atque conveniens, experiendo noscamus; nescio an etiam 
impedimenta futura sint, nisi et animi quaedam ingenita natura et 
studio exercitata velocitas recta nos ad ea, quae conveniunt causae, ferant." 
("Such a situation would make the process of speaking infinitely slow, 
if it were always necessary for us to try out every one of the arguments 
and thus to learn by experiment what is suitable and appropriate; I am 
not sure that it would not be an obstacle to progress, unless a certain 
natural talent and a facility acquired by study lead us directly to the 
arguments that suit the case.") (De institutione oratoria V- x. 122-23.) 
From this it is clear that Quintilian's views are more balanced than one 
might suppose from the account in the Logique. 
8. Especially notable in these lines: "J'estimais fort l'éloquence, 
et j'étais amoureux la poésie; mais je pensais que l'une et l'autre 
étaient des dons de l'esprit plutôt que des fruits de 1 étude. Ceux qui ont 
le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digèrent le mieux leurs pensées, afin 
de les rendre claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader 
ce qu'ils proposent, encore quils ne parlassent que bas breton, et qu'ils 
n'eussent jamais appris de Rhétorique. Et ceux qui ont les inventions 
les plus agréables, et qui les savent exprimer avec le plus d'ornement et 
de douceur, ne laisseraient pas d'être les meilleurs poètes, encore que 
l'art poétique leur fût inconnu."—Discours de la méthode, éd. E. Gilson 
(Paris, 1947), p. 7. 
9. Cited by Gilson, p. 185. 
10. Descartes and Port-Royal agree on a related point—the criticism of 
the Lullistes (the followers of Raymond Lull, 1235-1315), who aspired, 
with the help of Lull's Ars brevis, to speak well on any and all subjects. 
Their starting points or "attributs généraux" were species of common­
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places, according to the Logique. Descartes writes with scorn in the 
Discours of Lulls art; it helps one, he says, to speak without judgment 
of things one knows nothing about. Gilson gathers the evidence showing 
that Descartes considered Lull's method to be a scheme of reasoning 
based on commonplaces. 
11. For this distinction, see, for example, Rhetoric I. ii. 13561 1-14. 
References are to The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon 
(New York, 1941). 
12. See, e.g., in the De institutione oratorio. IV, i, and VI, 1-11. 
13. At least the only one noted in the context of logic. 
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Chapter IV 
Port-Royal: Logic vs. Rhetoric (11) 
i L NOUS RESTE à expliquer la dernière partie de la logique, 
qui regarde la méthode, laquelle est sans doute Tune des plus 
utiles et des plus importantes" (Logique, p. 377). This intro­
duces an impressive and novel section of the Logique. The 
three earlier parts are based on the traditional list of mental 
operations: conception, judgment, and reasoning. The last 
part adds, in effect, a fourth kind of mental activity, by 
means of which thoughts are arranged into a convincing se­
quence. We note the familiar de-emphasis on the syllogistic 
phase of thought and learn at last what will supersede it as the 
Port-Royalists define a new way of combining thoughts. 
"Il sert de peu pour bien démontrer, de savoir les règles 
des syllogismes, qui est à quoi on manque très peu souvent; 
mais que le tout est de bien arranger ses pensées, en se servant 
de celles qui sont claires et évidentes, pour pénétrer dans ce qui 
paraissait plus caché" (Logique, p. 377). The work as a whole 
has a cumulative structure, each section depending for its 
materials on the one that precedes it. One consequence is 
that any treatment, such as would be found in most books of 
logic, that stops with the syllogism omits the most important 
step of all. 
The general place of method in the treatise is unmistak­
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ably clear: it is the last in a series of means to the end of truth 
or, more exactly, to true knowledge (the French word is 
science, as opposed to the vaguer term connaissance^). In order 
to grasp the exact place that Arnauld and Nicole assign to 
method in their scheme, let us analyze this term science, for 
the function of method is here (and everywhere, I assume) 
intimately linked to the nature of the truth to be found. The 
characteristic thing about this argument is its focus on assent, 
and on the degrees and motivations of assent. (The essentially 
simple and undifferentiated adhesion which might satisfy 
the rhetorician is hardly sufficient here.) In considering a 
statement or "maxime," 
1. one knows its truth because it is self-evident; we 
are persuaded of it if it is without need of further reason­
ing; it is the kind of knowledge that the logicians call 
intelligence (in English I should be inclined to call it 
intuition); or 
2. we feel the need for some other motive of assent; 
and this category of "maxime" may be subdivided ac­
cording to the nature of the supporting element that is 
required : 
a. if it is grounded on authority, the type of assent 
is known as foi; or 
b. if it is grounded on a reason or reasons, one will 
find oneself 
(1) in a state of imperfect conviction, which is 
opinion; or 
(2) in a state of perfect conviction, which may be 
a. only apparent, in which case the name for 
the state is erreur; or 
b. real, and that is science. 
Method is, therefore, the procedure which combines judg­
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ments in such a way as to produce knowledge in the sense 
just shown; and in so doing it must discover and then use self-
evident principles— (intelligence in the special sense men­
tioned above); or again, and more simply, method is the path 
one follows in going from the clear and evident to the hidden 
and the unassented-to. 
In practice it is useful to distinguish two methods, one for 
discovering the truth, the other for proving it to others when 
we have discovered it. 
Ainsi il y a deux sortes de méthodes; l'une pour découvrir la
vérité, qu'on appelle analyse ou méthode de résolution, et qu'on 
peut aussi appeler méthode d'invention; et l'autre pour la faire
entendre aux autres quand on l'a trouvée, qu'on appelle synthèse
ou méthode de composition, et qu'on peut aussi appeler méthode 
de doctrine. 
On ne traite pas d'ordinaire par analyse le corps entier d'une
science, mais on s'en sert seulement pour résoudre quelque 
question. [Logique, p. 391.] 
For the Port-Royalists, there is obviously no necessity for a 
doctrine or method of expression. In addressing someone with 
the aim of winning his assent, one uses essentially the same 
method as one used in establishing the truth in the first place. 
The synthetic and analytic procedures are, in fact, merely 
different movements along the same line; and in either case, 
the power of proof comes from linearity of thought, from 
strict observance of the order in which principles and conse­
quences occur. In analysis, one searches for the antecedent or 
antecedents upon which a given affirmation depends for its 
cogency. In synthesis one reverses the direction: both ante­
cedents and consequents being known, one simply displays 
their interrelationship to the person to be taught. There is 
no rhetorical adjustment of the truth to him; he grasps the 
truth in the same way as the scientist or specialist does. 
We may, therefore, take as the basis of the rest of our 
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discussion the synthetic method, which is " . .  . la plus im­
portante en ce que c'est celle dont on se sert pour expliquer 
toutes les sciences" (Logique, p. 402). Descartes' four rules 
are quoted in connection with analysis, but the authors of 
the Logique believe that they are " . .  . générales pour toutes 
sortes de méthodes et non particulières pour la seule analyse" 
(Logique, p. 401). Like Descartes, however, they find in 
geometry the model for method. 
Il y a encore beaucoup de choses à observer pour rendre cette 
méthode parfaite et entièrement propre à la fin qu'elle se doit 
proposer, qui est de nous donner une connaissance claire et 
distincte de la vérité. Mais parce que les préceptes généraux sont 
plus difficiles à comprendre quand ils sont séparés de toute 
matière, nous considérerons la méthode que suivent les géomètres, 
comme étant celle qu'on a toujours jugée la plus propre pour 
persuader la vérité, et en convaincre entièrement l'esprit. 
[Logique, pp. 402-3.] 
It is easy to state the three characteristics or conditions that 
must be fulfilled in the method: (1 ) there must be no am­
biguity in terms; (2 ) reasoning must begin from clear and 
evident principles; and (3 ) one must demonstrate every con­
clusion that is advanced. At once the controversial relationship 
with rhetoric emerges.1 
Ne laisser aucun des termes un peu obscur ou équivoque sans 
le définir. . . . 
N'employer dans les définitions que des termes parfaitement 
connus ou déjà expliqués. . . . 
N'abuser jamais de l'équivoque des termes en manquant d'y 
substituer mentalement les définitions qui les restreignent et 
qui les expliquent. [Logique, p. 404.] 
Again and again Arnauld and Nicole insist on clarity, ex­
plicitness, and univocity of terms, the last of these being 
PORT-ROYAL: LOGIC VS. RHETORIC ( I I  ) 
truly the sine qua non of their method. But one has only to 
read casually in Book I of Aristotle's Rhetoric, e.g., in chaps. 
5, 6, 7, 9, io, where the notions of happiness, good, utility, 
vice, virtue, and wrongdoing are introduced in the way proper 
to the orator, in order to see the unavoidable ambiguity of the 
terms which will serve as basic predicates in rhetorical reason­
ing. Notice his remarks on happiness: "We may define happi­
ness as prosperity combined with virtue; or as independence 
of life; or as the secure enjoyment of the maximum of pleas­
ure; or as a good condition of property and body, together 
with the power of guarding one's property and body and 
making use of them. That happiness is one or more of these 
things, pretty well everyone agrees."2 Whoever tries to elimi­
nate this ambiguity simply confuses rhetoric with science, 
according to Aristotle's view. To make such an attempt means 
that one has failed to see that the starting points of arguments 
must be either special and peculiar to one category of things-
like the principles of a particular science—or that, in certain 
situations (as in rhetoric), they must be common, that is, so 
conceived that they can be made to fit many or all sorts of 
things.3 
Cicero understands very well the need for flexible, multi­
valent starting points. More than once in De oratore he has 
Antonius emphasize the tendency of the well-trained and 
experienced orator to return, no matter how varied the cir­
cumstances, to a small number of headings as he puts his 
case together and argues it. There is a curious passage 
in the dialogue where we learn of three aspects which may be 
isolated in a matter under debate, aspects recognizable in the 
answers given to these three questions: was the deed done?, 
what was done?, and of what sort or quality was it? The sec­
ond of these requires an act of definition. As an example, 
Antonius refers to a case in which everything turned on the 
sense of the word maiestas. Neither advocate sought to define 
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precisely the term at issue, as they might have done if they 
had followed the advice of some teachers. 
Quod mihi quidem perquam puerile videri solet. Alia est enim,
cum inter doctos homines de eis ipsis rebus quae versantur in 
artibus disputatur, verborum definitio, ut quom quaeritur quid 
sit ars, quid sit lex, quid sit civitas. In quibus hoc praecipit
ratio et doctrina, ut vis eius rei quam definias sic exprimatur ut
neque absit quicquam neque supersit. [De oratore II. xxv. 108.] 
("This advice seems to me very puerile, for the definition of 
words is quite a different thing when a dispute arises among 
specialists about matters treated in the sciences, as when one 
inquires, what is an art, what is a law, what is a state? In these 
circumstances reason and method direct that the nature of the 
thing which you define should be expressed in such a manner 
that there will be nothing lacking or superfluous.") 
Instead, both speakers used all the resources of rhetorical am­
plification on the content of the phrase maiestatem minuere. 
Risking a formal definition might have given to the opponent 
the chance to add something damaging, or to subtract or 
modify something; and the initiative would thus pass to other 
hands. In any case, there is a scholastic air about such an 
exercise, something almost childish. Finally, and worst of all, 
it is ineffective; it does not really make an impression on the 
mind of the judge; it escapes him before he grasps it. And 
so the contrast goes: on the one side, that of logic, insistence 
on exactness and singleness of meaning; on the other, a desire 
to use in argument the possibilities of analogy, of flexibility 
in application, even of imprecision. 
As for principles, the Port-Royalists want to begin with 
axioms, with individual acts of judgment in which subject 
and predicate are seen to be joined inescapably. They offer 
at one point a list of eleven such principles. "Clear and in­
dubitable" (Logique, p. 424), these truths may serve as the 
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basis ("fondement") for knowing the most hidden things. 
Here are three of them: "Tout ce qui est enfermé dans l'idée 
claire et distincte d'une chose, en peut être affirmé avec 
vérité." " . .  . Le néant ne peut être cause d'aucune chose." 
" . .  . Il est de la nature d'un esprit fini de ne pouvoir com­
prendre l'infini." (Logique, pp. 425, 427.) But the rhetorician 
or orator—as, for example, in the theory of Aristotle—looks 
neither at things nor within himself in order to discover his 
principles. He looks rather to his audience and to the opinions 
it holds, to its fund of common knowledge. Most of the first 
book of the Rhetoric consists, in fact, of summaries of such 
knowledge, as I have indicated above. In Book II, the treat­
ment of maxims as the premises or conclusions of enthymemes 
reveals the same tendency in Aristotle's advice—to look foi 
the commonly accepted opinions: "The maxim, as has been 
already said, is a general statement, and people love to hear 
stated in general terms what they already believe in some 
particular connexion. . . . The orator has therefore to guess 
the subjects on which his hearers hold views already, and 
what these views are, and then must express, as general truths, 
these same views on these same subjects."4 
From univocal definitions and self-evident premises, the 
discussion in the Logique moves to demonstration itself. As 
the act of combining the known with the unknown in such a 
way that the latter follows from the former, its characteristic 
qualities are order and completeness. In a first set of rules 
for demonstrations, we read: "Prouver toutes les propositions 
un peu obscures en n'employant à leur preuve que les défini­
tions qui auront précédé, ou les axiomes qui auront été 
accordés, ou les propositions qui auront déjà été démontrées, 
ou la construction de la chose même dont il s'agira, lorsqu'il y 
aura quelque opération à faire" (Logique, p. 404). This 
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advice or precept, which regards mainly the rigor of the dem­
onstration, is later supplemented in another enumeration by 
two other "règles pour la méthode," which stress further the 
need for sequence and add the requirement of exhaustiveness. 
Traiter les choses autant qu'il se peut dans leur ordre naturel, 
en commençant par les plus générales et les plus simples, et
expliquant tout ce qui appartient à la nature du genre, avant de
passer aux espèces particulières. 
Diviser autant qu'il se peut chaque genre en toutes ses espèces,
chaque tout en toutes ses parties, et chaque difficulté en tous ses 
cas. [Logique, p. 443.] 
The ideal is to define everything and to prove everything 
(unless what one starts with is certain in itself). Arnauld and 
Nicole know quite well that they are describing an ideal 
performance, one that can be only approximated in fact: the 
repeated phrase autant qu'il se peut has an operative value, 
not merely a decorative one. But because one must always 
reckon with the limits of the human mind and with the often 
elusive characteristics of things does not weaken the ideal 
for them. Its attractive power remains intact. 
It is not difficult to find the points of contact between this 
theory of demonstration and rhetorical theory. They come 
together at the point where rhetorical arrangement, the opera­
tion following on invention, is investigated. Nor is it hard 
to understand the antagonism between these two approaches 
to the subject of combining arguments into convincing or 
persuasive units. Rigor and natural order in the one is set 
off against a looser organization in the other, against a tenta­
tive plan that may vary decidedly with the circumstances and 
according to the judgment of the orator. It is the notion of a 
chain of propositions versus the notion of a sum or total. A 
speech has, of course, a "natural" order, from exordium to 
narratio to confirmatio to refutatio to peroratio; it moves from 
introduction to statement of the act and issues to presenta­
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tion of proofs and refutations to conclusion. But this order, 
though logical and usual, may be changed by rearranging 
the parts or even by suppressing one or more of them.5 From 
my reading of Quintilian I conclude that the only fixed posi­
tion in the scheme is that of the peroration. This takes us 
quite far from the insistence on gradual progression from 
genus to species or from whole to part that Arnauld and 
Nicole felt to be necessary. Morever, both exordium and 
peroration are extraneous from the point of view of logic, since 
they lie outside of the effort to demonstrate; from the point 
of view of rhetoric, they are entirely pertinent as the places 
in which the speaker exerts himself to gain the attention, 
good will, and docility (in the strict sense of the word) of 
the judge and, at the end, to restate his case quickly and 
impressively.6 
In the narration one should aim at clarity, brevity, and 
probability (and incidentally, this third term indicates that 
one will settle for something less than deductive certainty); 
one should avoid, Quintilian continues, contradictions and 
inconsistencies; but he adds that if anyone needs this bit of 
advice he might as well give up the study of the rhetorician's 
art. In other words, he takes as obvious the central topic of the 
Port-Royalists and goes on from there. As a very real possi­
bility, one may consider inserting a digression at the end of 
the narration—something not completely detached, of course, 
but a brilliant amplification of some theme that has been 
touched upon, or something like a second exordium to make 
sure that one has the ear and sympathy of the audience (De 
institutione oratorio. IV. iii). Digressions may be placed to 
advantage in other parts of the text or speech. 
Under the heading of proofs, one notes that signs and 
symbols prove as surely as arguments and groups of argu­
ments do; and to these we must add the whole category of 
"atechnical" means of persuasion, such as documents, wit­
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nesses, and the like. Again, Quintilian realizes as well as 
anyone that argumentation requires principles, things taken 
for granted at the outset. Here he lists the ones that are 
certain: 
Pro certis autem habemus primum quae sensibus percipiuntur, 
ut quae videmus, audimus, qualia sunt signa; deinde ea, ad quae 
communi opinione consensum est, deos esse, praestandam pieta­
tem parentibus; praeterea, quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persua­
sione etiam si non omnium hominum, ejus tamen civitatis aut 
gentis, in qua res agitur, in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque in 
jure non legibus, sed moribus constant; si quid inter utramque 
partem convenit, si quid probatum est, denique cuicumque adver­
sarius non contradicit. [De institutione oratoria V. x. 12-13.] 
("But we take as certain, in the first place, things perceived 
by the senses, for instance, things that we see or hear, such as 
signs; secondly, those things on which there is general agree­
ment, such as the existence of the gods and the duty of honoring 
one's parents; thirdly, things that are established by laws or 
that have been received as customary, if not by all men at least 
by the nation or state where the case is being pleaded—for many 
rights depend not on law but on custom; and finally, those things 
that both parties accept or that have been proved or that the 
adversary does not contradict.") 
He concerns himself much less with what is self-evident than 
with what is indisputable or, rather, undisputed in fact. If an 
argument is accepted without further proof, that suffices; it 
may then play the role of an initial principle in the act of 
demonstrating. 
The division of proofs into strong and weak, to which 
Quintilian refers (in Bk. V, chap, xii), is singularly out of 
harmony with the logical spirit, as is the discussion that fol­
lows from the distinction. One may, for example, give an 
appearance of strength to weak arguments by grouping them 
in a single development. Or, again, suppose that the speaker 
faces choices such as these : should the strongest arguments be 
put at the end of the proof?, or part of the strong ones at the 
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end, as Homer does, with the weak in between?7 Quintilian 
limits himself to this dictum: follow the order required by 
the particular case, but avoid a descending progression from 
strong to weak arguments. 
On all of the foregoing points—the loose definition of 
proof, the pragmatic nature of its principles, the division and 
ordering of arguments—the attitude and theory of the rhe­
torician run counter to those of the logicians of Port-Royal. 
In Chapter III and in the preceding pages, I have reviewed 
and analyzed the particular comments made by the authors 
of the Logique on the subject of rhetoric. By means of parallel 
citations and developments from the best known ancient 
treatises, I have defined, in passing, the issue and some of its 
implications. In the case of method—understood in the narrow 
sense given the term by the Port-Royalists, even though they 
do not work out explicitly the consequences of this notion for 
rhetoric—I have attempted to do so because they seem to me 
inevitable. I should like to draw together into a final and 
systematic statement my view of this conflict between logic 
and rhetoric and then to sketch the broad context into which 
the controversy fits. In 1662, we are obviously at a critical 
point in the history and application of two disciplines or in­
tellectual styles. We have the good fortune to have on both 
sides the basic documents containing the fully elaborated posi­
tions. They are not contemporary, it is true; there had not yet 
appeared with unmistakable authority the expected French 
Quintilian. But the Latin one was very much alive, both in 
the collèges and outside of them; Patru was active; Bary had 
published, in 1659, his Rhétorique française; in 1664 (the 
date, incidentally, of the second edition of the Logique, with 
its strongly polemic "Second discours"), Rapin was to launch 
his series of comparisons and reflections with a volume on 
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Homer and Virgil. We see thus the emergence into intellec­
tual consciousness of a contrast between methods that exclude 
each other when stated in their pure forms; though at the 
hands of lesser thinkers and critics, they undergo varying 
degrees of compromise and confusion. 
A word about terminology is necessary at this point. Until 
now in this chapter, I have used "method" as referring to 
a part of logic, the crowning part in the constitution of a 
science, since it regulates the task of joining terms and affirma­
tions into demonstrations, and I have made it analogous to 
arrangement in my comparison of the Port-Royalists with 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. But in what follows, I 
should like to use the word in a broader sense, so that the 
logic of Port-Royal, with its four operations, is one method, 
and rhetoric, with its five stages (to adopt the analysis of 
Cicero and Quintilian), is another and, in this instance, an 
opposed method. 
1. Let us assume, then, that both methods are designed 
to cause someone to assent to a truth. Logic focusses on one 
part of the person addressed, the intellectual part. So does 
rhetoric—is it not concerned with teaching and proving?— 
but it aims at a more comprehensive agreement, one involving 
imagination, feeling, will. 
2. The truth that is accepted in each case differs: that 
which one reaches by logic is in fact known from the outset, 
at least virtually, in the definitions and premises; that which 
results from the processes of rhetoric is not known until the 
debate is over and a verdict rendered. And if one looks at 
the truths, not genetically, but in themselves, that of logic is, 
in the typical and decisive case, a judgment that cannot be 
doubted; that of rhetoric is an opinion molded by and adapted 
to particular circumstances; it has, therefore, no lasting hold 
on the mind of the judge (or listener or reader). 
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3. In both cases we are concerned with sequences: in 
logic, with sequences of thoughts based on principles that 
are simple, unambiguous, and objective; in rhetoric, with 
sequences of actions both mental and verbal based on start­
ing points that may be clear or ambiguous, objective or not, 
provided they are effective. 
4. The initial drives of the two methods—toward simplicity, 
on the one hand, and toward effectiveness, on the other—are 
applied to characteristically different materials: in logic, to 
ideas which have not only unvarying identities as terms in 
reasoning but also unvarying references to aspects of things 
("Tout ce qui est enfermé dans l'idée claire et distincte d'une 
chose en peut être affirmé"); in rhetoric, to the audience and 
its baggage of notions, maxims, dispositions, and feelings, 
which may or may not be in conformity with things. In such 
a situation, the logician tends to see careless verbalizing in the 
works of his opponent; while the orator criticizes the logician 
for irrelevant and unattractive technicality. 
5. The techniques by which the aspirations of the two 
methods are satisfied in the solution of problems differ mark­
edly, although each one treats at least partially everything that 
the other treats. Each method analyzes inquiry or activity in 
its own way: in logic, the phases are conception, judgment, 
reasoning, method; in rhetoric, they are invention, arrange­
ment, elocution, memory, and delivery. These enumerations, 
however blank they may seem, suggest an essential point. 
Logic is a series of mental acts in the course of which truth 
is discovered and established, with provision being made for 
communicating the truth to other minds once it is known 
and after error-causing influences such as prejudice or self-
interest have been eliminated. Rhetoric is a set of procedures 
guiding a personal transaction between speakers and hearers 
in the course of which a position is advanced, justified, and 
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made appealing, with provision being made for the use of 
demonstrative proof as one of several kinds of persuasive 
devices. 
6. The end results of applying the two methods are exactly 
opposed. As here understood, logic leads (if it is carried far 
enough) to the formation of a unified science that replaces 
other attempts to state what is known, attempts usually 
marked by vagueness and irregularity. On the other hand, 
rhetoric, because of the freedom it allows in invention and 
expression and because of its respect for what is particular in 
cases and circumstances, tends to produce many differing 
opinions, all credible to some degree; its justifications and 
decisions are never exclusive in any final sense. 
7. Consequently, each method has its special attitude to­
ward dialogue and controversy. The logician aims to elimi­
nate controversy, since it is a sign of inadequate knowledge; 
and he distrusts unresolved dialogue, since the truth is one— 
or, at least, he hopes to make it so. The rhetorician thrives 
on controversy; and in moments of leisure—one thinks at once 
of Cicero—he takes pleasure in dialogue. 
Through these documents one catches sight of an inevi­
table and far-reaching rivalry between two conceptions of the 
truth and between two ways of finding and supporting the 
truth. Because of the universality of the notions involved, 
the possible repercussions—in morality, in science, in history, 
in literature—are infinite. In fact, both rhetoric and logic, as 
we see them here and in antiquity, tend deliberately to expand 
their claims. Each starts with a relatively limited area or prov­
ince, and then a kind of imperialism begins. In the Gorgias 
and Phaedrus of Plato, for example, rhetoric is hemmed in 
by the standards of justice and dialectic. Aristotle's view 
does not require the eventual transformation of rhetoric into 
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dialectic upon which Plato insists; he finds a place for it as 
a method of dealing with problems, usually practical ones, 
where scientific solutions are not possible and where more 
than one opinion may be justified. It is not to be confused 
with logic or poetics or politics, though it has some of the 
characteristics of those disciplines and even borrows from 
them. However, in the theories of the professional Greek 
rhetoricians and, later, in those of Cicero and Quintilian, 
rhetoric asserts its claims to universality as a method. And 
not without plausibility: the Socratic or Platonic objection is 
answered, Cicero thinks, by the fact that, when truly under­
stood, rhetoric does not simply train speakers in the technique 
of expression; it presupposes a joining of eloquence to wisdom. 
Thanks to wisdom, rhetoric can claim universal relevance; 
thanks to eloquence, it has a special dignity as the science 
that makes wisdom effective, that actually introduces true 
or probable insights into the fabric of human affairs. 
The expansionism of logic is no less marked. It pervades 
the Cartesianism that inspires the fourth part (in particular) 
of the Logique : the model of knowledge and hence of method 
may be seen in geometry, the one place where there are 
agreed-upon truths and conclusive demonstrations. What the 
Port-Royalists wish to do is to extend, by suitable generaliza­
tion, the way of geometry to all scientific inquiries and, be­
yond that, to judgment and reasoning as factors in everyday 
life. We cannot doubt that Arnauld and Nicole recognized 
this conflict of attitudes, aims, and procedures between rhet­
oric and logic—not perhaps in terms so purely opposed as 
the ones I have used above, but the fact is that, as they felt 
and conceived the issue, it could be resolved only by the 
substitution of logic for rhetoric and not by tolerance or 
compromise. 
There is a curious resemblance and difference to be noted 
here. It has to do with the discipline of grammar. According 
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to Quintilian, the art of rhetoric builds on a foundation laid 
down by the art of grammar. In the course of his early train­
ing, the future orator must learn his language and how to 
express himself correctly in it. Exercises in literary analysis 
and appreciation are important parts of this conception of 
grammar. The work of the professor of rhetoric assumes that 
of the professor of grammar, the two disciplines being con­
ceived so as to fit together in a sequential order. Now, in 
1660, Lancelot and Arnauld published their Grammaire 
générale et raisonnée. This was two years before the appear­
ance of the Logique, but the doctrine of the later work har­
monizes perfectly with that of the earlier one. In the gram­
mar, for example, the parts of speech are analyzed and defined 
by reference to mental acts which are, as we find out later 
in the logic, none other than conception and judgment. In 
other words, the grammar of Port-Royal leads to logic and 
not to rhetoric as in the ancient plan. Arnauld and Nicole 
see no necessity for adding an art of expression, the effect 
of which is simply to encourage false and hyperbolic thoughts 
and forced figures. "Or Ton trouvera peut-être autant de choses 
utiles dans cette logique pour connaître et pour éviter ces 
défauts que dans les livres qui en traitent expressément" 
(Logique, p. 28). 
It would be wrong, incidentally, to give the impression 
that rhetoric is the only art or discipline criticized in the im­
portant "Second discours" (or, for that matter, in the body 
of the treatise itself). There are substantial paragraphs on 
ethics, metaphysics, and physics. The authors claim that they 
have elucidated the general principles of each of these sci­
ences in such a way as to eliminate errors and prejudices 
and to prepare the way for accurate judgment in these fields. 
They make a very ambitious statement to the effect that 
although their readers will not find in the Logique all that 
it is necessary for them to know in relation to these subjects, 
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they will find there almost all that they need to remember. 
Even so, the position of rhetoric is especially precarious. After 
all, the Port-Royalists do acknowledge that we cannot give 
up entirely the books that treat technically the subject matters 
of morals, physics, and metaphysics. As for rhetoric, the only 
art really required is a discipline that restrains natural tend­
encies of thought and expression; and logic suffices for that. 
The aim of replacing rhetoric becomes particularly plausible 
when the Port-Royalists propose logic as a way of teaching. 
It is not exclusively a tool for scientists. "La logique est Tart 
de bien conduire sa raison dans la connaissance des choses, 
tant pour s'en instruire soi-même, que pour en instruire les 
autres" (Logique, p. 39). In rhetoric, one starts character­
istically with what we now think of as an "inter-personal" 
situation and with the things which must be done by the 
speaker or thinker as he addresses another party. In the logic 
of the Port-Royalists, one starts with the individual thinker 
and his effort to know things, but one eventually rejoins one's 
fellow man—without a change of method—since logic can 
solve the problems of communication and persuasion, too. 
Something even more insidious, in a sense, is that the 
Port-Royalists have taken care not to make their new discipline 
repellent because of subtlety and complexity. They explain in 
the last pages of the "Premier discours" why they have 
omitted a number of items from the usual list of topics in logi­
cal treatises. The really useful things are included, such as the 
division of terms and ideas, certain reflections on propositions, 
and the rules for the use of figurative language. Some more 
abstruse and less useful topics, such as the conversion of 
propositions and the demonstration of syllogistic figures, are 
nevertheless discussed; they may be skipped by the reader, 
but, if covered, they exercise the mind, making it habitually 
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more attentive. On the other hand, a great number of tradi­
tional questions having to do with subjects like the "universal 
a parte ret," ''beings of reason," "second intentions" have 
disappeared without a trace. The authors had as their original 
intention to compose something simple enough and short 
enough to be read and learned quickly. 
La naissance de ce petit ouvrage est due entièrement au 
hasard, et plutôt à une espèce de divertissement qu'à un dessein
sérieux. Une personne de condition entretenant un jeune sei­
gneur, qui dans un âge peu avancé faisait paraître beaucoup de
solidité et de pénétration d'esprit, lui dit qu'étant jeune il avait
trouvé un homme qui l'avait rendu en quinze jours capable de 
répondre d'une partie de la logique. Ce discours donna occasion
à une autre personne qui était présente, et qui n'avait pas grande
estime de cette science, de répondre en riant que si Monsieur 
. .  . en voulait prendre la peine, on s'engagerait bien de lui 
apprendre en quatre ou cinq jours tout ce qu'il y avait d'utile
dans la logique.8 
The plan decided upon was to make for the young gentleman 
(the Duc de Chevreuse) an abstract from the common logics 
that would be more concise and more exact than the original 
works. The job turned out to be more demanding than it had 
seemed at first. New reflections presented themselves, and 
instead of an abstract a new logic was the result. Neverthe­
less, the undertaking succeeded, for the young man, with­
out a tutor and by using four tables, each of which was the 
business of one day, learned what he needed to know. And 
at the end of the first discourse, the authors assert that all 
others who are "somewhat advanced" will be able to read 
and learn this logic in seven or eight days! 
The accident that explains the genesis of this remarkable 
book points to the secret of its enormous success. The Port-
Royalists are, as usual, playing to win in the competition for 
the interest of all intelligent readers, speakers, and writers of 
the century. According to them, their logic will do what rhet­
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oric failed to do as regards thinking and do with stricter 
conscience what rhetoric was supposed to do as regards com­
munication. Moreover, and this is one of the greatest achieve­
ments of Arnauld and Nicole, their "art de penser" can be 
read by and speaks directly to an unspecialized audience that 
has become very sensitive to pedantry. In this virtue of accessi­
bility, there lies, perhaps, a certain revenge. This improve­
ment, this victory that the authors imagined—could it be pure? 
Were they not offering to the public a rhetorical version of 
logic? Is logic logic when it has been designed and com­
posed so as to be learned easily by a "jeune seigneur" who 
is pressed for time? If, as Zeno is alleged to have said, logic 
is the clenched fist and rhetoric the extended hand, which 
is this? 
I should like to suggest in conclusion a way of looking 
at the whole picture of critical thinking and theorizing in 
the decades from 1635 to 1685, with which I have been 
mainly concerned in the preceding chapters. On the first level 
of an imaginary scale, one may put the great majority of 
audiences and readers: these are people who have little or 
no theoretical interest in the rules and disciplines that under­
lie poetry, eloquence, and other forms of expression, and for 
whom criticism is informal judgment according to taste. At 
one remove from these, we may locate the occasional and 
basically unsystematic critics. Their production is large; they 
write observations, reflections, discourses, and dialogues.0 
Through the resulting assortment of judgments, maxims, and 
often ill-digested learning, one catches repeated glimpses of 
an aspiration toward lucidity in the treatment of literature 
according to rhetorical criteria. But this lucidity is achieved 
only on a third level, the level where we meet the authors 
of treatises: Bary, Le Gras, Rapin (to mention the most im­
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portant figures), and, of course, their Greek and Latin au­
thorities. It is here that problems of invention and style 
emerge into the open and that one finds a serious effort to 
state within the framework of a discipline the implications 
of the principles (such as nature and art) brought to bear 
on them. 
But on this third level and in the midst of this discussion, 
unquestionably dominated by rhetoric, there suddenly erupts 
a competing discipline, logic. Its origins are certainly Carte­
sian; but it owes its effectiveness to the masterful vulgarisa­
tion of the Port-Royalists. In their treatise and in those of 
the rhetoricians, as in clear mirrors, we can see reflected one 
of the deepest tensions of French thought in the seventeenth 
century, and, more specifically, one of the decisive periods 
in the evolution of French literature—the early 1660's. These 
works allow us to grasp in intellectual terms (and subject, 
alas, to the limitations of such terms) something essential in 
French classicism. I mean that, seen abstractly, it proceeds 
from a balance of rhetorical and logical attitudes. In it the 
possibilities of emptiness and servility that go with a search 
for elegance, accessibility, and hienséance are balanced by 
efforts to reach and state a truth that is more than relative and 
to guard that truth against any drive on the part of expression 
to become an end in itself. 
To complete the picture, I should be inclined to add a 
fourth level, on which all reference to authors ancient or 
modern would be dropped in favor of anonymous (though 
not unspecified) points of view. The achievements of the 
great authorities could then be understood as deriving, by 
ways known to intellectual creativity, from insights and ideals 
that belong, in part, of course, to Aristotle and Cicero and 
Port-Royal but have also an independent reality that stands 
outside of time. Individual thinkers in concrete historical situ­
ations (to borrow an expression from Sartre) commit them­
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selves to these attitudes with more or less clairvoyance and 
elaborate them as best they can, without ever realizing com­
pletely and definitively the possibilities of logic or of rhetoric, 
as the case may be. One sign of the extratemporality of 
these ideals lies precisely in that they recur from time to 
time as sources of theory and creation. I have just referred 
to Sartre; his example and that of Camus are instructive. 
There is plenty of justification, I think, for saying that in an 
essay like "Qu'est-ce que la littérature?'*, Sartre defines, in 
effect, literature as rhetorical activity that starts from the com­
monplaces of Marxism, and also that Camus, to judge from 
his Discours de Suède, adopts the notion of a literary art that 
ideally affects innumerable readers, bringing them together 
not, of course, with the Sartrian aims of removing feelings of 
innocence and irresponsibility in the class struggle but with 
the aim of helping them to sense the dignity and pathos of 
human brotherhood. 
When, therefore, the seventeenth-century theorists of prose 
began to see their problems with sufficient clarity and to raise 
formally questions concerning truth and expression, they were 
working a vein that had produced before (they had, in fact, 
chosen it for that reason). It was productive again for them, 
although they had not foreseen the contest with logic. As 
later centuries were to discover, the vein had still further 
uses and was subject to other surprises.10 
I. In their treatment of method the Port-Royalists do not themselves 
take up the discipline of rhetoric apropos of these conditions. But I have 
thought it useful to develop the contradictions here also. The disagree­
ments already seen (in Chapter III) concerning the characters and 
motives of speakers, the commonplaces, the use or figurative style, and 
the exciting of passions are thus completed with regard to two important 
Ehases of rhetoric, invention and arrangement. By this extrapolation I ope to underline further the radical nature of the conflict between 
logic and rhetoric. 
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2. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 
1941), 1360b 15-20. 1339. 
3. See ibid., 135811 21-22. 1334. 
4. Ibid., II. 21. 1395b 5-12. 1416. 
5. See De institutione oratoria IV. ii. 4, 24. 
6. Ibid., IV- i. 5; ibid., VI. i. 1-2, 7 et seq. 
7. Ifcid., V. xii. 4-5, 14. 
8. Page 1 of the "Avis." 
9. On the subject of eloquence I have in mind authors and works 
like: Le P. Charles de Saint-Paul, Tableau de l'éloquence française 
O657); R. Bary, Actions publiques sur la rhétorique française (1658); 
N. de Hauteville, L'Art de bien discourir (1666); G. Guéret, Entretiens 
sur l'éloquence de la chaire et du barreau (1666); Le Sieur de Riche-
source, La Rhétorique du Barreau (1668) and his L'Eloquence de la 
chaire (1673); D'Aubignac, Discours académique sur l'éloquence (1668); 
J. Carel de Sainte-Garde, Réflexions académiques sur les poètes (1676); 
and two anonymous pieces in Divers traitez d histoire, de morale et d'élo­
quence (1672) entitled "L'Orateur" (apparently by Guéret) and "Si 
l'empire de l'Éloquence est plus grand que celui de l'Amour." Here is 
the cautious conclusion of the last-mentioned item: "Concluons donc, 
que l'Eloquence est toute puissante, et que l'Amour est toujours victorieux 
avec elle; ne divisons point leur autorité, et reconnaissons qu'ils se 
prêtent mutuellement leur assistance: si l'on dit que l'Amour rend 
éloquent, ajoutons que l'Eloquence rend amoureux, de leurs empires n'en 
faisons qu'un seul, et si nous admirons l'Eloquence, craignons l'Amour" 
(p. 129). 
10. In saying "centuries," I am thinking of the eighteenth as well 
as the twentieth. I hope to analyze in another series of studies the ways 
in which the philosophes reinterpreted rhetoric and applied it to their 
problems of communication. 
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Chapter V 
Pascal's Two Arts of Persuasion 
OR MOST READERS the two principal achievements of 
Pascal are the Lettres provinciales and the fragments we call 
the Pensées. Neither of these works can be considered as 
purely literary in the sense of having within itself its end 
and justification. Pascal created them as means of persuasion 
and their essential characteristics derive from this overriding 
aim. In trying to interpret them, we find ourselves pushed 
back inevitably to questions of rhetorical technique; we are 
obliged to make explicit conceptions of method that we have 
either brought to the works or discovered in Pascal. If we 
take the latter choice, we look for signs of method in the texts 
and, in the Pensées at least, we soon note many useful indi­
cations. The Lettres provinciales offer fewer guidelines; in 
regard to this work especially, we turn with interest to other 
writings of Pascal and, in particular, to the two important 
fragments on method usually published under the general 
title De l'esprit géométrique, the second one usually being 
referred to as "L'Art de persuader/' the subtitle that Desmolets 
gave it in 1728.1 
If we are to see the relationship between these two frag­
ments and the Provinciales (without forgetting, of course, the 
Pensées), we must face at once three questions: (1) What is 
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the relationship between the documents? (2) On what prin­
ciples are they based? (3) What are their practical implica­
tions? I intend to deal here with all of these, but mainly with 
the second and third, since the answer to the first, though 
hard to give circumstantially in terms of dates and external 
events, becomes fairly easy when one passes to the second 
problem, that of analyzing the texts. 
According to Brunschvicg, the probable story runs as fol­
lows: we know from Nicole's preface to Arnauld's Nouveaux 
éléments de géométrie (published in 1667, but the prepara­
tion of it goes back to 1660) that Pascal had composed an 
"Essai d'éléments de géométrie/' which he later abandoned 
apparently because Arnauld objected to the order of the 
demonstrations. The two fragments we are concerned with 
here seem to have been written as a preface to this discarded 
work or, better, were drafts ("deux ébauches successives") of 
what was to be its preface. Brunschvicg dates it—the date is 
"tout à fait approximative," he says—as belonging to the winter 
of 1658—59. Chevalier follows this account, but tends to 
move the date further back. In his chronological table at the 
entry for 1657, he says that "vers cette époque" De l'esprit 
géométrique was composed as a preface to a treatise; and, 
emphasizing the theme of the double infini, which figures 
importantly in the first fragment, he relates the contents of 
the piece to problems with which Pascal was preoccupied as 
early as 1654. There is then a somewhat shaky case for be­
lieving that Pascal composed the two pieces for a single oc­
casion—that is, as the preface for a geometry textbook. 
However, since the discussion is not continuous, since the 
"first" fragment—on the esprit géométrique or the spirit of 
geometry—does not lead directly into the "second"—on the 
art of persuading—there is further need to justify the usual 
practice of printing the two texts side by side, or the more 
radical solution of Chevalier, who prints them as a single 
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text divisible, after a short introductory paragraph, into a 
Section I and a Section II. A very useful hint comes from 
the Port-Royal Logique. In the "Discours sur le dessein de 
cette logique," which appears at the beginning of the first 
edition (1662), one reads: 
On a aussi tiré quelques autres réflexions d'un petit écrit non 
imprimé, qui avait été fait par un excellent esprit et qu'il avait
intitulé, de l'Esprit Géométrique, et c'est ce qui est dit dans le
chapitre X de la première partie, de la différence des définitions 
de nom et des définitions de chose, et les cinq règles, qui sont
expliquées dans la quatrième partie, que l'on y a beaucoup plus
étendues qu'elles ne le sont dans cet écrit.2 
In the second edition of 1664, the "excellent esprit" is identi­
fied as "Feu Monsieur Paschal." The first fragment contains 
a long treatment of two kinds of definitions—"de nom" and 
"de chose"—and many references to rules of demonstration, 
but nothing is said about any particular number of rules. In 
the other fragment, much is made again of rules for solid and 
invariable proofs; Pascal lists eight of them, of which three 
are not, strictly speaking, essential, which leaves five that 
are "d'une nécessité absolue";3 but nothing is said here about 
the distinction that one may make in the kinds of definitions. 
One must conclude from the foregoing, I think, (1) that we 
have in these documents the écrit of which the Port-Royalists 
speak, and (2) that we have a strong precedent for putting 
them together: men who knew Pascal and what he intended 
thought of them as somehow unified, as part of the same 
discussion.4 
Taken together the two texts do outline and, to some ex­
tent, expound a position that is entirely coherent. Both of 
them are focussed primarily on truth, and on method as the 
way of stating truth "invincibly" once it is known (rather 
than as the way of discovering truth). Both of them quickly 
identify this method with that of geometry, and this step 
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leads in both to a statement of the conditions of proof ex­
pressed in terms of definitions, axioms, propositions, and ar­
rangement of these elements. The differences one notes in 
passing from one document to another are such as to make 
them complementary rather than opposed. At bottom they 
represent two angles or approaches to the same situation, the 
situation in which a truth already possessed by one party 
(whom I shall call X) is to be stated cogently to someone else 
(for convenience's sake, Y). The first fragment begins from 
the point of view of X, moves into a treatment of the quasi-
geometrical form in which knowledge must be cast if it is 
to be demonstrable, and ends just after Pascal has dealt with 
a hypothetical Y, who cannot see that the infinite divisibility 
of space or étendue is self-evident. The second fragment be­
gins with an analysis of the psychological conditions under 
which consent to a proposition takes place—in other words, it 
starts with Y—moves on to a statement of the rules of demon­
stration, and breaks off in the midst of a defense of this geo­
metrical procedure that a hypothetical X might use. Although 
these contrasting summaries oversimplify two very dense texts, 
they will serve to underline the fact that Pascal examines the 
same process of demonstration or persuasion primarily from 
the point of view of X in the first fragment, and primarily 
from that of Y in the second. 
As a matter of fact, since the method is the same in either 
case, whether the aim be demonstration or persuasion, one 
can only conclude that to demonstrate and to persuade are 
for Pascal one and the same thing, and that he intends to 
have geometry—or more precisely, its method or esprit—replace 
rhetoric as the discipline of persuasive speech. Interpersonal 
discourse has a new and different set of norms by which it 
will be measured. They are not the norms of logic; that term 
means first and foremost to Pascal the rules of the syllogism, 
which he thinks are so much a matter of nature that no one 
1 1 2 
PASCAL'S TWO ARTS OF PERSUASION 
can be ignorant of them (so natural, indeed, that without 
the art of the geometrician, they are inadequate!); and even 
in those parts of their treatises where logicians have spoken 
of the demonstrative rules favored by Pascal, they have failed 
to see how important they are and how they have conse­
quences for all kinds of orderly thinking. What Pascal does 
in the second fragment is, I think, to show how the new 
method dominates the field formerly left to eloquence. The 
art de persuader becomes the art de démontrer, and rhetoric 
apart from geometry is a misleading waste of time. Thus we 
see exactly what was meant by the word véritable in the com­
pliment recorded in the second edition of the Logique: "Feu 
Mr. Pascal qui savait autant de véritable rhétorique, que 
personne avait jamais su . . .  " (p. 341). 
On most of the essential points there is no need to add here 
to what I have already said in the preceding chapter on the 
difference between logic as the Port-Royalists understood it 
and the traditional rhetoric. Pascal, too, wishes to remove what 
would now be called subjective factors from knowing and 
judging. Instruction easily takes precedence over pleasing and 
moving as aims of discourse. The rhetoricians prefer to fit 
their arguments into a loose structure or plan, the parts of 
which may be moved about or even omitted sometimes. 
Pascal's idea of order calls for a strict and invariable sequence 
of proofs where everything (definitions and propositions) de­
pends on everything else and where every element is in its 
appropriate place, for each piece has the role either of ante­
cedent or consequent with regard to its neighbor. Further­
more, he tends in these fragments to treat language and 
thought without distinction; he has no interest, if one may 
judge from his conclusions here, in elocution, that art of 
adding successive layers of ornament (tropes, figures of speech 
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and thought, rhythms) to the bare expression of truth. In the 
Pensées there is no doubt of his opinion: "Toutes les fausses 
beautés que nous blâmons en Cicéron ont des admirateurs, et 
en grand nombre." Or, again, and even more to the point: 
"L'éloquence est une peinture de la pensée, et ainsi, ceux qui 
après avoir peint, ajoutent encore, font un tableau au lieu d'un 
portrait."5 
In any art or method having to do with language or dis­
course addressed to an unspecialized listener, the nature of 
the person spoken to forms an important part of the analysis: 
he is the one who decides and by deciding fixes the value of 
the argument. For Quintilian, as for Aristotle, characteristics 
of age, passions, standing in society, and the like are factors 
that no orator dares neglect. They affect—in some cases pro­
vide—proofs that bring adherence, at least in the particular 
circumstances and for the time being. More systematic in his 
procedure, Pascal divides his listener's act of consent into 
two aspects or, rather, into the acts of two powers: esprit and 
volonté. Each of these has its principles or moteurs: 
Ceux de l'esprit sont des vérités naturelles et connues à tout 
le monde, comme que le tout est plus grand que sa partie, outre 
plusieurs axiomes particuliers que les uns reçoivent et non pas 
d'autres, mais qui, dès qu'ils sont admis, sont aussi puissants, 
quoique faux, pour emporter la créance, que les plus véritables. 
[Oeuvres, p. 593.] 
There is a similar distinction for the will: certain fixed and 
natural desires, common to all men, like the desire for hap­
piness, as opposed to variable desires for objects or goods that 
are in fact effective in their appeal though pernicious (at 
least when taken as ultimate goods). 
Pascal believes that demonstration of the kind described in 
"De l'esprit géométrique" must attach itself, not to the opin­
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ions and desires that vary from person to person, but to moteurs 
invariably and universally present in men. After all, what he 
wants to bring about through persuasion is a lasting disposi­
tion, a permanent conversion; such a commitment calls for an 
unshakable basis in some truth or aspiration that everyone 
sees or feels. The orator of Quintilian, attentive to circum­
stances and bienséances, and ready to turn to use the possi­
bilities, temporary or not, in a situation, is likely to be satis­
fied with any workable starting point; whether that basis will 
last—because of some universal significance it may have—need 
not really concern him. 
Thus Pascal, like his friends at Port-Royal, felt a tension 
between genuine rhetoric and that of Cicero and his admirers. 
It arose from a different attitude toward elocution, the ex­
pressive phase of rhetoric, but it goes much deeper than that, 
to the technique of demonstration and to the mechanism of 
consent. 
We must now attempt to describe in a summary way what 
might be called the dynamic scheme that underlies Pascal's 
art de persuader or art de démontrer. One has only to run 
through the five rules—eight, in his more fully worked-out 
version—to locate the elements with which Pascal deals. As 1 
have already said, he takes demonstration to be a process in­
volving definitions, axioms, and propositions. It is the business 
of the definitions to be explicit and univocal, and of the axioms 
to be self-evident. In demonstrating, one moves through the 
steps necessary for seeing the dependence of the propositions 
on the axioms and definitions. Pascal adds, however, a further 
and essential step; he indicates what it is but never carries 
out his intention to treat it fully. "Je passe maintenant à celle 
[la règle, presumably] de Tordre dans lequel on doit disposer 
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les propositions pour être dans une suite excellente et géo­
métrique . . ." (Oeuvres, p. 598). The picture is something 
like this: definitions and axioms combined with proposi­
tions make demonstrations, which are in turn arranged into 
an order of demonstrations (that is, of propositions with their 
attendant demonstrations) so that a coherent suite is formed. 
Truths are sequential and systematic; one attains them by 
composition; they rest on intuitive bases. (Note that in a de­
ductive procedure of this kind one naturally speaks of "truths" 
rather than of the "truth.") 
It is very important to realize that for Pascal this scheme is 
a mold into which anything truly known will fit. It is dynamic 
in that it may be extended to all fields of knowledge. In Pas­
cal's mind it assumes the form of an active tendency that 
seeks further applications. "Il n'y a rien de plus utile et de 
plus universel," he says (Oeuvres, p. 598). I believe that if 
Pascal had completed these fragments and made of them a 
truly unified exposition, the result would have been his 
Discours de la méthode. It would have occupied in his thought 
the moment or stage that precedes certain knowledge of par­
ticular matters in just the way that the Discours of Descartes 
precedes his specialized inquiries. 
The similarity between the four rules of Descartes and the 
three phases I have defined above is striking. Descartes' first 
rule establishes the intuitive bases of knowledge; his second 
and third rules are focussed on the analysis and solution of 
problems, that is, with demonstrations; his third and fourth 
rules, which insist on a smooth passage from the simple to the 
complex and on the need for completeness, suggest Pascal's 
interest in an ordre that will result in an "excellent and geo­
metrical sequence." But the Cartesian rules are intended both 
for the discovery and for the exposition of truth—or so they 
seemed to the logicians of Port-Royal.6 Pascal's method, as 
116

PASCAL S TWO ARTS OF PERSUASION 
he here describes it, is clearly intended as a way of exposition. 
The first fragment begins thus: 
I. On peut avoir trois principaux objets dans l'étude de la 
vérité: l'un de la découvrir quand on la cherche; l'autre de la 
démontrer quand on la possède; le dernier, de la discerner d'avec 
le faux quand on l'examine. 
Je ne parle point du premier: je traite particulièrement du 
second, et il enferme le troisième. [Oeuvres, p. 575.] 
Moreover, in one way Pascal outdoes Descartes; his terms, 
definitions, axioms, propositions, demonstrations, and suites 
géométriques are much nearer to geometry than the more 
generalized language of Descartes: jugements, difficultés, ob-
jets, dénombrements. 
Pascal's scheme or method is first characterized, therefore, 
by its claim to universality in application. The next thing to 
note about it is that it alone truly demonstrates. 
Celui [i.e., l'art] de démontrer les vérités déjà trouvées, et de 
les éclaircir de telle sorte que la preuve en soit invincible, est le 
seul que je veux donner; et je n'ai pour cela qu'à expliquer la 
méthode que la géométrie y observe: car elle l'enseigne parfaite­
ment. . . . [Oeuvres, p. 576.] 
And a few lines below, Pascal adds, still speaking of geometry, 
". . . elle seule sait les véritables règles du raisonnement . . ." 
(Oeuvres, p. 576). It alone reasons infallibly; the slight hesi­
tation of the "presque" in the following text is corrected in 
the rest of the sentence: 
Je veux donc faire entendre ce que c'est que démonstration 
par l'exemple de celles de géométrie, qui est presque la seule des 
sciences humaines qui en produise d'infaillibles, parce qu'elle 
seule observe la véritable méthode, au lieu que toutes les autres 
sont par une nécessité naturelle dans quelque sorte de confusion 
que les seules géomètres savent extrêmement connaître. [Oeuvres, 
pp. 576-77-] 
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The claims of uniqueness and of unlimited usefulness that 
Pascal makes for his favorite technique are certainly strong 
enough to make us wonder whether he worked from this 
Euclidean idée de derrière la tête in the Lettres provinciales 
and in the Pensées. This line of thought leads us away from 
purely literary considerations, but properly so, I think. What­
ever their aesthetic values may be, these works reach out finally 
beyond themselves. Their underlying principles of construc­
tion and order cannot be reduced to poetic forms, since this is 
literature written in the service of Christian truth as Pascal 
understands it. 
We can say at once that in neither work is he attempting 
to discover the truth (the first of the objets mentioned above), 
but the essential phrase defining the second aim has a singu­
larly profound echo: " . .  . la démontrer quand on la pos­
sède." That is, in fact, precisely what Pascal undertakes to 
do in the Pensées. And the second aim includes a third: 
" . .  . la discerner d'avec le faux quand on l'examine," and 
what is that if not the basic task of the Lettres provinciales? 
In the case of the letters, the correspondence is so close that 
I should like to point it out in more detail. Pascal's reasoning 
emerges clearly from this sentence: "Car, si l'on sait la 
méthode de prouver la vérité, on aura en même temps celle de 
la discerner, puisqu'en examinant si la preuve qu'on en donne 
est conforme aux règles qu'on connaît, on saura si elle est ex­
actement démontrée" (Oeuvres, p. 575). The Lettres pro­
vinciales are designed to locate errors, those of Port-Royal's 
enemies, and they do so in the light of a body of truth that 
Pascal takes as already known and in the light of a method 
that he has accepted as valid. In this polemic it is, of course, 
important to know what the Jesuits have to say on this or 
that point of doctrine, but it is even more important to ex­
amine their way of justifying their views. Since truth depends 
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on method, deficiencies in method become decisive signs of 
inadequacy or falsity. 
What is implied here? Something like this, I believe: 
Christian truth or truths may be conceived as entering into 
a sort of axiomatic system, characterized by scriptural starting 
points, by creedal assumptions, by subordinate theorems or 
positions that come into being as church fathers and theologi­
ans apply and elaborate the undisputed données, and, finally, 
by an aspiration to consistency that asserts itself from the 
outset and makes itself felt through all the later develop­
ments. That this or something comparable to it was Pascal's 
view or criterion can be shown, I think, at many points in the 
Lettres provinciales. What Pascal is doing, as he gives grounds 
for his own theses or refutes those of his opponents, seems to 
me to become particularly clear if we refer his procedure to 
such a model. 
This way of looking at the letters obliges us to set aside for 
a while attention to the things that we usually and rightly 
admire in them—satire, drama, strong feeling, seemingly effort­
less control of ideas and means of expression—and to concen­
trate on the secret working of a factor that, logically speak­
ing, is prior to those qualities. I mean, of course, Pascal's 
dynamic intuition of method, for this is what generates, as it 
turns from geometry to the confusion of a theological dispute, 
the list of topics to be treated; and, at the same time, it defines, 
broadly and yet decisively, the manner in which they will be 
treated. 
The subject of six of the letters (Nos. i, 2, 3, 4, 17, 18) is 
obviously grace, and the sense of that term must be fixed if 
the discussion is to make any headway. In other words, six 
letters turn explicitly or implicitly on a problem of definition: 
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hence the usefulness of putting together what Pascal says 
about this important matter in the two fragments concerning 
l'esprit géométrique. In the first place, he insists on qualities 
like clarity and intelligibility in definitions. But that is too 
vague; what he really wants (and he thinks of this as typically 
and essentially geometrical) is univocity, singleness of mean­
ing for each term, with each meaning made explicit in a single 
definition, so that whenever in the flow of thought one be­
comes doubtful or confused, this clarifying formula—agreed 
upon at the outset—may be substituted for the term. "Voilà 
une définition géométrique/' he writes, after defining an even 
number as one divisible by two into two equal parts, "parce 
qu'après avoir clairement désigné une chose, savoir tout 
nombre divisible en deux également, on lui donne un nom 
que Ton destitue de tout autre sens, s'il en a, pour lui donner 
celui de la chose désignée" (Oeuvres, p. 577). In a geometri­
cal method one must, therefore, avoid equivocation above all; 
as the sin in logic, it ruins the foundation of any discourse. 
What I have said so far suggests such complete liberty on 
the part of the thinker and places in his hands such complete 
control of definition that the meanings of words tend to be­
come a matter of private convention. Pascal qualifies this au­
thority. Some terms (as examples: time, movement, number, 
space) are indefinable; in fact, they become less intelligible 
when one tries to define them. They have the privilege of 
being grasped by a lumière naturelle common to all men. The 
resulting clarity surpasses anything that might be achieved 
even by the geometrician. He would find himself making 
definitions out of terms that would require further definitions, 
stated in still other terms, and so on, ad infinitum. 
On voit assez de là qu'il y a des mots incapables d'être définis; 
et si la nature n'avait suppléé à ce défaut par une idée pareille 
qu'elle a donnée à tous les hommes, toutes nos expressions 
seraient confuses; au lieu qu'on en use avec la même assurance 
et la même certitude que s'ils étaient expliqués d'une manière 
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parfaitement exempte d'équivoques; parce que la nature nous en 
a elle-même donné, sans paroles, une intelligence plus nette que 
celle que l'art nous acquiert par nos explications. [Oeuvres, p. 
580.J 
In any case, where definitions are concerned, Pascal thinks 
we should seek fixity and perfect intelligibility, either through 
the help of art (that is, method) or through assent to natural 
insight. 
In what follows I want to stress certain phases of the argu­
ment in the first letter, in order to show the role of Pascal's 
doctrine of definition as an underlying factor in his defense 
of the Jansenists. It would be possible to make similar points 
in connection with other letters in this group. 
Pascal moves quickly past the question de fait (whether 
the five heretical propositions are in fact in Jansenius' book) 
to the essential topic, the question de droit (whether Arnauld 
has been understanding the term "grace" improperly). All 
sides agree that grace confers on the righteous a power that 
is relevant to and prior to action. However, the Jesuits want to 
introduce at this point the formula pouvoir prochain. 
Je chargeai ma mémoire de ce terme, car mon intelligence n'y 
avait aucune part. Et de peur d'oublier, je fus promptement 
retrouver mon Janséniste, à qui je dis incontinent, après les 
premières civilités: Dites-moi, je vous prie, si vous admettez le 
pouvoir prochain} II se mit à rire et me dit froidement: Dites-moi 
vous-même en quel sens vous l'entendez, et alors je vous dirai ce 
que j'en crois. [Oeuvres, p. 671.] 
The narrator tells him that he understands the term in the 
sense of the Molinists. But just at this point we note the 
existence of a confusion that arises because the important 
term here is used in more than one sense: 
Auxquels des Molinistes, me dit-il, me renvoyez-vous?—Je les 
lui offris tous ensemble, comme ne faisant qu'un seul corps et 
n'agissant que par un même esprit. 
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Mais il me dit: vous êtes bien peu instruit. Ils sont si peu 
dans les mêmes sentiments qu'ils en ont de tout contraires. 
[Oeuvres, p. 671.] 
Two things are interesting here. In the first place, the 
natural assumption of an esprit géométrique like that of the 
inquirer is that the Molinists would as a group be unified in 
the way that a consistent doctrine would be; they would, in 
fact, form a group or body because of a body of beliefs or doc­
trines animated by a single spirit. Pascal writes with an under­
tone of irony, but he is referring to a genuine ideal of knowl­
edge and understanding. In the second place, the truth of the 
situation turns out to be just the opposite: a collection of 
inconsistent and contradictory opinions. Clearly the speakers 
owe it to themselves and to all interested parties to make ex­
plicit the opposed senses and to reduce them to one that is 
acceptable to both sides if possible. 
The narrator goes first to a disciple of M. Le Moine who 
tells him that, in the case of the justes, pouvoir prochain means 
(  O not to lack anything necessary for action, and then goes 
on to some Jacobins or neo-Thomists who tell him that having 
the pouvoir prochain means (2) not having all that is required 
for action (that is, action in accomplishing God's command­
ments), since a final touch of grace must be added: " . .  . 
il leur faut de plus [aux justes] une grâce efficace qui n'est 
pas donné à tous, et qui détermine leur volonté à prier; 
et c'est une hérésie de nier la nécessité de cette grâce pour 
prier" (Oeuvres, p. 673). At once the narrator realizes that 
the Jansenists are, after all, orthodox, because they hold posi­
tion (2) and hence the neo-Thomist wing of the Molinists 
should not be persecuting the Jansenists; it is the allies of the 
Thomists who are heretical, because they assert position (1). 
How can these two factions, joined against the Port-Royalists, 
co-operate when their views are opposed? 
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The explanation is simple: both groups are out to ruin M. 
Arnauld; they do not care about consistency of definitions. 
As the disciple of M. Le Moine says to one of the Thomist 
fathers who is about to re-affirm view (2): "Voulez-vous re-
commencer nos brouilleries? ne sommes-nous pas demeurés 
d'accord de ne point expliquer ce mot de prochain, et de le 
dire de part et d'autre sans dire ce qu'il signifie? A quoi le 
Jacobin consentit" (Oeuvres, p. 673-74). The narrator de­
clares the whole affair to be pure chicanery, for there can be 
no serious discussion without a willingness to consider terms 
and to come to agreement on the senses they carry. Instead of 
this logical bona fides, the opponents of M. Arnauld have 
agreed on nothing except a plot against him. "Pouvoir pro-
chain" is not a very dangerous expression if it consists merely 
of syllables without sense, though one should not stoop to use 
a device so unworthy: "Mais ce serait une chose indigne de 
la Sorbonne et de la théologie d'user de mots équivoques sans 
les expliquer" (Oeuvres, p. 674). The Molinists are denying 
the essential nature of words as carriers of meaning; they tell 
the narrator, that, in order to avoid heresy, one must assert 
that all just people have the pouvoir prochain, but abstrahendo 
a sensu Thomistarum et a sensu aliorum theologoruml 
The last word is said on the matter when Pascal, through 
his porte-parole, indicates the way out of the confusion. He 
has him ask if one finds the expression in Scripture or in the 
Fathers or in the Councils or in papal usage; and since the 
answer is "no" each time, we have no need to use it. I believe 
that Pascal reveals here the key to the problem of definition in 
religious matters, as he asks: "Quelle nécessité y a-t-il donc de 
le dire, puisqu'il n'a ni autorité ni aucun sens de lui-mêmei5" 
(Oeuvres, p. 674). The term might have had a single sense 
by definition, but that possibility is ruled out by the Molinist 
disputants; and it might have been similar to words like 
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"time/' "movement," "extent"—that is, it might have had a 
sense in itself, naturally accessible to all, but that possibility 
is contradicted by the very fact of the dispute. One other 
possibility remains: the lumière naturelle might have given 
way to supernatural insight coming from authoritative sources, 
but there is nothing in the genuine supports of the tradition 
for the term. This is something new. In De l'esprit géo­
métrique, Pascal had said nothing about the Bible and the 
church fathers in connection with definition. From the point 
of view of function, however, it is clear that the meaning of 
a word like grâce has in theology a place like that of "time" 
or "motion" in geometry (as Pascal understands that disci­
pline): it is a given from which one works. It must be pre­
cisely understood, that is, in a single sense, and for that 
understanding one looks to divine sources. 
The geometric method—or the general approach to knowl­
edge derived from it—draws the attention of a thinker to his 
definitions, first, and then to the demonstrations by which he 
validates propositions. In letters Nos. 5 through 10, Pascal 
shifts, as one might expect, to propositions and proofs. Here 
he analyzes la morale des jésuites, and the key word is 
maxime: over and over again, this or some equivalent ex­
pression appears. There can be no doubt that Pascal is now 
working on a different level, for maxims are principles or 
propositions having to do with conscience and conduct. The 
inevitable question soon emerges. What warrant can the 
Jesuits give for the principles according to which they guide 
consciences? 
We note in the two answers that are given a sharp opposi­
tion between a quasi-geometrical guarantee and something 
much more personal offered by the casuists. As the narrator 
goes from point to point, the criterion he expects to see and 
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use is that every maxime must be drawn from (or at least 
consistent with) some prior truth taken as axiomatic. To him, 
certainty and truth are guaranteed only by clear dependence 
on what has been stated in the Bible, in articles of faith, or 
in a continuous tradition of the church fathers, popes, and 
councils. The model of this procedure is one that we have 
met before : demonstration moves in a tight sequence, starting 
from things that cannot be doubted and working toward a 
coherent ensemble of doctrine. However, the narrator comes 
to the conclusion that the Jesuit fathers have broken with the 
tradition and have, as a result, removed all possibility of cer­
tainty in what they propose as guides in conduct. 
Je ne sais comment vous pouvez faire, quand les Pères de
l'Eglise sont contraires au sentiment de quelqu'un de vos casuistes. 
Vous l'entendez bien peu, me dit-il. Les Pères étaient bons pour
la morale de leur temps; mais ils sont trop éloignés pour celle
du nôtre. Ce ne sont plus eux qui la règlent, ce sont les nouveaux
casuistes. [Oeuvres, p. 713.I 
And Pascal has the "Père" go on to cite the "fameux Père 
Reginaldus" : "Dans les questions de morale, les nouveaux 
casuistes sont préférables aux anciens Pères, quoiqu'ils fussent 
plus proches des Apôtres" {Oeuvres, p. 713). 
Eventually we understand that this rupture has not taken 
place in an arbitrary way; the trouble simply is that the casu­
ists do not begin with an ideal of certainty and incontradiction 
as they bring forth their maxims. Theirs is the method of 
"opinions probables," described at the opening of the fifth 
letter as "la source et la base de tout ce dérèglement" {Oeuvres, 
p. 706). "C'est le fondement et Va b c de toute notre morale," 
says the Jesuit father, and he quotes from his authorities: 
Une opinion est appelée probable lorsqu'elle est fondée sur 
des raisons de quelque considération. D'où il arrive quelquefois
qu'un seul docteur fort grave peut rendre une opinion probable. 
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. . . Car un homme adonné particulièrement à l'étude ne 
s'attacherait pas à une opinion s'il n'y était attiré par une raison
bonne et suffisante. [Oeuvres, p. 710.] 
The Jesuits find thus their moral principles in the minds of 
men rather than in the scriptures or in the tradition. From the 
viewpoint of the narrator and of Pascal, new principles of 
conduct must be established in the light of things already 
firmly known, if they are to be certain; but the casuists con­
tent themselves with probabilities based on the experiences 
and reflections of particular men. 
The problem of contradiction forces itself upon the narrator: 
Qui m'a assuré que dans la liberté que vos docteurs se donnent 
d'examiner les choses par la raison, ce qui paraîtra sûr à l'un le 
paraisse à tous les autres? La diversité des jugements est si grande. 
. . . Vous ne l'entendez pas, dit le Père en m'interrompant; aussi 
sont-ils fort souvent de différents avis; mais cela n'y fait rien; 
chacun rend le sien probable et sûr. [Oeuvres, p. 711.] 
The "Père" is ready for the objection, and we can see why. 
The presence of contradictions does not shock or offend in 
the method of the casuists. It will not do in geometry, of 
course, because geometry requires orderly progress from im­
personal and axiomatic truths; it is not a method that en­
courages or tolerates diversity of opinion; as one of its deepest 
aspirations, it strives to bring about unanimity. 
I do not mean to imply that the Jesuits break completely 
with proved tradition. When the narrator objects that the 
Bible, the popes, and the councils, who are in the direct line 
of the Gospel ("la voie unique de l'Evangile" [Oeuvres, p. 
714]), cannot be renounced and that they form barriers to 
the free invention of probable opinions, the Jesuit father 
undertakes to show that there is no difficulty from that side. 
In fact, approximately the first half of the sixth letter sum­
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marizes precisely those methods by which contradictions 
between such opinions and dogmatic decisions may be recon­
ciled. There are three techniques: to introduce a distinction 
in interpreting a word or phrase; if that fails, to appeal to par­
ticular circumstances which support the opinion that is or 
seems to be contradictory; and, as a last resort, to use a subtle 
new method. The example here is a casuist's rule opposed to 
a decision in which three popes concur. Nevertheless, one of 
the Jesuits, Diana, affirms that the dispensation allowed in the 
rule may be made: 
Et comment accorde-t-il cela? lui dis-je. C'est, répliqua le père,
par la plus subtile de toutes les nouvelles méthodes, et par le 
plus fin de la probabilité. . . . C'est que, comme vous le vîtes
l'autre jour, l'affirmative et la négative de la plupart des opinions
ont chacune quelque probabilité, au jugement de nos docteurs, 
et assez pour être suivies avec sûreté de conscience [Oeuvres, 
pp. 717-18.] 
The formula used for this is the "double probability" of the 
pour and the contre: on one of the sides of the argument, we 
have a decision or principle advanced by the popes, with all 
the authority inherent in their pronouncement, and, on the 
other side, the casuist's opinion; but there is no need to decide 
between them; since both have "probability," one may follow 
either with security. What happens is not the accommodation 
of new opinions to authoritative doctrine (which Pascal could 
not object to); instead, that doctrine is subordinated to the 
basically skeptical devices of the new probabilities. 
There is actually a deeper level of analysis possible here. 
Why this innovation of method on the part of the casuists? 
Why adopt a technique of demonstration that produces contra­
dictory opinions as the guiding rules of Christian consciences? 
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Pascal (in the person of his narrator) is sure that he knows 
the answer. He imagines a difficulty for the person being 
guided in the face of the contradictions: 
Mais mon Père, lui dis-je, on doit être embarrasse à choisir 
alors! Point du tout, dit-il, il n'y a qu'à suivre l'avis qui agrée 
le plus. Eh quoi! si l'autre est plus probable? Il n'importe, me 
dit-il. Et si l'autre est plus sûr? Il n'importe, me dit encore le 
Père; le voici bien expliqué. [Oeuvres, p. 711.] 
He goes on to explain that probability is enough; there is no 
need to go into questions of degree of probability. The per­
son seeking help may choose, of the pour and the contre, 
the more pleasing alternative, even though he does not be­
lieve it to be the more probable; and he may do so with com­
plete confidence. A confessor who refused absolution in such 
a case would be "en état de damnation" (Oeuvres, p. 718). 
The man who consults the casuist determines by a free choice, 
along the line of least resistance, if he wishes, which of the 
alternatives is actually true. The priest merely sets up the 
terms of the choice. That is what damns the method of the 
casuists in Pascal's eyes: they are not working to produce con­
version or moral renewal by means of these probable max­
imes. The effect is to allow the Christian to continue as he 
is with the added security of a quiet conscience. 
But the problem remains: why would the Jesuits permit 
such relaxation? "Voici quelle est leur pensée" says a Jansen­
ist friend of the narrator: 
Ils ont assez bonne opinion d'eux-mêmes pour croire qu'il est 
utile et comme nécessaire au bien de la religion que leur crédit 
s'étende partout, et qu'ils gouvernent toutes les consciences. Et 
parce que les maximes évangéliques et sévères sont propres pour 
gouverner quelques sortes de personnes, ils s'en servent dans ces 
occasions où elles leur sont favorables. Mais comme ces mêmes 
maximes ne s'accordent pas au dessein de la plupart des gens, 
ils les laissent à l'égard de ceux-là, afin d'avoir de quoi satisfaire 
tout le monde. [Oeuvres, pp. 704-5.] 
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The casuists thus fall into two groups. There are severe ones 
for the few who are truly devout, and lax ones (the great 
majority) for the many Christians who seek laxity. Priests 
belonging to the second group accept the doctrine of the 
opinions probables as a pragmatic device for gaining public 
support. Their rules come into being inductively, so to speak, 
as a result of situations or moral dispositions that exist in fact; 
they are designed to gain favor and influence rather than to 
improve lives and souls. The geometrically-minded Christian, 
like Pascal, starts with the idea that he knows the truth and 
that he is going to demonstrate it to someone who does not 
yet know that truth. The casuist of the more typical kind 
talks or behaves as if the customer were always right, when his 
real function is to convince himself first of the truth of his 
maxims and then to show them, with the force of proof be­
hind them, to the people he advises: this is something quite 
different from offering two or more contrasting formulas to 
someone who will make up his mind according to his own 
disposition. Such "truths" arise out of particular circumstances 
and personal relationships. Their value is determined by what 
is applicable and effective or what is thought to be probably so. 
The esprit de géométrie leads one to be especially careful 
about terms or definitions, about the status of propositions, and 
about the sequence or order of propositions. We have now 
seen a reflection of the first two of these topics in several of the 
letters. What of the concept of an ensemble of doctrine? Does 
it have a role in the work? I think that the answer must be 
yes; and the unity in question is easily shown if one follows 
out two lines of thought, basing the first on the idea of his­
torical sequence and the second on that of systematic whole­
ness or consistency, although both turn out to be essentially 
the same thing. 
As Pascal approaches his polemic tasks in the Provinciales, 
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as he distinguishes the true from the false—one of the uses of 
the geometrical method, it will be recalled—a continuous 
historical account is present in his mind. He expresses it or 
indicates it most simply when he refers to "l'écriture et la 
tradition de l'Eglise" (Oeuvres, p. 709). The latter obviously 
depends on the former and grows out of it in an organic way. 
Pascal sometimes analyzes further each of these two great 
factors: The Bible may appear as containing a sequence from 
the patriarchs to the prophets to Christ to St. Paul and the 
apostles; and the succeeding part of the story may be traced in 
links provided by the church fathers (with special mention for 
St. Augustine and for the last of the fathers, St. Bernard), by 
St. Thomas, and, finally, by the judgments of popes and coun­
cils (see, e.g., Oeuvres, p. 683). At any point along this line, 
Pascal may point out conflicts involving the "new" Thomists 
and the casuists. We may have the Gospel versus the casuists 
(p. 772), or the fathers versus the casuists (p. 713), or St. 
Paul versus the casuists (p. jyyy, and sometimes the line as a 
whole stands against them, as when one tries by various de­
vices to make certain opinions probables acceptable. Without 
attempting anything like a detailed history of beliefs—to do 
so would spoil the plan of the letters and lose readers as well 
—Pascal gives us to understand that an unbroken sequence 
does exist in the background of the present dispute. 
In the first letter and in the seventeenth and eighteenth, 
that is, at the beginning and at the end of the Provinciales, 
Pascal insists on the difference between a question de fait 
and a question de droit ou de foi. The second line of thought 
that I have proposed, since it turns on coherence rather than 
on historical elaboration, is closely tied to this distinction. 
The question de droit ou de foi belongs, I believe, on the 
plane of the geometrical spirit, of that tendency that assumes 
and provides a structure into which knowledge must fit. And 
so this overarching antithesis, which to my mind serves as the 
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key to the whole undertaking of the Provinciates, takes on its 
typically Pascalian nuance in the light of his fondness for the 
esprit géométrique. A question de fait has nothing to do with 
geometry; it asks, did X say what he is alleged to have said? 
The question and the answer to it involve the senses and, 
insofar as method is concerned, call for canons based on the 
conditions of accurate observation. A question de droit, how­
ever, is quite independent of operations of sense; it asks, does 
what X said or is alleged to have said square with what we 
already know to be true? 
In letters Nos. i, 2, 3, 4, 17 and 18, where the discussions 
turn on opposed notions of grâce and its effects, and in letters 
Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, where Pascal attacks the moral 
maxims of the Jesuits, he places himself on the terrain of 
droit or foi: he is asserting the incompatibility between what 
they say and what must be taken as truth, given the Bible 
and the Christian tradition. Even letter No. 11, in which 
he defends irony and satire as justifiable in his campaign, 
contains an appeal to orthodox sources: 
Ne prétendez pas, mes Pères, de faire accroire au monde que ce
soit une chose indigne d'un Chrétien de traiter les erreurs avec
moquerie, puisqu'il est aisé de faire connaître à ceux qui ne le
sauraient pas que cette pratique est juste, qu'elle est commune 
aux Pères de l'Eglise, et qu'elle est autorisée par l'Ecriture, 
par l'exemple des plus grands saints, et par celui de Dieu même. 
[Oeuvres, p. 780.] 
The remaining letters (Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16) involve 
mainly questions de fait: did particular casuists and others 
make the statements and argue for the principles that Pascal 
had criticized in letters Nos. 5 through 10? 
When Pascal returns, in the last two complete letters, to 
the five propositions and to the issue of heresy, he uses both 
arguments de facto and arguments de jure. In terms of the 
former he challenges once again Père Annat to locate verbatim 
AUDIENCE, WORDS, AND ART 
the propositions in Jansenius' book. But this challenge, which 
Pascal takes as unanswerable, is less decisive than the turn he 
gives to the controversy by reasoning in the perspective de 
jure. If the propositions are in the book and have the sense 
condemned by the Jesuits (that is, the "sens de Calvin"), all 
parties to the dispute, Port-Royalists as well as everyone else, 
reject them as inconsistent with sound doctrine concerning 
grace and the freedom of will to resist it. As soon as he real­
ized, says Pascal, that the dispute was not about possibly 
heretical tenets, he began to lose interest in it: 
Dès lors votre dispute commença à me devenir indifférente. 
Quand je croyais que vous disputiez de la vérité ou de la fausseté
des propositions, je vous écoutais avec attention; car cela touchait
la foi: mais quand je vis que vous ne disputiez plus que pour
savoir si elles étaient mot à mot dans Jansenius ou non, comme 
la religion n'était plus intéressée, je ne m'y intéressai plus aussi. 
[Oeuvres, p. 872.] 
Pascal does not give up on the factual question; he thinks 
that it is possible to disagree—in the line of fact—on what the 
"sens de Jansenius" is and that it is possible, consequently, to 
understand him in a way that does not contradict in the least 
the position of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on grace and 
its operation. Naturally this is the way in which Pascal and 
those with whom he sympathizes do understand Jansenius. 
It is nonetheless true that the discussion in the letters does 
not move toward an effort to state differing interpretations of 
what Jansenius said in fact; it suffices that all hands agree on 
the central doctrines. Pacal emphasizes one question only: 
whether or not the propositions in dispute are equivalent to 
ones that are already received as valid within the system of 
beliefs. 
As expressed in the eighteenth letter, Pascal's views in­
clude in reality a third sort of question. Starting with a refer­
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ence to questions of fact, he goes on to show the rest of his 
hand: 
D'où apprendrons-nous donc la vérité des faits? Ce sera des yeux,
mon Père, qui en sont les légitimes juges, comme la raison l'est des
choses naturelles et intelligibles, et la foi des choses surnaturelles
et révélées. Car, puisque vous m'y obligez, mon Père, je vous
dirai que, selon les sentiments de deux des plus grands docteurs
de l'Eglise, saint Augustin et St. Thomas, ces trois principes de 
nos connaissances, les sens, la raison et la foi, ont chacun leurs 
objets séparés, et leur certitude dans cette étendue. [Oeuvres, p. 
897.] 
The statement of the relations of these étendues and princi­
ples, as they emerge in the Provinciales, will serve to sum­
marize the main points of my analysis. Questions de fait have 
to be judged in the light of sense experience: for example, 
did Jansenius actually affirm the five propositions in so many 
words, iisdem verbis, so that all may see the truth of the 
allegations? Questions de foi have to be decided, not by refer­
ence to sensation—although Pascal points out that by the 
principle of fides ex auditu, faith is based on sense experience 
in an important sense—but in the light of Scripture and of 
decisions handed down by the Church. The intermediate 
order of raison seems to have no relevance to the problems of 
the Provinciales, and we know from the famous passage in 
the Pensées on the three orders, which corresponds so closely 
to what Pascal says in this eighteenth letter, that the realms 
of corps, esprit, and charité are infinitely distant from one 
another. And yet, is it not clear that Pascal has transposed 
the geometrical ideal and technique into the uppermost 
of his orders? When the time comes for faith to examine and 
justify itself, and to assert itself against the intrusion of error, 
it reverts for its mode of analysis and for its criterion of validity 
to the method of reason. Pascal has chosen to deal with Jesuits 
and other opponents of Port-Royal (1) by asking for defini­
tions with clear and single meanings; (2) by isolating state­
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ments, maxims, and propositions in the moral theory of the 
Jesuits and in the views of Jansenius; and (3) by sketching 
a line of theological demonstrations that arise from axiomatic 
beginnings and eventually group themselves into a system, 
such being the aim toward which faith, like geometry, in­
evitably moves. 
Perhaps the fairest way to judge what has happened is 
to say, not that Pascal has applied the method of geometry 
to a religious controversy, but something subtler. I mean, 
that geometry itself is merely the application of a general 
methodological insight; its method is the particular technique 
inspired by that insight when someone makes it relevant to 
mouvement, nombre, espace, temps; and thus the appear­
ance of "geometrical" schemes in the Lettres provinciales, 
rather than being a transfer, is, instead, another incarnation 
of a tendency that stands above any one of its scientific or 
polemic uses. 
Such transposition or re-use is not feasible when the char­
acter of the reader changes, as it does in a very significant 
way when Pascal begins to plan his apology of the Christian 
religion and to write the Pensées. For him the two factors of 
method and audience vary together; changes in one imply 
changes in the other. The Provinciales owe an important 
part of their persuasiveness to the fact that the reader, the 
"provincial," and those like him, are men of good sense, of 
good senses, and of faith (to mention all three of the means 
to knowledge) and the quasi-geometrical substructure of the 
work is well attuned to the members of such an audience. 
They share the premises from which Pascal begins; he is 
showing them how what they already know and accept makes 
possible, when it is used in an orderly manner, the detection 
of error and malice in the doctrines and attitudes held by 
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the enemies of Port-Royal. It is not for such believers that 
he writes in the Pensées. There he wishes to attract the atten­
tion of readers who feel indifferent to religion or even hostile 
to it. 
His problem is, as usual, to find something on which to 
build. He cannot start with religious beliefs, but he must 
locate something equally firm; and we know that he eventu­
ally finds it in the instabilities and contradictions of human 
nature, in the everlasting conflict between what man wants 
and thinks he is entitled to—truth and happiness—and what 
he can actually have. These contradictions he cannot elimi­
nate by a drive toward simplicity and faultless demonstrations, 
in other words, by applying the genius of the geometrical 
method. And so he adopts a procedure that is Augustinian 
(eventually Platonic) in origin, the method of dialectical 
harmonization. The conflicts that lead to the logical style 
of the Provinciales come mainly from errors of definition 
and reasoning and represent impurities in a body of doctrine 
and practice; hence they may be corrected by the applica­
tion of the esprit de géométrie. The Pensées begin with some­
thing more fundamental; human nature in its fallen state. 
The contradictions found there do not arise from the misuse 
of words and from non sequiturs in reasoning. They inhere 
in a subject and they require for their proper treatment a 
technique that will, in its first phase, make the contrarieties 
pitilessly clear and then, in its second phase, show how one 
may harmonize the opposed traits or tendencies by sub­
ordinating them to God. I have shown elsewhere7 that one 
may classify many of the Pensées under headings correspond­
ing either to those two phases or to aspects of them: the 
recognition of psychological and moral conflicts; the emphasis 
on their real or "existential" character; the resulting perplex­
ity as one faces them; the search for a solution; the discovery 
of the simultaneous truth of the opposites when a compre­
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hensive principle harmonizes them; the self-validating feature 
of the whole process, since it results in unity (an important 
sign of truth) and since those who contest it may be rele­
gated to the stage that precedes the dialectical resolution. 
I do not wish to separate entirely the working of the esprit 
de géométrie and that of the dialectical spirit in Pascal's 
thought. Remnants of the one turn up in the other, as Pascal 
modulates from one perspective to the other. In the first 
section of "De l'esprit géométrique," where he illustrates the 
method of geometry by going briefly into the notions premières 
of that science, he lists, as the common properties of things, 
movement, number, and space or extent. Actually there is a 
scriptural source for these terms, and Pascal cites it: "Deus 
fecit omnia in pondère, in numéro et in mensura" (Sap., 
XI, 21). These three properties serve respectively as start­
ing points for the three branches of géométrie (in its generic 
sense) which are mécanique, arithmétique, and géométrie 
(in its specific sense). 
Ainsi il y a des propriétés communes à toutes choses, dont la
connaissance ouvre l'esprit aux plus grandes merveilles de la 
nature. 
La principale comprend les deux infinités qui se rencontrent 
dans toutes: l'une de grandeur, l'autre de petitesse. [Oeuvres, 
p. 583-84.] 
As a consequence, any movement, number or space or time 
(associated with movement by Pascal), is always situated 
between something quantitatively larger and something quan­
titatively smaller, and one is ultimately justified in saying that 
" . .  . ils se soutiennent tous entre le néant et l'infini" 
(Oeuvres, p. 584). 
Mais ceux qui verront clairement ces vérités pourront admirer 
la grandeur et la puissance de la nature dans cette double infinité 
qui nous environne de toutes parts, et apprendre par cette con­
sidération merveilleuse à se connaître eux-mêmes, en se regardant 
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placés entre une infinité et un néant d'étendue, entre une infinité
et un néant de nombre, entre une infinité et un néant de mouve­
ment, entre une infinité et un néant de temps. Sur quoi on peut
apprendre à s'estimer à son juste prix, et former des réflexions qui
valent mieux que tout le reste de la géométrie même. [Oeuvres, 
p. 591.] 
This is but a step from the great passages on the "Dispro­
portion de l'homme" of the Pensées. There man stands as a 
whole, as a colossus, in respect to the small infinite and as 
a néant in respect to the opposed infinite; and there the 
physical paradox opens up an unending series of simultane­
ously present contraries in man. We recognize in him knowl­
edge of middle things but not of extremes, that is, knowledge 
that is also ignorance; spirit that is attached to body; aspira­
tions to truth and felicity attached to knowing powers that 
are inadequate and objects of desire that are elusive; and so 
on, as we move through the dialectical paths of the Pensées. 
If we turn now to the Pensées for echoes and vestiges 
of the geometrical mind, we first recognize that Pascal fore­
sees there two main possibilities, after he has brought about 
a favorable disposition in his reader by argumentation (such 
as that of the fart). One may become the Christian who 
knows and judges by the heart or one may in addition know 
by reasoning, with the aid of prophecies and proofs. In either 
case one is persuaded: 
Ceux que nous voyons chrétiens sans la connaissance des 
prophéties et des preuves ne laissent pas d'en juger aussi bien 
que ceux qui ont cette connaissance. Ils en jugent par le coeur 
comme les autres en jugent par l'esprit. C'est Dieu qui les in­
cline à croire et ainsi ils sont très efficacement persuadés. [Oeuvres, 
pp. 1344-45-] 
The reappearance of the word preuves is significant; it occurs 
many times, of course, in "De l'esprit géométrique." We must 
note, however, its ambiguity in the Pensées: 
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Car il ne faut pas se méconnaître: nous sommes automate 
autant qu'esprit; et de là vient que l'instrument par lequel la 
persuasion se fait n'est pas la seule démonstration. Combien y 
a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent 
que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les 
plus crues; elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il 
y pense. [Oeuvres, p. 1219.] 
Of the two sorts of proofs—reasons and custom or habit— 
the former are provided for, even though they have an in­
ferior place in Pascal's apologetics. That they are associated 
with geometry is shown by the return of the notion of demon­
stration. It is the same with other elements of the earlier 
and more technical vocabulary. After the passage cited above, 
"Ceux que nous voyons chrétiens . . . , Pascal first wrote, 
and then crossed out, a few lines in defense of those who 
know by and are guided by the heart. He thinks of an objec­
tion to this effect, that heretics and infidèles go astray pre­
cisely because their faith centers in the heart; here is his 
answer: 
. .  . Je réponds à cela que nous avons des preuves . .  . et 
que les infidèles n'ont aucune preuve de ce qu'ils disent et ainsi 
nos propositions étant semblables dans les termes elles diffèrent 
en ce que l'une est sans aucune preuve et l'autre très solidement 
prouvée.8 
Pascal's attitude toward the infidels and the heretics reminds 
us of the one he assumes toward his opponents in the Pro­
vinciales: to combat error he instinctively falls back on terms 
and propositions duly expressed and ordered. 
In an interesting fragment he ties the idea of proof to 
twelve subordinate topics: 
PREUVE. — 1 ° La religion chrétienne, par son établissement: 
par elle-même établie si fortement, si doucement, étant si con­
traire à la nature. — 2 ° La sainteté, la hauteur et l'humilité 
d'une âme chrétienne. — 3 ° Les merveilles de l'Ecriture sainte. 
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— 4 ° Jésus-Christ en particulier. — 5 ° Les apôtres en particulier. 
— 6 ° Moïse et les prophètes en particulier. - 7 ° Le peuple 
juif. — 8 ° Les prophéties. — 9 ° La perpétuité: nulle religion 
n'a la perpétuité. — 10 ° La doctrine, qui rend raison de tout. — 
11 ° La sainteté de cette loi. — 21 ° Par la conduite du monde. 
[Oeuvres, p. 1228.] 
No one can say exactly what Pascal would have done with 
this list of topics had he finished the project. What he did 
do, for example, in connection with the history of the Jews, 
prophecies, and the question of perpétuité in other frag­
ments makes it plausible for one to conclude that each of 
these headings implied in his mind a proposition or a small 
group of propositions which he intended to prove. The list 
suggests, thus, a series—or perhaps a vaguer word would be 
safer here—a group of demonstrations. It reminds us of that 
order (in Pascal's terms, " . .  . l'ordre dans lequel on doit 
disposer les proposition pour être dans une suite excellente 
et géométrique," Oeuvres, p. 598) toward which the geo­
metrical spirit aspires in its second phase, after particular 
points have been established. In any case, the preuve result­
ing from this twelve-fold demonstration has for him a definite 
unity. He sees it as a whole that carries his reader with 
certainty to his general conclusion: 
II est indubitable qu'après cela on ne doit pas refuser, en con­
sidérant ce que c'est que la vie, et que cette religion, de suivre 
l'inclination de la suivre, si elle nous vient dans le coeur; et il est 
certain qu'il n'y a nul lieu de se moquer de ceux qui la suivent. 
[Oeuvres, pp. 1228-29.] 
It would be wrong, therefore, to think of geometry and 
dialectic as mutually exclusive in Pascal's mind. One leads 
to the other, as when the properties of things bring us to 
the play of the infinities; and one makes use of the other, 
as when we see that the Christian religion, though a matter 
of conversion and of the heart at first, may become proven 
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knowledge. Nevertheless, our final statement must be, I think, 
that each of these esprits has its own framework and tech­
nique in science and in morality. We can see one art of 
persuasion first treated theoretically in the unfinished texts 
with which we began and then put to practical use in the 
Lettres provinciales; and we can see in the Pensées how a 
different problem, aim, and audience led Pascal to develop 
another way to the truth. 
1. For details concerning the manuscripts, see Oeuvres complètes, éd. 
Léon Brunschvicg et al. ("Grands Ecrivains de la France" [Paris, 1914I), 
231 ff., and Oeuvres complètes, éd. Jacques Chevalier ("Bibliothèque de 
la Pléiade" [Paris, 1954]), P- 575­
2. See Brunschvicg, Oeuvres, IX, 231, where this paragraph is re­
printed from the Logique. 
3. Page 597 in the Chevalier edition (see note I, above). All further 
quotations from Pascal cited in this chapter are taken from this edition. 
4. I should also mention, as part of the history of the association of 
these texts, that they were together in a manuscript once in the posses­
sion of Sainte-Beuve, used by Faugère, but now lost. 
5. Pages 1096 and 1099, respectively; fragments 33 and 48. The 
analogy drawn between thought and ornamented expression, on one 
side, and portraits and pictures, on the other, reminds one of the relation 
of man to author in another fragment: "Quand on voit le style naturel, 
on est tout étonné et ravi, car on s'attendait à voir un auteur, et on 
trouve un homme" (p. 1096. no. 36). The theme of the author as 
decorator (stylistically speaking) is further emphasized elsewhere: "Tout 
ce qui n'est que pour l'auteur ne vaut rien. Ambitiosa recidet ornamenta" 
(p. 1096, no. 34). That snippet from Horace is an ornament of sorts! 
6. See the Logique, IVe partie, chap. ii. 
7. In my essay "Conflict and Resolution in Pascal's Pensées," Romanic 
Review, XL1X, No. 1 (February, 1958), 12-24. 
8. Pensées, éd. L. Lafuma (Paris, 1951), I, 222 (italics added). 
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Chapter VI 
Three Conceptions of the Audience 
T WAS the habit of Corneille and Racine to provide dis­
courses, epistles, prefaces, or other supporting statements 
when they presented their plays to the public in printed 
form. Molière was less systematic, but from him we have 
the Critique de l'Ecole des femmes, L'Impromptu de Ver­
sailles, and the substantial documents accompanying Tartuffe. 
One approaches these texts with the hope that they will give 
something like a direct look at the values and methods that 
guided the three dramatists. One leaves them enlightened, 
surely, but disappointed. 
We do get from Racine's prefaces a sense of the curve 
described by his genius: the growing awareness and control 
of his form, beautifully realized in Bérénice and Andromaque; 
the perfecting of it in Phèdre; then, after a silence, the return 
with a new vision in Esther and Athalie. In his two critical 
plays Molière speaks briefly (and for a while in person) of 
his kind of comedy. Corneille's discourses, examens, and 
prefaces are the most satisfying of all from the point of 
view of dramatic theory, because of their scope and pre­
cision. To have a dramatist of his stature say so carefully 
what his principles are—or rather, as in the Discours and 
Examens, what they have become for the 1660 edition of his 
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works—is a rare piece of good luck. Still, these prefaces 
and assorted papers leave much of our curiosity unsatisfied. 
Corneille takes for granted his distinctive moral universe of 
dilemmas, choices, and tests, since all that falls under the 
heading of moeurs and therefore lies outside of poetic art as 
he conceives it; Racine says almost nothing about style; and 
Molière's two little comedies are fascinating and tantalizing 
by turns, since they give so much space to satirical common­
places and to the problem of meeting the king's deadline that 
what happens in between, that is, between the discussion of 
general ideas and a finished comedy, eludes us. But Corneille's 
ethic, Racine's expression, and Molière's gift of comic inven­
tion are to us matters of first importance, and we find ourselves 
wishing that they had had more to say on those subjects. 
The difficulty comes, of course, from the fact that we are 
inclined to make these documents do more than they are 
intended to do. With the possible exception of the Discours 
of Corneille—and even there the case is not simple—none of 
them is, in essence, designed to introduce us to the poetics 
of the author; they give us rather his reaction to his audience's 
reaction. Corneille, Racine, and Molière write what they 
consider to be suitable prefaces to the printed versions of 
works that have already been performed and commented on; 
as reactions to reactions they have, therefore, the traits of 
arguments ad hoc rather than of theoretic statements. 
I should like to propose, then, that we approach these 
arguments from another direction. Instead of asking what 
they say on the subject of poetic theory, let us concentrate 
on what they signify, that is, on what they tell us about the 
typical relationship between dramatic poets and their audi­
ences in the seventeenth century, and especially on what 
they tell us about the way in which each of the dramatists, 
having accepted as a matter of course the typical relationship, 
goes on to refine it, to imagine in his own fashion his audience 
and to dispose himself toward it. 
142 
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE AUDIENCE

It is obvious that the dramatic literature of any period tends, 
by its nature, to be dependent on audience support. In the 
seventeenth century, however, this condition is reinforced 
by special economic and social factors, with the result that 
the audience has both in theory and in fact a decisive role 
in the creation of literature. In outline the view from which 
I start is that Corneille, Racine, and Molière find and see 
themselves engaged in literary transactions (that word being 
taken in its etymological sense) that have three aspects or 
phases: poet, work, and spectator. These three aspects are, 
in fact, links in a causal chain; what the poet does in his 
creative activity is the cause of the work, and the work, when 
performed, becomes in turn the cause of an experience in 
the spectator's senses, heart, and mind. It is this experience 
or the quality of it that determines more than anything else 
the value that is attached to the work and to the art of the 
poet. In short, by accepting the basic set of human and 
artistic factors in the relationship I have defined, Corneille, 
Racine, and Molière accept a rhetorical approach to literature 
in general and to drama in particular. 
In any such set of complicated factors in which one element 
is dominant, as the audience is here, we expect a natural 
tendency toward some sort of balance, toward some limita­
tion of the dominant principle. Great poets are not going to 
leave all decisions having to do with the value of their works 
up to their audiences. The prefaces, discourses, and playlets 
studied here are, for the most part, attempts on the part of 
the dramatists to achieve such a balance. As they explain 
and defend themselves, they reveal characteristic and per­
sonal ways of coming to terms with a privileged public always 
in danger of slipping into arbitrary judgments. Actually there 
are only two main lines of appeal open to any dramatist who 
has adopted the notion of literature as a kind of rhetorical 
activity. ( i ) He may invent special qualifications which must 
be present in his audience before he will abide by its ver­
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diets, distinguishing thus between those who are really quali­
fied and those who, because of ignorance or hostility, need 
not be taken seriously. Or, (2) he may shift the grounds of 
the argument, so that artistic principles come to the fore; 
instead of making distinctions in his audience or appealing 
to some audience that he wishes he had, he justifies his work 
by showing that what he has done is right, poetically speak­
ing. (Of course, there remains a third possibility, which is 
to combine in varying proportions these two, so that at times 
the poet defends himself on grounds that are basically moral or 
psychological and at other times on premises that are basically 
technical or artistic.) The interesting thing is to see how 
each of the three poets has, by temperament and by choice, 
his favorite among these possibilities and his own way of 
working with it. 
Corneille wrote three Discours on dramatic poetry, one for 
each volume of the first collected edition of his works. As 
these essays make clear, he has an abstract idea of his audi­
ence that guides him in the process of creation. Although, 
as we shall see, the actual audience is the one that means 
most to him, the abstract one gives us a convenient approach 
to the other. 
In the first place, then, Corneille counts on the presence 
of certain human traits in his or in any public. His discus­
sion of pity and fear, of the incidents that arouse those emo­
tions, of the heroes who will arouse the admiration which 
he thinks of as his contribution to the list of possible dramatic 
effects, in fact his whole treatment of the topic of the effects 
that are sought by serious drama is determined by reference 
to human values and sensibilities that are essentially the same 
everywhere and at all times. The same idea of an abstract 
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or typical audience (as opposed to a particular one) under­
lies his argument when he sets forth in what ways dramatic 
poems make us better. We are improved by the maxims they 
contain, by the examples of vices and virtues they offer, with 
the good and bad fates that follow from them, and by the 
purgations that such poems bring about; and on all of these 
points, it is evident that Corneille does not see the utilité of 
dramatic poems as something tailored uniquely to the char­
acter of his seventeenth-century audiences; it has a universal 
validity. 
In the second place, however, as important and funda­
mental as this concept is, it is overlaid with something more 
particular that definitely varies according to place and time. 
One must, for example, take into account the difference be­
tween French spectators and the ancients. Corneille has just 
expressed his disagreement with Aristotle, who condemns 
the fourth of a list of types of tragic situations and actions. 
This fourth kind, in which characters who know what they 
want to do, undertake to do it, and then fail to accomplish 
the act, is said by Aristotle to have nothing tragic about it. 
Il y a grande apparence que ce qu'a dit ce philosophe de ces 
divers degrés de perfection pour la tragédie avait une entière justesse de son temps, et en la présence de ses compatriotes . . . 
mais aussi je ne puis m'empêcner de dire que le goût de notre
siècle n'est point celui du sien sur cette préférence d'une espèce
à l'autre, ou du moins que ce qui plaisait au dernier point à ses
Athéniens ne plaît pas également à nos Français. . . .1 
The "Examen du Cid" written at about the same time, intro­
duces other and even finer distinctions. Corneille explains 
that he has been obliged to make changes in his source. As 
he conceives his subject, he may not allow Rodrigue to marry 
Chimène in the play; he must content himself with saving 
his hero. The marriage, he says, 
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. .  . est historique, et a plu en son temps; mais bien sûrement
il déplairait au nôtre; et j'ai peine à voir que Chimène y con­
sente chez Fauteur espagnol, bien qu'il donne plus de trois ans 
de durée à la comédie qu'il en a faite.2 
And so one cannot follow blindly Greek or Spanish taste and 
expect to please French audiences. 
Another interesting idea is expressed in this same "Exa-
men" : that French taste itself varies from one time to another. 
Corneille judges quite severely two scenes, the one in which 
Rodrigue offers his sword to Chimène in order that she may 
kill him and avenge her father's death and the later one in 
which he says that his "fidèle ardeur" takes away his desire 
to defend himself in the duel with Don Sanche. 
Ces beautés étaient de mise en ce temps-là, et ne le seraient pas 
en celui-ci. La première est dans l'original espagnol, et l'autre est 
tirée sur ce modèle. Toutes les deux ont fait leur effet en ma 
faveur; mais je ferais scrupule d'en étaler de pareilles à l'avenir 
sur notre théâtre. [III, 95.] 
This judgment appeared first in the edition of 1660, some 
twenty-four years after the first performances of Le Cid. But 
Corneille does not content himself with deploring the past 
and resolving to do something else in the future. For this 
edition he made many changes of diction and style in his 
original texts, so many, in fact, that it is a notable monument 
to the purification of taste through which he had himself 
lived. This moral and literary evolution explains, as a recent 
study has shown,3 a number of revisions in the ending of 
Le Cid. 
We see an indirect indication of this theme of the chang­
ing audience in Corneille's clear and explicit desire to inno­
vate. For him it is not enough to stay in the old paths, in 
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the chemins battus. What has pleased once is a matter of 
history; after being satisfied with one kind of fare, the taste 
of the audience will surely turn to something else. Again and 
again, from Mélite onward, we find mentions of this quest 
for novelty. Here is a typical example, from the dédicace of 
Don Sanche: 
Void un poème d'une espèce nouvelle, et qui n'a point d'exemple 
chez les anciens. Vous connaissez l'humeur de nos Français; ils 
aiment la nouveauté; et je hasarde non tam meliora quam nova, 
sur l'espérance de les mieux divertir. [V, 404.] 
Then support from the ancients is furnished by Horace's com­
ments on Greek audiences and Roman poets, the former 
" . .  . apud quos / Illecebris erat et grata novitate morandus 
/ Spectator. . . .  " ("Among whom the spectator had to be 
held by charms and pleasing novelty.") And the latter 
Vel qui praetextas, vel qui docuere togatas / Nee minimum 
meruere decus vestigia Graeca / Ausi deserere. . . . [Ars poetica, 
223-24, 286-88.]' 
("Who, as authors of both tragedies and comedies, dared to 
forsake the footsteps of Greece: that was not the least of their 
merits.") 
The other side of the coin, the dark side corresponding 
to this responsiveness to changing public taste, turns up at a 
critical point in Corneille's career; I mean, when he con­
cludes after the failure of Pertharite (1652) that he is no 
longer in touch with the public. One cannot read the lines 
without emotion: 
La mauvaise réception que le public a faite à cet ouvrage m'avertit 
qu'il est temps que je sonne la retraite. . .  . Il vaut mieux que 
je prenne congé de moi-même que d'attendre qu'on me le donne 
tout à fait; et il est juste qu'après vingt années de travail, je 
commence à m'apercevoir que je deviens trop vieux pour être 
encore à la mode. [VI, 5.] 
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If such is the basic conception that Corneille has of his 
audience—that it shares some traits with all audiences, but 
above all else is particular and changing—what is his attitude 
toward it? The essence of his attitude shows through the 
lines I have just quoted. He accepts the reactions of his 
public almost without question. From the start of his career 
as a dramatist, he gives the trump cards, so to speak, to the 
spectators, because he takes plaire as the first principle of 
dramatic art; and, after that, there is little one may do other 
than assent to their decisions; for it is useless to try to demon­
strate to an audience that it did, against its own sentiments, 
enjoy a performance or to argue that it should have done so. 
In 1637, he composed for publication, along with the text of 
La Suivante, an epistle to M. ***, which was left anonymous, 
perhaps because of the boldness of the reflections that Cor­
neille wished to present. We find in it a passage that sums 
up the view to which he returns many times in succeeding 
prefaces: 
Cependant mon avis est celui de Térence: puisque nous faisons 
des poèmes pour être représentés, notre premier but doit être de 
plaire à la cour et au peuple, et d'attirer un grand monde à 
leurs représentations. [II, 119.]4 
Then Corneille mentions the rules, which come unmistakably 
in second place: 
II faut, s'il se peut, y ajouter les règles, afin de ne déplaire pas
aux savants, et recevoir un applaudissement universel; mais sur­
tout gagnons la voix publique. . . .  " [II, 119-20.] 
Some spectators and critics insist on conformity to rules as 
the basis of excellence in drama but not Corneille: public 
approval—the sign that a play has pleased—is to him the 
indispensable requirement. 
Nowhere does he make this clearer than in the examen 
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of Le Cid. He interprets its success in English, Italian, and 
Flemish versions (as well as in French) as decisive justifica­
tion for the liberties he had taken with the rules (although he 
contends elsewhere that his play is basically regular). In an­
other examen, that of Andromède, he takes a step even further 
in the direction of nonconformity, as he justifies the use of 
stances, irregular lines, and rhymes as a means of arriving at 
the end of the art. Of course, Corneille is perfectly willing to 
congratulate himself on a coincidence of dramatic success and 
observance of rules, as in the cases of Cinna and Polyeucte; 
but where there is a conflict between regularity and popu­
larity, his empiricism and his taste for what works in the 
theater assert themselves. And for the last words to the reader 
in the short introduction to Suréna, his last play, he writes: 
"Vous en jugerez." 
One may say that it is easy for a writer like Corneille, 
who usually has the public on his side, to accept its judg­
ments. The fact is that even when one of his works fails— 
in the popular sense—he blames himself, not the audience. 
The Suite du menteur, for example, did not succeed so well 
as the play to which it formed a sequel, although Corneille 
judged it, he says in the epistle, to have more "beaux senti­
ments" and "beaux vers": 
Ce n'est pas que j'en veuille accuser ni le défaut des acteurs,
ni le mauvais jugement du peuple: la faute en est tout à moi,
qui devais mieux prendre mes mesures, et choisir des sujets plus
répondants au goût de mon auditoire. [IV, 279.] 
Or, again, apropos of Théodore: 
. .  . Sa représentation n'a pas eu grand éclat; et quoique beau-
coup en attribuent la cause à diverses conjonctures qui pourraient
me justifier aucunement, pour moi je ne m'en veux prendre qu'à
ses défauts, et la tiens mal faite, puisqu'elle a été mal suivie. 
J'aurais tort de m'opposer au jugement du public. . . . [V, 8.] 
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Here he does allow himself a pointed remark about taste. 
The theme of prostitution, unavoidable in his subject, had 
proved a stumbling block for his public. The moral purity 
of the contemporary theater is thus demonstrated, he con­
cludes, since a story greatly appreciated in the version that 
St. Ambrose gives in his De virginibus is too licentious for 
a French audience in 1645. 
Corneille acquiesces if the play does not win popular favor; 
and by "popular" I mean to include a wide range from the 
humblest spectators to members of the court and to exclude 
critics who reason from theory and from learning. This is, 
in fact, the only significant distinction that he sees in his 
public: the many versus the erudite few. If he makes no 
serious effort to appeal adverse judgments from the former, 
he does respond, with tact, firmness, and ingenuity, to the 
opinions of the latter. He reminds them that they speak 
usually as grammarians and philosophers rather than as poets 
and that they are free to try to do better than he has done. 
Then he goes out to meet them on their own ground with 
arms of their choice. If they will judge his plays according 
to the rules, he intends to have his say in those terms. His 
discourses and his examens are, in a way, formal claims to 
the right of the poet to analyze and defend his works in the 
perspective of art; and in spite of a certain diffidence that he 
shows from time to time, he appears determined to outthink 
the critical specialists. In the first discourse, he goes right to 
the point, which is for him their inadequate grasp of the 
nature of poetic principles. His own secret lies in his rela­
tively free attitude toward the regulation of art by theory. 
To the dogmatist who likes to ask of any work whether it 
observes the rules and imitates the ancients, Corneille slyly 
quotes ancients who see a place for innovation; he recalls 
Horace's praise for poets of his own time: "Nee minimum 
meruere decus, vestigia Graeca/ Ausi deserere," and then the 
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scornful exclamation: "O imitatores, servum pecus,"5 and 
concludes by translating from the Annals of Tacitus (Bk. 
XI, chap, xxiv): 
Ce qui nous sert maintenant d'exemple, dit Tacite, a été autre­
fois sans exemple, et ce que nous faisons sans exemple en pourra
servir un jour. [I, 25.] 
This liberal attitude is eventually justified by what happens in 
fact or practice. For example, although the perfection of trag­
edy consists, according to the usual formula, in the arousal of 
pity and fear for the protagonist, Corneille proposes Polyeucte 
as a work that excites pity without fear and still succeeds. 
Cela posé, trouvons quelque modération à la rigueur de ces 
règles du philosophe, ou du moins quelque favorable interpré­
tation, pour n'être pas obligés de condamner beaucoup de poèmes
que nous avons vu réussir sur nos théâtres. [I, 63.] 
He wants his critics to know that he, too, knows something 
about regularity and irregularity and how those terms have 
to be kept flexible and in harmony with search and novelty 
and respect for experience. His choice is to hold the audience 
and then, if need be, to rewrite the rules. 
In a way, the interesting thing is that, at this point in his 
career and in the history of serious drama in France, he 
should engage in this elaborate defense—and in some cases, 
condemnation—of his own works. He knows that some of 
his audience or his readers of 1660 expect that kind of thing; 
they are so absorbed in questions of art that go beyond the 
immediate experience of works that essays and analyses are 
needed supplements as he publishes his dramatic texts. Be­
ginning with Sertorius (1662), Corneille wrote no more 
examens; although he promised his publisher that when the 
next group of eight plays was ready, he would supply a 
fourth discourse and a new group of examens. The promise 
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was not kept. Part of the explanation lies, no doubt, in the 
general movement of taste away from the faith in rules that 
was so noticeable in and around the Academy during the 
first years of its existence; and another reason for this silence 
must lie in the fact that Corneille had won his case against 
the doctes and had given added impetus to the movement in 
question. 
In summary we may say that Corneille considers the pleas­
ure of his audience, or of the majority of it, as the crucial 
factor in any judgment of his works. If a learned minority 
wishes to find against him, he is ready and willing to state a 
position that makes his practice understandable in terms of 
rules, of course, but also in terms of French usages and of 
progress by experiment. 
"Et nous, qui travaillons pour plaire au public . . . , " 
writes Racine, in dedicating Andromaque to Madame: like 
Corneille, he aims to please; that rule comes first. The others 
may be discussed later (if, indeed, at all—Racine has no taste 
for detailed and public statements about his art). The whole 
sentence reads: "Et nous, qui travaillons pour plaire au public, 
nous n'avons plus que faire de demander aux savants si nous 
travaillons selon les règles. La règle souveraine est de plaire 
à Votre Altesse Royale" (II, 32).6 He returns to the theme 
with a slight variation, as he comments on simplicity in the 
plot of Bérénice. He had sought this quality, but certain 
people reproached him for it, even though they had been 
strongly affected by the play and would gladly see it again. 
Que veulent-ils davantage? Je les conjure d'avoir assez bonne 
opinion d'eux-mêmes pour ne pas croire qu'une pièce qui les 
touche et qui leur donne du plaisir puisse être absolument contre 
les règles. La principale règle est de plaire et de toucher. Toutes 
les autres ne sont faites que pour parvenir à cette première. 
[II, 368.] 
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And yet, in spite of the repetition of terms that have a 
Cornelian ring, I wonder if it is not necessary to discount 
them in Racine's case. I suspect that the audience, that is, 
the particular group of spectators and patrons for whom he 
wrote, appeared often to him as a necessary evil. He is aware 
of the public at large, painfully aware of certain critics, and 
respectfully, at times snobbishly, aware of the court and 
the King. He obviously senses and responds in one way or 
another, positively or negatively, to a goût du siècle. A well-
known instance may be found in his remarks on the char­
acters of Andromaque and Pyrrhus. He suppresses the second 
marriage of Andromaque to Molossus: "J'ai cru en cela me 
conformer à l'idée que nous avons maintenant de cette prin­
cesse" (II, 38). We have seen this sort of adjustment before 
as part of Corneille's technique. But Racine does not hesitate 
to depart from contemporary taste. Whereas Corneille seems 
in his second discourse to envy the freedom of the novelist 
and the ease with which he changes from place to place 
and stretches his time limits, Racine, when he mentions the 
novel, comments not on some technical aspect of the art of 
the genre but on the corruption of taste (he thus turns on 
the group he professes to wish to please) that has been caused 
by "precious" characterizations, a corruption that blinds some, 
at least, to the authenticity of a character like Pyrrhus. 
This is symptomatic of a tendency that reverses the empha­
sis we have noted in Corneille, who on occasion argues from 
the idea of a typical public while writing for a particular 
and evolving one. Racine, on the other hand, certainly knows 
his seventeenth-century audience, but he is inclined to dis­
trust it and to quarrel with it; he actually writes for a general­
ized and even idealized public that is his own creation. There 
are two interesting examples of the effort to generalize. In 
answering a possible objection to some extravagances in Les 
Plaideurs (1668), he says: 
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Mais enfin je traduis Aristophane, et l'on doit se souvenir qu'il
avait affaire à des spectateurs assez difficiles. Les Athéniens sa­
vaient apparemment ce que c'était que le sel attique; et ils étaient
bien sûrs, quand il avaient ri d'une chose, qu'ils n'avaient pas ri
d'une sottise. . . . Quoiqu'il en soit, je puis dire que notre siècle
n'a pas été de plus mauvaise humeur que le sien, et que si le 
but de ma comédie était de faire rire, jamais comédie n'a mieux
attrapé son but. [II, 142-43.] 
The assimilation and, hence, the generalization are clear. 
Racine thinks of himself as having written for a group of 
people who have tastes in common with those of the ancient 
Greeks and who have in a sense escaped from their own 
limits in time and space. He returns to this comparison of 
his French audience to that of classical Athens in the Preface 
to Iphigénie (1674). After mentioning some ways in which 
he had departed from the tragedy of Euripides, he tells us 
that, where the passions are concerned, he has followed his 
model more exactly, with moving results. 
J'ai reconnu avec plaisir, par l'effet qu'a produit sur notre théâtre 
tout ce que j'ai imité ou d'Homère ou d'Euripide, que le bon sens 
et la raison étaient les mêmes dans tous les siècles. Le goût de 
Paris s'est trouvé conforme à celui d'Athènes. Mes spectateurs 
ont été émus des mêmes choses qui ont mis autrefois en larmes 
le plus savant peuple de la Grèce. . . . [III, 142-43.] 
The characteristics that make a good audience—bon sens, 
raison, goût—do not vary, and it is the abstract audience thus 
constituted that Racine respects and serves. 
He also idealizes his audience, in the sense that he tries 
to define and locate one that is perfectly sensitive, intelligent, 
and impartial: in view of the prestige associated with antiquity 
in general and with the Greeks in particular, the passages 
just quoted are in themselves signs of that tendency. But the 
process of idealization shows up most clearly after passages 
in which Racine has felt himself on the defensive. I am 
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thinking especially of the combative tone that one detects 
in the prefaces to Britannicus and Bérénice, and, also, though 
to a lesser degree, in those to Alexandre and Andromaque. 
In similar circumstances Corneille presents the figure of the 
disinterested judge, trying the merits of particular cases against 
poetic rules, liberally understood. Racine's approach differs 
completely. He can be quite bitter, as in the first two in­
stances I have mentioned. He is not in the least inclined 
to start an elaborate exposé of his poetics; he limits himself 
to quick strokes, rich in implications, such as the following: 
" . .  . Une action simple, chargée de peu de matière, telle 
que doit être une action qui se passe en un seul jour, et qui 
s'avançant par degrés vers sa fin, n'est soutenue que par 
les intérêts, les sentiments et les passions des personnages 
. . . " (Britannicus, Première Préface, II, 246). Or this, 
which defines so well the general effect that Racine wishes 
to produce: "Ce n'est point une nécessité qu'il y ait du sang 
et des morts dans une tragédie: il suffit que l'action en soit 
grande, que les acteurs en soient héroïques, que les passions 
y soient excitées, et que tout se ressente de cette tristesse 
majestueuse qui fait tout le plaisir de la tragédie" (Bérénice, 
Préface, II, 366). 
However, these valuable sketches are embedded in para­
graphs of sometimes intemperate remarks against the partisans 
of plots filled with "jeux de théâtre," with improbable inci­
dents and declamations. He is apt to call such critics ignorant 
and unjust, as when he invokes Terence at the end of the 
Preface to Britannicus: "Homine imperito nunquam quid-
quam injustius," a line which he had already translated 
earlier, "II n'y a rien de plus injuste qu'un ignorant." He 
refuses to be drawn into a contest with theoreticians who 
are mainly supporters of Corneille, anyway, and whose poor 
taste is made worse by ill will. Near the end of the Preface 
to Bérénice, he takes up criticisms offered by certain persons 
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apparently too highly placed to be treated roughly; he sug­
gests that they are misguided rather than ignorant. Their 
charge had been that a tragedy such as Bérénice, with so 
little complication in its plot, could hardly be composed 
according to the rules of the theater. Racine's characteristic 
reaction is to inquire (indirectly, it seems) whether the play 
had been boring to them. On finding out that, on the con­
trary, they had been pleased and moved by it, he asks "Que 
veulent-ils davantage?" 
La principale règle est de plaire et de toucher. Toutes les 
autres ne sont faites que parvenir à cette première. Mais toutes
ces règles sont d'un long détail, dont je ne leur conseille pas [à
ces quelques personnes] de s'embarrasser. Ils ont des occupations 
plus importantes. Qu'ils se reposent sur nous de la fatigue 
d'éclaircir les difficultés de la Poétique d'Aristote; qu'ils se réser­
vent le plaisir de pleurer et d'être attendris; et qu'ils me permet­
tent de leur dire ce qu'un musicien disait à Philippe, roi de 
Macédoine, qui prétendait qu'une chanson n'était pas selon les
règles: "A Dieu ne plaise, Seigneur, que vous soyez si malheureux
que de savoir ces choses-là mieux que moi!" [II, 368.] 
My point is this: the seventeenth-century poet has two 
choices in facing his critics; he may answer them by appeal­
ing to poetic principles taken as true, or by appealing to 
other judges in whose opinions one may have more con­
fidence, that is, to the truly qualified part of his audience; 
Corneille prefers the first alternative, Racine the second. As 
soon as one gets beyond a few general points that should 
be clear to everyone, Racine believes poetics to be the busi­
ness of the poet, not of the spectator, and so, in order to 
confirm the value of his work, he looks to the reactions of 
certain elite elements in his audience. 
He speaks in the first Preface to Alexandre of the approba­
tion of "les premières personnes de la terre et les Alexandres 
de notre siècle/' and in the epistle, addressed to the king, 
he says delicately that the king "had not disapproved" of his 
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tragedy. Andromaque is dedicated to Madame. The move­
ment of thought in the epistle is typical of Racine: away 
from the negative subtleties of critics to the positive judg­
ments of people of taste. The interest of Madame in the 
play, her help in composing it, the fact that she had "hon­
ored it with tears" when he read it to her for the first time-
all that consoled him for the hardness of those who were 
untouched by it: "Je leur permets de condamner Y Androm­
aque tant qu'ils voudront, pourvu qu'il me soit permis d'ap­
peler de toutes les subtilités de leur esprit au coeur de Votre 
Altesse Royale" (II, 31). The next paragraph praises her 
intelligence, and the whole development leads to the state­
ment that the supreme rule is to please Her Majesty. But the 
elite consists of more than one or two top people. In pre­
senting his next play, Les Plaideurs, Racine shows us la cour 
correcting errors of judgment committed in la ville. When 
it was first performed in Paris, there were some who thought 
it irregular and others who felt that legal subjects would 
not do as sources of diversion for the court. "La pièce fut 
bientôt après jouée à Versailles. On ne fit point de scrupule de 
s'y réjouir; et ceux qui avaient cru se déshonorer de rire à 
Paris, furent peut-être obligés de rire à Versailles pour se faire 
honneur" (II, 141). 
One cannot, of course, suppose that Racine identified sound 
taste blindly with Louis XIV, Henriette-Anne d'Angleterre, 
or some circle at the court. The essential thing is that his 
mind usually turns, in the face of conflicts and criticisms, 
to some ideal spectator or spectators, and one incarnation of 
the ideal is found in Versailles and its principal personnages. 
More significant, no doubt, and more indicative of his true 
feelings is the extraordinary passage in the Preface to Britan­
nicus in which he makes a series of scarcely veiled allusions 
to some Cornelian heroes and heroines of whom he dis­
approves, ending on a sarcastic note: "Voilà sans doute de 
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quoi faire récrier tous ces Messieurs." He suggests that he 
might do likewise, and then he asks two important ques­
tions: "Mais que dirait cependant le petit nombre de gens 
sages auxquels je m'efforce de plaire? De quel front oserais-je 
me montrer, pour ainsi dire, aux yeux de ces grands hommes 
de l'antiquité que j'ai choisis pour modèles?" (II, 247). 
Racine's imagination moves from the small number of con­
temporaries whose approval really counts with him to an even 
more select group, great creators in fact, but here changed 
into spectators and judges. (The idea is no doubt traceable 
to a passage in chapter xii of Longinus' treatise On the Sub­
lime, though Racine does not name his source.) He con­
tinues: "Car, pour me servir de la pensée d'un ancien, voilà 
les véritables spectateurs que nous devons nous proposer; et 
nous devons sans cesse nous demander: 'Que diraient Homère 
et Virgile, s'ils lisaient ces vers? que dirait Sophocle, s'il voyait 
représenter cette scène? ' " (II, 248). This climaxes the trend 
of Racine's thought away from the conception that we no­
ticed in the thinking of Corneille, the conception of an audi­
ence given hic et nunc and accepted as it is. Racine likes 
the idea of moving Paris in the direction of Athens, or, at 
another moment, he will define for himself an audience that 
can exist only in abstract thought, because, with its good 
sense and good taste, it is the same everywhere and always.7 
The process of generalization is completed by a tendency to 
restrict and to idealize the audience. The perfect judges con­
sist of a small number of gens sages or of cultivated per­
sonnages like Madame and Louis XIV, or, better still, of ideal 
poet-spectators like one or more of the great ancients. 
With Phèdre (1677) Racine takes leave of his audience, 
in the sense of a sizeable and diverse public. When he comes 
back to dramatic poetry at the request of Mme de Maintenon 
and creates Esther (1689), he is, indeed, working for a select 
few (and for a very special theater and troupe). The success 
of the work at Saint Cyr was a brilliant one: 
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De sorte qu'un divertissement d'enfants est devenu le sujet de
l'empressement de toute la cour; le Roi lui-même, qui en avait
été touché, n'ayant pu refuser à tout ce qu'il y a de plus grands
seigneurs de les y mener, et ayant eu la satisfaction de voir, par 
le plaisir qu'ils y ont pris, qu'on se peut aussi bien divertir aux
choses de piété qu'à tous les spectacles profanes. [II, 456.] 
Although Racine the courtier obviously enjoyed this success, 
something deeper was at stake. It seems certain that his piety 
had led him by this time away from the concern with pleasing 
an audience as he had tried to do with Andromaque or with 
l'phigénie. After all, there is a new and transcendent Spec­
tator to be reckoned with : "Tout respire ici Dieu . . . ," an­
nounces the allegorical personnage, Piety, at the end of the 
prologue to Esther. Have we not here a Racine close enough 
to Pascal in disposition and outlook to feel in his turn that 
"le fini s'anéantit en présence de l'infini, et devient un pur 
néant?" 
What he had in mind for Athalie, as regards performance 
and audience, is even more difficult to fathom. It did not 
have the reception that its predecessor had had, partly be­
cause Esther had been too successful and had disrupted the 
program at Saint Cyr, but only partly. Actually, we cannot 
conceive of a seventeenth-century theater or company or 
audience that could have done justice to it. Athalie repre­
sents the final break with any simple notions of plaire and 
toucher, of subservience to details of performance and to 
verdicts of spectators; and it thus reveals in retrospect, I be­
lieve, the real and profound sense of Racine's relation to his 
audience throughout his career. The persistent desire to uni­
versalize it and to idealize it that we have noted is actually 
his means of freeing himself from the limits and dangers of 
a rhetorical conception of tragedy. There can be no doubt 
that his art owes a great deal to the principles and discipline 
of rhetoric, but these things are means to poetic ends with 
him; in reality, he is haunted far more by form and thought 
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than by effect. One cannot say that the audience is his guide 
as he finds his way from Andromaque to Phèdre and the per­
fected tragic form animating it or from Esther to Athalie, two 
steps in the evolution of another dramatic form. Racine knows 
better than anyone else what he wants to do and what his 
ideal is; he knows it because he works, not from sensitivity to 
the reigning taste, but from familiarity with great models. 
In the series of works from Andromaque to Phèdre, he 
strives for the particular synthesis and proper ordering of 
action, character, thought, and style, for the simplicity and 
elegance that had been " . .  . si fort du goût des anciens" 
(II, 36). And, as he explains it, he hopes to achieve in his 
last two plays two other characteristics of his Greek models. 
In the first place, he tries to integrate chorus and music into 
his dramas, so as to realize more fully the possibilities inherent 
in an art that is directed to performance; and, in the second 
place, on an other than technical plane, he dares to integrate 
drama with religion, as his models had done (with this differ­
ence, of course, that their basis had been pagan, while his is 
Christian). Racine seeks at this late moment in his career to 
resolve the conflict, long standing in his century, between 
drama and faith, between experience in the theater and the 
rest of one's experience, colored as it must be by Christian 
habits and convictions. He attempts to bring about by a 
creative stroke what was a datum for the ancients, since their 
drama was not far from its origins in religion. He says the 
whole thing very simply: 
J'entrepris donc la chose [la composition d'Esther], et je m'aperçus 
qu'en travaillant sur le plan qu'on m'avait donné, j'exécutais en 
quelque sorte un dessein qui m'avait souvent passé dans l'esprit, 
qui était de lier, comme dans les anciennes tragédies grecques, 
le choeur et le chant avec l'action, et d'employer à chanter les 
louanges du vrai Dieu cette partie du choeur que les païens 
employaient à chanter les louanges de leurs fausses divinités. 
[III, 455-] 
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In short, what Racine wanted all the time to do, apparently, 
was to achieve a more and more authentic revival of an 
ancient genre, and the stages of that re-creation correspond 
roughly to stages in his personal evolution. As a poet he de­
pended less and less on his audience; his light came from 
other sources—from form at first and then, also, from Christian 
truth as he saw and understood it. 
Of the three great seventeenth-century dramatists, Molière 
has the most intimate acquaintance with his public. Racine 
tends to write for an ideal audience, one that has never been 
and never can be fully and concretely realized. Corneille 
writes for a real audience, and yet he keeps a certain moral 
distance between it and him. But Molière, whose energies 
are so completely bound up in the theater, has to know his 
spectators and their tastes. His contact with them as manager 
and as member of a troupe is necessarily very close. He must 
know them, moreover, for reasons arising from the nature of 
comedy. 
A glance back at a statement made by Racine will show by 
contrast the principle involved. In the "Seconde préface" to 
Bajazet, he justifies himself carefully for starting from a sub­
ject that is nearly contemporary, the main episodes of the 
story having taken place in Constantinople about thirty years 
before. He would not recommend, he says, choosing such a 
subject if the action had taken place in the country of the 
spectators, where the principal characters would be, if not 
familiar, at least known to them. "Les personnages tragiques 
doivent être regardés d'un autre oeil que nous ne regardons 
d'ordinaire les personnages que nous avons vus de si près. On 
peut dire que le respect que l'on a pour les héros augmente 
à mesure qu'ils s'éloignent de nous: major e longinquo rever­
entia" (II, 477). To produce its proper effect, tragedy must 
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start from people and acts that are remote; and Racine's 
argument is, precisely, that Turks in Constantinople are suffi­
ciently remote, in place at least, to satisfy this primary con­
dition. If there is to be tragedy in the Racinian manner, the 
dramatist must see events and characters e longinquo and 
make it possible for his audience to do the same. Molière 
obviously thinks of comedy and its subject matter in exacdy 
the opposite way: he takes it as a miroir public that is focussed 
on surrounding and identifiable realities. Consequently, his 
view of the audience has a special ambiguity. 
As spectators, he sees them in the light of the ever-recurring 
notion of plaire. In the Critique de l'école des femmes, Lysidas, 
the pedantic poet, provokes Dorante, the defender of Molière, 
to the following classic retort: "Je voudrais bien savoir si la 
grande règle de toutes les règles n'est pas de plaire, et si une 
pièce de théâtre qui a attrapé son but n'a pas suivi un bon 
chemin" (III, 358).8 He returns to the point a few lines later: 
"Je dis bien que le grand art est de plaire, et que cette comé­
die ayant plu à ceux pour qui elle est faite, je trouve que c'est 
assez pour elle et qu'elle doit peu se soucier du reste" (III, 
360). However, and this is where the ambiguity begins, 
Molière sees his audience also as his subject matter, as a basic 
element in the maneuvers of comic creation. His specific task 
is, he says, to " . .  . entrer comme il faut dans le ridicule 
des hommes, et de rendre agréablement sur le théâtre les 
défauts de tout le monde" (III, 351). Or, in the same vein: 
"Lorsque vous peignez les hommes, il faut peindre d'après 
nature; on veut que ces portraits ressemblent, et vous n'avez 
rien fait si vous n'y faites reconnaître les gens de votre siècle" 
(III, 354). Molière hopes to observe and represent in such a 
way as to cause in the theater an experience of recognition, 
and sometimes of self-recognition, of truth and its applications: 
that is, I believe, the force of the castigat ridendo for him. 
In order to please his audience, Molière must, therefore, put 
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it into his work, with due attention, of course, to the first 
principle of comic art, according to which one does not repre­
sent individuals (that went out, as Boileau was to recall in 
the Art poétique, with the end of the old Greek comedy) but 
comic natures. They are abstract, but, by that very token, 
communicable to many. 
What happens when Molière reacts against unfavorable 
judgments to his audience or of some segment of it? "Seg­
ment" seems the proper word, because he enjoys on the whole, 
as Corneille does, a relationship of mutual sympathy with the 
people who come to his plays. When attacked, however, he 
does not defend himself, in the manner of Corneille, on the 
basis of rules and art. On this subject Molière's attitude re­
sembles that of Racine : he appeals incidentally and reluctantly 
to rules. Dorante's reply to Lycidas, which I have quoted 
earlier, gives Molière's view—that his work does, in fact, con­
form to the "rules," since it pleases the public for which it 
was created. By this argument he empties the rules of all 
their mystery and most of their prescriptive force. They be­
come, as Dorante goes on to say, " . .  . quelques observations 
aisées que le bon sens a faites sur ce qui peut ôter le plaisir 
que l'on prend à ces sortes de poèmes; et le même bon sens 
qui a fait autrefois ces observations les fait aisément tous les 
jours sans le secours d'Horace et d'Aristote" (III, 358). They 
are found empirically, and are easily rediscovered; they are 
guidelines and guardrails, helpful in knowing what should be 
left out rather than what should be put in. Like Corneille, 
then, Molière knows that he can fall back on the favor of 
the audience as one answer to his critics. 
The curious thing is that when he addresses himself more 
specifically to the critics in order to remind them that they are 
in the minority, he does not write prefaces and discourses. 
The great exception comes in the quarrel over Tartuffe, but 
that does not really invalidate the point, I think: Molière's 
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more natural reaction is to offer plays in his defense. He 
prefers not to set aside his comic vision in dealing with 
critics, for that vision may and does include his public, his 
critics, and even himself. Here, as elsewhere in his comedies, 
his satirical technique is directed ad hominem, or, more ex­
actly, perhaps, ad naturam: what a man says is linked insepar­
ably to that man's nature or basic moral disposition. It is one 
of the axioms of Molière's art that the sense and value of 
words and actions are fixed ultimately by the mental and 
moral character of the agent. This insight, brilliantly illus­
trated by complex creations like Tartuffe and Alceste but 
notable as well in many lesser figures, inspires him as he 
begins to deal with critics. He relates what people say about 
the Ecole des femmes to their characters, thereby recalling to 
the more intelligent part of his audience that the detractors 
are pedants, envieux, prudes, 'précieux, marquis. The moral 
essences that determine what they do and say are enough to 
disqualify them as judges. To complete his response, Molière 
makes it possible for the men of good sense to identify them­
selves with reasonable spokesmen like Dorante and the Che­
valier, who belong to the line of Philinte (in Le Misan­
thrope), Cléante (in Tartuffe), and Chrysalde (in the Ecole 
des femmes). 
The principles are the same when Molière answers his 
attackers directly instead of representing them: in the Pré­
face to Tartuffe, he emphasizes to us and to his contemporary 
readers the vicious morality that underlies the criticisms and 
then appeals on rational grounds to the better part of his 
audience: "Ils n'ont eu garde de l'attaquer [la comédie] par 
le côté qui les a blessés: ils sont trop politiques pour cela et 
savent trop bien vivre pour découvrir le fond de leur âme. 
Suivant leur louable coutume, ils ont couvert leurs intérêts 
de la cause de Dieu: et le Tartuffe, dans leur bouche est une 
pièce qui offense la piété" (IV, 373). Their behavior in 
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connection with the play is in character; it harmonizes with 
the rest of their actions. As for the audience that is real for 
Molière, the one that he respects, these lines occur just be­
low the preceding ones: 
J'ai eu beau la soumettre [la comédie] aux lumières de mes amis
et à la censure de tout le monde: les corrections que j'ai pu faire,
le jugement du Roi et de la Reine, qui l'ont vue, l'approbation
des grands Princes et de Messieurs les Ministres, qui l'ont honorée
de leur présence, le témoignage des gens de bien, qui l'ont 
trouvée profitable, tout cela n'a rien servi. [IV, 374.] 
Let us return for a moment to the Critique. Speaking in 
the first s^cene of her love of company and visitors, which 
has just been condemned by Elise, Uranie explains very 
briefly: "Je goûte ceux qui sont raisonnables et me divertis des 
extravagants" (III, 312). Is this not the key to Molière's 
conception of his audience, whether he views it as a source 
of subjects or as a group of spectators? Working on the plane 
of comic creation, he locates among them the extravagants 
who are to be his targets, and then, on the other plane, that 
of the spectators and their experiences in the theater, he 
assumes that every one will recognize the truth of his charac­
terizations and that his comic models will move in some small 
degree out of their errors, flaws, and rigidities. If the latter 
protest instead, Molière's characteristic impulse is to re-
represent them so that the healthy part of his public is con­
firmed in its judgment and the other part is abandoned to its 
particular form of the ridiculous. 
In these texts we see three distinct conceptions of the au­
dience; and, since the dramatists all accept (at least initially) 
as an underlying rule that the audience is entitled to be 
pleased, we also see three distinct ways of keeping this prin­
ciple from becoming too burdensome. Corneille thinks of 
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himself as facing a particular group of people whose taste is 
a matter of a given historical moment; he willingly accepts 
the decision of the many; for the learned few he supplies 
reasons for many aspects of his practice, arguing from a pre­
cise but undogmatic view of his art. Racine thinks of himself 
as facing an audience containing a goodly number of ignorant 
and prejudiced people whose taste cannot be taken as the 
final criterion; he, therefore, tends to re-create it by broadening 
it to take in people of other ages, or he introduces important 
divisions into it. He prefers to see himself as working for the 
court, or for a few gens sages, or for the great ancients, who 
can be invoked at least in his imagination, or, finally, by an 
unexpected turn, for Saint Cyr and God. He will reason from 
artistic principles on occasion; but if one compares the sum 
of what he has to say about his dramatic technique with the 
sum of Corneille's criticism, there is no doubt that he expressed 
his real view when he quoted, apropos of Bérénice, the reply 
of the musician to Philip of Macedon. With Molière there is 
nothing like Racine's effort to find somehow and somewhere 
the audience he ought to have; he thinks of himself as facing 
a particular audience that is basically won over, that is already 
his, with the exception of a few of his targets. After that state­
ment, however, one must elaborate a bit: there is the rather 
undifferentiated but very much prized group of sensible people 
that includes the court;9 on the other hand, there is the large 
and variegated group of people, particularly noticeable to 
Molière when he is author rather than actor,10 who are 
irrational in one way or another. If he is criticized, he resorts 
even less than Racine does to statements of principles, once 
the general thesis of comedy as the miroir public has been 
advanced; he merely turns his art on his attackers. 
Seventeenth-century literary theory tended, with few ex­
ceptions, to crown a situation de fait, in which the Molières, 
Racines, and Corneilles, real or fancied, were dependent on 
166

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE AUDIENCE

audiences and protectors. Its typical reflex, so to speak, was 
to discuss literary art in terms of the rhetorical triad—poet, 
work, and audience—so adjusted to each other that the special 
weight of the third factor does not nullify the other two. 
What we see in the prefaces, discourses, and critical plays 
examined here is a constant effort on the part of poets to 
make this system work, either by insisting on distinctions and 
refinements in the audience or by showing that any drama 
called into question conforms in fact to recognized conven­
tions and truths of poetics. 
1. Oeuvres de P. Corneille, éd. Charles Marty-Laveaux ("Grands 
Ecrivains de la France" [Paris, 1862-68]), I, 72. All quotations in the text 
have been taken from this edition. 
2. Ibid., Ill, 94. For another and similar instance, see ibid., IV, 138, 
where, apropos of Le Menteur, he tells us of changing the ending of La 
Verdad sospechosa so that, in accordance with the French convention of 
his day, there would be a happy outcome for everyone in the play. 
3. G. Couton, Réalisme de Corneille (Paris, 1953). 
4. The lines from Terence are: "Poeta, quum primum animum ad 
scribendum appulit, / Id sibi negoti credidit solum dari / Populo ut 
placeret, quas fecisset fabulas" ÇAndria, Prologue, 1-3*). ("When the 
poet first applied his mind to writing, he supposed that his sole business 
was to see that his plays pleased the people.' ) 
5. Ars poetica, 286-87, and Epistles I. xix. 19. 
6. All of my references are to Oeuvres de J. Racine, ed. Paul Mesnard 
("Grands Ecrivains de la France" [Paris, 1865-73]). 
7. One might expect, therefore, some mention of future generations 
as well as of past and present ones. Racine cannot have been indifferent 
to the judgment of posterity, but I have found only one reference to it 
in the prefaces and épîtres, and that one is rather oblique. Apropos of 
Phèdre, he writes: "Au reste, je n'ose encore assurer que cette pièce soit 
en effet la meilleure de mes tragédies. Je laisse et aux lecteurs et au 
temps à décider de son véritable prix" (II, 302). 
8. All references are to Oeuvres de Molière^ ed. Eugène Despois and 
Paul Mesnard ("Grands Ecrivains de la France' [Paris, 1873-1900]). 
9. "Sachez, s'il vous plaît, Monsieur Lycidas, que les courtisans ont 
d'aussi bons yeux que d'autres . . . que la grande épreuve de toutes 
vos comédies, c'est le jugement de la cour; que c'est son goût qu'il faut 
étudier pour trouver l'art de réussir; qu'il n'y a point de lieu où les 
décisions soient si justes; . . . que du simple bon sens naturel et du 
commerce de tout le beau monde, on s'y fait une manière d'esprit qui, 
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sans comparaison, juge plus finement des choses que tout le savoir en­
rouillé des pédants' ZCritique, III, 354-55). Molière finds a way, a few 
lines further on, to qualify this sweeping praise of the court. He has 
Dorante say: "La Cour a quelques ridicules, j'en demeure d'accord, et je 
suis, comme on voit, le premier à les fronder" (III, 542). See also note 
10, below. 
10. In the Impromptu de Versailles, there is a point at which the 
chevalier is asked by the marquis whether Molière has exhausted all 
possible comic subjects. Dorante replies: "Plus de matière? Eh! mon 
pauvre Marquis, nous lui en fournissons toujours assez. . . . Crois-tu 
qu'il ait épuisé dans ses comédies tout le ridicule des hommes? Et sans 
sortir de la Cour, n'a-t-il presque vingt caractères de gens où il n'a point 
touché. . . . Va, va, Marquis, Molière aura toujours plus de sujets qu'il 
n'en voudra; et tout ce qu'il a touché jusqu'ici n'est rien que bagatelle 
au prix de ce qui reste" (III, 415). 
l68 
Chapter VU 
Conclusions and Implications 
N THE FIRST four chapters of this book I have given an 
account of the rise of two radically different conceptions of 
rhetoric and of the clash between them. The first of these, 
whose history I have outlined by taking as the point of de­
parture the program of the Academy and as the more or less 
clear denouement the Comparaisons and Réflexions of Rapin, 
came into being by a long process in which a theory of ex­
pression that goes back to Quintilian and Cicero and through 
them to Greek theorists was translated, adapted, and reformu­
lated. I have studied the second in the Logique of Port-Royal; 
it has its ancient precedents, too, though not so much in 
theories of expression as in Greek atomisms and geometry; it 
came into being in sevententh-century France as a develop­
ment and application of the method of Descartes. These two 
approaches to problems of expression and persuasion are so 
different that when we study them in the texts where they 
are stated in pure terms, we must finally see them as in­
commensurable. But the two theories, with their aspirations 
toward persuasion, on the one hand, and toward demonstra­
tion, on the other, are involved in various fruitful compro­
mises, with the result that the tendency to artifice in the one 
and to aridity in the other are overcome in a general ambition 
to be both appealing and truthful in every kind of expression. 
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In Chapters V and VI, it was possible to show, at least in 
part, how the two approaches were developed and specified 
by Pascal and by the most important dramatists of the period. 
In Pascal we have someone perfectly able to work on two 
levels, on that of theory as well as that of practice. He has no 
fully worked-out treatise on the subject of rhetoric, but he 
does have two significant fragments that outline a treatise; 
and there are many signs in the Pensées of the degree to which 
he is fascinated by problems of intellectual method. In the 
Lettres provinciales there is much evidence to show that what 
he chooses to write about as he enters the argument between 
the Jesuits and the Jansenists and what he takes to be suitable 
criteria in assaying the truth of the two positions derived from 
considerations such as those set down in the fragments. In fact, 
the basic conflict, that between a rhetoric based on appeals to 
opinions known to be favored by the person addressed (the 
position of the Ciceronians and of Rapin) and a rhetoric based 
on objective grounds that must be accepted by the person 
being addressed (the position of Port-Royal and of Pascal), 
lies at the heart of Pascal's procedure. The opinions probables 
of the Jesuits and their imperialistic aims which justify any 
means as long as it is effective—I speak as Pascal might, not 
as a historian—are treated much as the discipline of rhetoric 
is treated in the logic of Port-Royal; the victorious point of 
view is quasi-geometrical in its structure and dynamics. The 
striking thing is that when Pascal comes to the task that 
underlies the Pensées, he selects a very different technique, 
one that is dialectical rather than demonstrative in the fashion 
of geometry. In other words, he not only sides with the Port-
Royalists in their opposition to the traditional rhetoric, he 
also knows how to formulate and use still another procedure 
when occasion demands. 
The example of Pascal (in the Provinciales, dit least) is that 
of a man who, by generalizing a mathematical method, arrives 
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at a logic that he can apply to problems of persuasion in 
apologetics. Corneille, Racine, and Molière certainly were not 
theoreticians of rhetoric on any comparable scale; they were 
interested in literary creation rather than in religious conver­
sion or polemic. Still, one finds in what they say to their critics 
arguments that depend for their force on a conception of 
dramatic art that must be called rhetorical, it seems to me. 
This time the technique of "persuasion" is more traditional 
than Cartesian in inspiration. I have not tried to align the 
plays or passages from them with the more technical pages 
of Cicero and Quintilian—as has been done in some studies 
—in order to locate examples of the various topoi, devices, and 
figures of speech or thought that are treated theoretically in 
the sources; instead, I have studied the audience as a force 
in creative consciousness, using as evidence the statements 
that the playwrights made about what they were doing or 
thought they had done. The basic problem is this: once one 
has accepted the rhetorical framework, one must form a pre­
cise image of the audience for which one writes and in that 
act form an idea of oneself and of one's art. Corneille, Racine, 
and Molière all agree in assuming that the audience is a 
decisive factor, but for reasons of temperament, personal 
circumstances, and what may be called generic vocation, each 
has his own way of coping with it. 
"Classique est l'écrivain qui porte un critique en soi-même et 
qui l'associe intimement à ses travaux." Valéry's definition ap­
plies, as a matter of fact, to almost every major writer in 
France, at least since the Renaissance. If one considers the 
period covered by the present studies—from 1635 to 1685, 
roughly speaking—it certainly points to something essential in 
the consciousness of the principal authors. From the founding 
of the Academy to the Quarrel of the Ancients and the Mod­
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erns, one question with which they worked was the following: 
in the light of what poetic principles could they bring into 
existence a literature worthy of France and of its monarchy 
and worthy of being compared with the classical legacy? This 
does not mean that they were not as interested as we are in the 
dilemmas and contradictions of human behavior or that they 
could not go far beneath the masks that men wore then and 
in every age; nor does it deny their ability to sense the prob­
lems of "human time" or to recognize, with anguish in some 
cases, the néant to which men must return or from which, 
with supernatural aid, they may hope to escape. What it does 
mean is that these concerns, though real and present, emerge 
into a critical consciousness that is focussed on the process 
of creation. The seventeenth century thought profoundly 
about man, his nature, and his existence, but experience and 
reflection alone did not bring into being those works in which 
we may, at our leisure, see the characteristic humanism of the 
age. In the presence of this flowering, of this marvelous burst 
of literary creativity, we must note these truths: It was essen­
tially contingent, it might not have been, it would not have 
been but for the force of a productive discipline that caused 
works to be. 
I am not reverting to the notion of a theoretical and dis­
embodied doctrine classique. I am not speaking of a critical 
system; as the history of criticism in the seventeenth century 
shows, nothing that can be called a system was ever fully 
achieved; poetic and rhetorical disciplines functioned as ideal 
goals while always remaining, in fact, more or less amorphous. 
On the contrary, I am saying that, as we think about the 
factors implied by the very existence of French classical litera­
ture, we are led not to lifeless doctrine but to personal discip­
line, to a kind of qualification that has been freely assumed by 
someone and vitally held by him in view of doing or making 
something well. Such a personal qualification has, of course, 
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a content; and when that content is made explicit, one slips 
often into the statement of something like a theory. But the 
ideological part must always be understood as entering into 
the powers of a particular writer or poet and as affecting, 
though not mechanically determining, his creative activity. 
Reserving for the moment further comment on the sub­
jective aspect of discipline so understood, let us summarize 
its objective content as that emerges from the preceding 
studies. 
i. In the first place, we have been discussing knowledge 
directed to the uses of language. That is not its only subject 
matter; the revivals of the Ciceronian tradition during the 
seventeenth century were accompanied by an effort to re­
capture a truly comprehensive view of problems of expression; 
to brake the tendency to associate rhetoric with only one of 
its parts, the study of style; and to substitute for that narrow 
view a conception of the art as dealing also with the invention 
and arrangement of ideas and arguments and with the 
characteristics and interests of audiences. One of the im­
portant complaints of the Port-Royalists was that the "style 
rhétoricien" reflected an excessive concern with words and an 
inclination to let ideas and things slip toward the edges of the 
inquiry. Still, language is rarely out of sight, for the simple 
reason that it looks both ways: backward to the meaning that 
it conveys and forward, as the proximate cause, to the effect 
being sought. There is no need to dwell here on the work 
done in the seventeenth century to purify and to temper the 
French language so that it would be capable of all kinds of 
eloquence, but the acceptance of the linguistic medium as 
distinctive and self-contained is noteworthy. Terms derived 
from the plastic arts or from music do not invade in any 
significant way the discussions of literature. In fact, several 
signs point in the opposite direction : it is argued that pictures 
must have their equivalents of the three unities; drawing and 
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color are for the Port-Royalists ways of illustrating the dis­
tinction between thought and figurative expression; Poussin 
studies Quintilian. 
2. According to the plan of the Academy, verbal disciplines 
—once the Dictionnaire was out of the way—would be ex­
pounded under the three headings of grammar, rhetoric, and 
poetics. Within this framework, however, they intended to 
give eloquence or rhetoric a special place. As the Remarques 
of Vaugelas show, it is the discipline into which grammar 
flows, so to speak, and out of which poetics arises as the re­
sources of language are used in a freer and richer way. The 
priority of rhetoric is even more marked in the theory of Rapin, 
where the field of belles-lettres is divided into eloquence 
proper, poetics, history, and philosophy. As is clear from the 
analyses given in the second chapter above, the first of these 
not only provides the basis for the others but many themes 
and devices characteristic of rhetoric turn up in the reflections 
assigned to the other disciplines. 
3. The subordination of poetics to rhetoric implies at once 
a certain attitude toward the audience, whether it is composed 
of readers or listeners or spectators. In a theory (such as that 
of Aristotle) where poetics has an independent status, the 
poet or writer works with the primary aim of bringing into 
being a concrete whole or a self-affirming object; that cre­
ation is the end of his labor, not what someone will think of 
what he has done. If the audience is in his mind, it is there as 
an indirect influence; and he tends to think of it in average 
or perhaps in ideal terms; it is not particularized. In a poetic 
theory that is polarized by rhetoric, however, the writer is 
concerned from the beginning with the effect on his readers 
or spectators, because success or failure with the members of 
that audience is an immediate sign of the value of his work. 
And he has to cope with his public as it is, here and now. 
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Corneille, Racine, and Molière knew this, as their critical 
writings make clear: although each of them had his own way 
of defending himself against this force majeure—withdrawal 
when one no longer had an effective rapport with it, appeal 
over its head to an elite or to an imaginary jury of ancients, 
appeal to Louis XIV or to the majority of the audience—each 
of them was conscious of writing for a small group of par­
ticular people, made up for the most part of well-to-do bour­
geois, real and would-be aristocrats, the king and his entour­
age. Moreover, in a more or less pure theory of poetics, the 
effect produced by a work depends on the unique combina­
tion of materials and form that it realizes; in other words, the 
effect inheres in the work. Where rhetoric tends to dominate 
thinking about poetry, the end of expression lies outside itself 
in persuasion, an event that takes place in the audience, not 
in the work. I should add that seventeenth-century poets do 
not often think of themselves as trying to persuade; however, 
they almost invariably associate their works with effects that 
in ancient times were taken to be secondary aims of the orator: 
delectare or conciliare, docere, and movere, which become 
plaire, instruire, and émouvoir. 
4. Beyond the idea of verbal discipline in general and the 
conception of rhetoric as the main verbal discipline, we may 
take note of more particular questions, such as those having to 
do with genres and rules. We all know that, to the strict 
seventeenth-century theorists at least, there is a nicely graded 
hierarchy from the epic to the epigram and that each of these 
has its requirements of action or thought or emotion and 
style. What we do not see so clearly is that these differenti­
ations in works are related to the other two factors involved in 
the rhetorical process: audience and author. The audience 
for an epic is not in the same state of mind or expectation as 
the audience for an epigram, nor is the audience for a comedy 
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identical, descriptively speaking, to that for a tragedy. We note 
comparable differences when we turn to eloquence in prose: 
there is l'éloquence de la chaire, l'éloquence du harreau, and 
the eloquence proper to the councils of the Prince (a feeble 
copy of the deliberative sort described by Aristotle and prac­
ticed by Cicero); and each of these has its particular audience. 
Again, poets are constantly being urged to consult their forces, 
to know themselves, to find the type of inspiration to which 
they are subject, and to study and practice the corresponding 
types of writing. My point is that the generic distinctions used 
by the seventeenth-century critics and writers may be ex­
plained in part, as they usually are, by reference to what 
Aristotle and Horace and their commentators had said and in 
part, no doubt, by the natural tendency of the human mind 
to see things as instances of types; but whatever their origin, 
they became enmeshed in the consequences of rhetorical 
principles and their precise meanings were fixed by the 
interrelations of artists, works, and audiences. 
It is at this point that the literary implications of these 
studies become clear. If it is true, as I have assumed, that many 
—even most—of the principal seventeenth-century authors 
sought to create for their own time a great literature, it is also 
true that they intended to do this without neglecting the 
claims of art and reason. They exemplify very well the defini­
tion of Valéry : each of them was to some degree, and usually 
to a high degree, a critic; while doing what he did, he wanted 
to know why he was doing it. I am suggesting that if we 
raise our eyes from the works and study the productive con­
ditions that surrounded them as they were being elaborated, 
we find ourselves facing, along with accidents (but how neces­
sary they are!) of circumstance and genius, an impressive 
ensemble of ideas. I have not presented it as a system, as a 
"classical doctrine," or as a list of rules. It has a certain shape, 
though the outlines are vague and the distinctions ambiguous; 
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and it has an objective existence. However, this ensemble is 
particularly interesting when we take into account its subjec­
tive aspect and its presence in the mind of the classical artist, 
for that is where it has an effective mode of being. There it 
forms the technical background against which he makes many 
of his choices. Placed from the beginning in the perspective 
of efficient causality, he sees himself as one who works en­
tirely or for the most part with words, not with words chosen 
for self-expression alone, nor with words used as the matter 
of an art object, but with words as part of a performance or a 
transaction. He writes for a public situation in which there 
will be a sequence of things done, said, known, and felt. As 
for the rules governing the game, since they now bear his 
mark and have become part of his creative power, he sees 
them as hints, vitally grasped, of possible plans and effects. 
He is aware of himself as free within limits. Although he did 
not invent the limits, he has chosen what his attitude toward 
them will be. For the most part he accepts them because of 
the challenges and promises that they hold out to him, but he 
knows that he may have to set himself new bounds beyond 
the old. 
In the adventures of rhetoric in seventeenth-century France, 
the historian of ideas and methods uncovers, therefore, the 
results of a persistent attempt to renew and rebuild one of the 
great intellectual techniques invented by the ancients, and to 
do so, furthermore, in the face of attacks from expert contro­
versialists for whom the future belonged to logic. The historian 
of literature finds in the documents principles of interest to 
him, for they make it possible for him to see in criticism now 
three centuries old signs of life and coherence instead of a 
curious taste for arbitrary pronouncements. It opens up to him, 
moreover, an important factor in some of the great creative 
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minds of the century. In several ways and degrees this rhe­
torical discipline was actualized in the energies of Pascal, 
Corneille, Racine, and Molière. That it played a part in their 
ways of stating and solving their problems is no doubt the 
surest testimony to its power and greatness; that some of their 
contemporaries misconceived and misapplied it should not 
cause us to undervalue its role, although their failures do make 
clear to us the essential misery of rhetoric, which is that it 
must always wait upon intelligence and inspiration. 
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10-11, 12, 54, 97; "Quintilien

français," 8, 9, i l ; Rapin, Bou­

hours, and, 9; Vaugelas and, 9

Paul, St., 130

Pellisson and d'Olivet, 9, 10, 11

Pensées of Pascal, 109, 118, 134-40,

170, 178; see also Pascal

Pertharite, 147

Phèdre, 141, 158, 160

Plaideurs, Les, 153, 157

Plato, 28, 46, 100, 101, 135

Plutarch, 46

Poetics of Aristotle, 33, 156, 174;

see also Aristotle

Polyeucte, 149, 151

Port-Royal and Port-Royalists, 57,

59, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 98,

106, 116, 132, 133, 170, 173; see

also Arnaud, Nicole; Logique

Pyrrhonians, 46

Quintilian, 13, 171; Bary, Le Gras,

and, 22, 54; beauty proper to

rhetoric, 79; conception of rhet­

oric, 65, 98; concern for audience

and bienséance, 114-15; concili­

are (or delectare~), docere, movere,

52-53> 75; contrasted with Port-

Royalists, 62-63, 75, 95-97, 101-2,

169; distinction among audiences,

50; on elocution, 62-63; emotion

and character in persuasion, 72,

75-76; "French Quintilian," 97

(see also Patru); grammar and

rhetoric, 102; Le Gras and, 14,

16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 54; order and

proofs, 94-97; on place of inven­

tion, 64; Rapin's reworking of,

29; universality of rhetoric as

method, 101; Vaugelas and, 7-9; 
view of the end of rhetoric, 52

Racine: attitude toward taste of age,

153; compared as to conception

of audience with Corneille and

Molière, 165-67; comparison of

Parisian and Athenian audiences,

154; conception of audience, 152­

61; God as Spectator, 159; Lon­

ginus and, 158; pleasing and mov­

ing as aims, 152; prefaces of, 141­

42; rhetoric, poetics, and, 159-61;

rhetorical approach to literature

and, 143-44, l7l> l7&\ rules and,

!52, 155; tendency to idealize

audience, 154, 156—58; his view

of tragic subjects, 161-62

Rapin: aims of eloquence, 52-53;

aims of history, 39-40; aims of

poetry, 34~35; Aristotle, Horace,

and, 33-34; art as taste, 32-33;

art in eloquence, 31, 32-33; art

in history, 44; art in philosophy,

49-50; art in poetry, 37-39; audi­

ence for eloquence, 31, 50-52;

audience for history, 40, 41; audi­

ence in philosophy, 44—45, 46—48;

belles-lettres and, 28-29; biensé­

ance and, 31, 33, 38, 48; Cicero

and, 29-30, 40; delectare, docere,

movere, 52-53; distinction of

nature and art, 30-32; on elo­

quence, 29-32; on history, 39-44;

nature of the historian, 39, 41,

42-43; nature of the orator, 31;

nature of the philosopher, 45-46;

nature of the poet, 36-37, 51; on

philosophy, 44-50; philosophy and

religion, 48; philosophy as prin­

ciples of savoir vivre, 45, 48; on

poetry, 33-39; problem of rhetoric

and, 6, 17, 23, 24, 27-28, 97

105, 169, 170; sectes in phil

ophy, 46-47; simplification of rhet­

oric, 28—29; subject matter in

eloquence, 31; subject matter in

history, 41-42; subject matter in

philosophy, 47-48; subject matter

in poetry, 35-36

Reginaldus, 125

Rhetoric of Aristotle, 91; see also

Aristotle

Richelieu, Cardinal, 3
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Suite du menteur, La, 149 
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Suréna, 149 
Tacitus, 42, 151 
Tartuffe, 141, 163, 164 
Terence, 148, 155 
Themistius, 46 
Théodore, 149 
Thomas, St., 130, 132, 133 
Thucydides, 28, 40, 45 
Valéry, 171, 176 
Varro, 46 
Vaugelas: cited in the Logique, 76­
77; grammar, rhetoric, and, 6-9, 
24, 54 76; Patru and, 9, io; 
Quintilian and, 7-8; Quintilien 
français" and, 8, 76 
Virgil, 28, 60, 98, 158 
Vossius, 14 
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